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Why Do Nominally Democratic Legislatures Enhance Authoritarianism? 





Recent scholarship on the role of parliaments in political development reveals two 
findings which seem contradictory, at least on the surface.  On the one hand, Steven M. Fish 
shows that Eastern European countries whose parliaments enjoyed stronger constitutional 
prerogatives at independence were more likely, controlling for starting level of democracy and 
other factors, to be electoral democracies or liberal democracies by 2000.1  This finding 
emphasizes the importance of legislatures for establishing horizontal and vertical control at 
political transition and preventing regime backsliding into a system with a strong and 
unaccountable executive branch of government.2   
But nominally democratic parliaments, when they are constrained by the executive 
branch of government, may not always increase the likelihood of democratic transition and 
survival.  Instead, they may have the opposite effect.  Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski 
show that authoritarian regimes which maintained legislatures enjoyed longer tenures than those
                                                     
1 Steven M. Fish, "Creative Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the Electoral Arena?" in 
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 
2 See Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).: 70. 
 2  
without such institutions.3  The authors offer an elite-level explanation for this pattern, arguing 
that autocratic institutions lengthen regime tenure because they reduce internal threats to rule by 
coopting opposition elites and bringing them into the regime.     
Why do partisan legislatures lengthen the tenure of authoritarian regimes?  I agree with 
Ellen Lust-Okar who writes that a fully convincing answer is not yet well established.4  While 
authoritarian regimes are skilled at the creation of a political class and the cooptation of parties, 
and in this sense Gandhi and Przeworski’s logic is plausible and even convincing, their 
explanation neglects mass-level dynamics.  Further, it fails to address why members of 
parliament accept this outcome (i.e. why cooptation is an outcome within the winset of both 
incumbent and opposition elites) and why ordinary citizens accept weak legislative institutions 
(i.e. why ordinary citizens do not contest for stronger legislatures).   
In order to begin to shed light on this larger puzzle, I investigate how institutions 
influence member behavior and how the deputy-citizen link shapes constituent attitudes toward 
the parliament.  I argue that mass political attitudes are an important but neglected part of a causal 
story which accounts for the empirical regularity identified by Gandhi and Przeworski.   
My analysis unfolds in three parts.  First, I argue that representation is a mechanism of 
cooptation occurring as members bargain for reelection in multiple--incumbent and mass--arenas.  
I investigate how incumbent preferences, which vary by regime type, shape legislative institutions 
and, in turn, how these institutions influence the level of and relationship between participation in 
debate and provision of casework.  The findings demonstrate that parliamentary institutions vary 
within a class of authoritarian regimes and shape members’ provision of programmatic and 
particularistic benefits. 
Second, I contend that incumbent preferences for debate in Morocco create an 
institutional opening for opposition elites, in this case Islamist deputies, to more fully develop 
party-focused strategies and programmatic benefits than their counterparts in Algeria.  I evaluate 
competing explanations for understanding why Moroccan Islamist deputies are more likely to 
perceive incentives to cultivate a party reputation than are members of other parties and why they 
are more likely to participate in committee debate, but no more or less likely to have higher 
caseloads.  Algerian Islamist deputies do not differ from other parties on these outcomes.  These 
findings demonstrate that variation exists in the activities of members in authoritarian settings and 
                                                     
3 Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," 
Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 11 (2007). 




run counter to conventional wisdom which suggests that Islamist parties gain popular support 
through service provision.5  
Third, I argue that incumbent strategies to engineer loyal parliaments have implications 
for public opinion.  I suggest that limited popular support for a strong legislature may serve as a 
contextual factor affecting the size of the winset in future rounds of bargaining over constitutional 
prerogatives of the legislative vis-à-vis the executive branch.  I investigate the effects of casework 
on public opinion and find that it does not enhance constituent support for a parliament with the 
power to make laws.  Rather, perceptions that elections are free and that the work of deputies is 
transparent and effective are related to greater support for a strong parliament.  This conclusion 
has implications for understanding why nominally-democratic legislatures enhance authoritarian 
rule.   
 
Institutionalism and the Study of Authoritarian Politics 
 
The slowing of the third wave of democratization has led to increased scholarly attention 
on the dynamics of non-democratic political settings.  This project seeks to address and extend 
two relatively neglected areas of this literature by focusing on the dynamics of formal institutions 
and on the relationship between elite-level bargaining and public opinion. 
 
The Dynamics of Formal Institutions 
 
Although it is non-controversial that the institutions of authoritarian politics should be 
studied with rigorous empirical methods, there is limited work examining the processes by which 
formal institutions, including parliaments, operate.6  References to legislatures figure centrally in 
nearly all of the country cases in Political Liberalization in the Arab World and have been the 
subject of a seminal work, Arab Legislatures.  However, few systematic studies investigate cross-
national or sub-national variation in the dynamics of legislative institutions, the activities of 
members, and the attitudes of ordinary citizens toward the legislature.7  The reoccurrence of the 
                                                     
5 See, for example, Augustus Richard Norton, "Hizballah: From Radicalism to Pragmatism?" Middle East 
Policy 5, no. 4 (1998). 
6 Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
7 Abdo  Baaklini, Guilain  Denoeux, and Robert Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The 
Resurgence of Democratic Institutions (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), Bahgat Korany and Saad Amrani, 
"Explosive Civil Society and Democratization from Below: Algeria," in Political Liberalization & 
Democratization in the Arab World, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998).  For examples of work on MENA region parliaments or councils, see: Kim et al. (1984) on 
Turkey, Korea, and Kenya; Baaklini et al. (1999) on Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Yemen, and 
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“weak-legislature conclusion” in some comparative politics literature suggests that conventional 
wisdom, perhaps until very recently, reflected the view that formal institutions and institutional 
dynamics in non-democratic political settings are a black box of idiosyncratic and personalized 
processes ill-suited to study with the tools of modern political science.8   
In this project, I consider differences in the level of participation in debate and provision 
of casework among Moroccan and Algerian members and investigate how the preferences of 
incumbents, which vary by regime type, account for these differences.   
 
Public Opinion toward Parliaments 
 
Second, studies of authoritarian institutions focus on how institutions, particularly 
electoral institutions, are shaped by elite-level bargaining.  This literature misses other ways 
institutions matter.  In particular, it neglects the reasons authoritarian governments implement the 
“trappings” of democracy in the first place, among them the effects of parliaments on the public’s 
image of the regime.9   
In this project, I examine why citizens hold different opinions about the importance of 
having a legislature with strong prerogatives and test whether the representative link shapes these 
orientations.  I ask whether the provision of casework—which the data suggest is one of the 
parliament’s most robust functions--influences popular support for democratic political 
institutions and report on the practical significance of these findings for legislative strengthening 
programs.   
 
Why Have Dynamics of Legislatures under Authoritarianism Been Missed? 
 
Why have elite and mass dynamics of legislatures in authoritarian settings been missed?  
In the past, misconceptions about authoritarian legislatures have probably been the most 
important contributors to the lack of research.  These include the belief that authoritarian 
legislatures are remnants of colonialism, that the dynamics of legislatures are irrational or 
                                                                                                                                                              
Egypt; Weinbaum (1975) on Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan; Al-Haj (2001) on Oman; Saif (2001) on 
Yemen; and, Baaklini (1978) on Kuwait.   
8 Michael L. Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World," in Handbook of Legislative 
Research, ed. Samuel C. Patterson, Gerhard Loewenberg, and Malcolm E. Jewell (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1985).: 734. 
9 See Marshall and Jaggers, as cited in Andreas Schedler, "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism," in 
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2006).:12.   
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idiosyncratic, or that parliaments are merely “window-dressing” and do not have important 
political outcomes.10   
The view that authoritarian legislatures are “window-dressing” is being replaced by new 
work showing that parliaments have important political consequences.11  Yet, as I also mentioned, 
our understanding of why this is the case is hindered by a lack of cross-national and sub-national 
data informing how authoritarian institutions operate.  In contrast to scholarship in consolidated 
democracies, where the processes of formal and informal institutions are a major domain of 
inquiry and are analyzed as both dependent and independent variables, scholarship on “weak” 
authoritarian legislatures is rare, and that which exists is largely descriptive.12   
Finally, practical concerns may have contributed to the dearth of studies on formal 
institutions, particularly those examining variation in legislative behavior and its relationship to 
the attitudes of constituents.  Studies of the dynamics of political institutions require extensive 
time and resources, particularly when large-scale data collection among members and citizens is 
required.  Perceived, and in some cases actual, barriers to political institutions in authoritarian 
regimes have undoubtedly prevented scholars from undertaking the type of research that has been 
conducted on national legislatures, such as the Congress, for a half-century or more.13  The data 
collection efforts associated with this present study demonstrates that such work is possible even 




In order to address these gaps, I investigate three sets of questions in the primary 
empirical chapters 4, 5, and 6.   
 
                                                     
10 Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of 
Democratic Institutions.: Chapter 1. 
11 Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." 
12 See, for example, Ahmed A. Saif, A Legislature in Transition: The Yemeni Parliament (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2001). 
13 Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The 
Resurgence of Democratic Institutions (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), Baaklini, Denoeux, and 





First, why do parliaments—“democracy’s premier institution”--exist in authoritarian 
regimes?14  If they do not legislate independently or control the executive, what role do they play?  
Why does cooptation of members of parliament work?  McGuire and Olson suggest that the 
outcome of cooptation makes both incumbent and opposition elites better off.15  But why should 
this be the case?  If opposition elites wish to govern, why would they cooperate or acquiesce in 
exchange for limited policy concessions? 
In Chapter 4 I argue that members’ choice of representative activities is a form of 
bargaining in multiple arenas.  I suggest that understanding how members simultaneously 
consider the preferences of regime power-holders and constituents allows us to better understand 
why cooptation of parliamentary elites occurs.  I argue that cooptation occurs as members make 
strategic choices among two goods—legislative responsiveness and constituency 
responsiveness—in order to maximize the probability of re-election.  Members must consider 
payoffs in two arenas: (1) regime power-holders, who exert influence over electoral structuring 
and access to patronage, and (2) constituents, whose support the member must mobilize in order 
to enhance the probability of being elected.  I argue that, given preferences of regime power-
holders for a weak legislature, members must acquiesce on legislative responsiveness to acquire 
resources to provide constituency responsiveness--the primary support-generating preference of 
constituencies.  This acquiescence constitutes the mechanism of cooptation, but I suggest that it 
amplified by mass-level political preferences for constituency service.  I show that incumbent 
preferences for level of debate and casework capacity vary in the two countries and explain why 
Moroccan deputies are more likely than Algerian deputies to have higher caseloads and to engage 
more frequently in parliamentary debate.  These results deepen our understanding of how and 




Second, if authoritarian legislatures exist to provide privileges for cooperation to 
potential political competitors (i.e. if members are coopted), why do many legislators go to their 
districts and provide constituency service?  Why do they vary from one another in the types and 
                                                     
14 Quote taken from Yun-Han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin, "How People View Democracy: 
Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan," Journal of Democracy 12, no. 1 (2001).: 131, emphasis mine. 
15 Martin C. McGuire and Mancur Olson, Jr., "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The 
Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature 34 (1996). 
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level of services they provide to their constituents?  How are incentives to cultivate a personal 
vote and actual caseloads explained by institutional variation and other systematic factors? 
In an analysis of data relevant to these questions, I find three puzzling empirical 
regularities.  First, comparative institutions literature suggests that closed-list proportional 
representation (PR) systems limit incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide 
casework.  Although we do not have a clear baseline from other authoritarian country cases, we 
observe levels of personal reputation-seeking behavior among members of parliament in Morocco 
and Algeria which appear high.  Further, conventional wisdom suggests that more inclusive party 
list selectorates should encourage personal reputation-seeking activities.  Yet deputies from 
Islamist parties, whose party list selection procedure is more inclusive than that of other parties, 
perceive greater incentives to cultivate a party reputation than their non-Islamist counterparts. 
In Chapter 5 I address these surprising patterns by suggesting that parliamentary 
institutions have “mechanical” and “psychological” effects on members’ perceptions of 
incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework.  I argue that the higher level 
of centrality of the Moroccan parliament provides an institutional opening which affects the 
strategies of opposition elites, in this case Islamist deputies, in Morocco differently from in 
Algeria, where such an opening does not exist.  These results inform work on the strategies of 




Finally, why do constituents vary in their support for democracy and strong democratic 
institutions?  Does constituency service improve support for a strong parliament with the power 
to make laws?  Is casework a form of representation which enhances popular demand for 
democracy?  Does casework, even if it is particularistic at best and clientalistic at worst, enhance 
support for having a legislature with stronger prerogatives vis-à-vis the executive?   
Most literature examining public opinion toward democracy in authoritarian regimes 
focuses on demographic, religious, and political economic determinants of support in the Arab 
world.  However, research from other world regions suggests that citizens’ evaluations of how 
well institutions deliver on human rights, freedom, and transparency is a strong predictor of 
support for democracy and democratic institutions.  The data suggest that while members shape 
the attitudes of ordinary citizens, casework is not a form of representation which enhances 
support for having a strong legislature.  I argue that this result adds to our understanding of how 
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mass-level dynamics are linked to elite-level bargaining and why nominally democratic 
legislatures are associated with longer regime tenure. 
 
A Conceptual Map of Legislative Politics in Multiple Arenas 
 
To organize my analysis of data relevant to these three sets of questions, I develop a 
conceptual map of legislative politics comprised of three arenas of political activity and three 
links or relationships between these arenas (See Figure I. 1.).  The framework I propose serves 
two functions.  First, it highlights two arenas of political activity—the members’ representative 
behaviors and mass political opinion—which are missing from Gandhi and Przeworski’s 
explanation but which are integral to understanding the empirical regularity they identify.  The 
conceptual map further illustrates how the three arenas of political activity (Levels I, II, and III) 
are related to one another (Links I, II, and III).   
Second, the map provides an organizational structure within which analyses of political 
dynamics at each of the three levels fit.  Taken together, the six components of the conceptual 
map sketch a broader argument about how mass and elite-level dynamics are connected, or, more 
specifically, how the nested game of institutional design and bargaining over the substantive 
outcome of elections occurs in multiple arenas and may affect regime tenure.  Within the scope of 
this project and with the available data, I do not test this broader argument.  Rather, I make a 
series of micro-level casual arguments about political dynamics within each of the three arenas 
and intend for the framework to encourage future work on the significance of institutional 
dynamics for regime survival and breakdown. 
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The conceptual map is comprised of three arenas of political activity: political 
institutions, representatives’ activities, and public opinion.  In each of Chapter 4, 5, and 6, I 















Link I: Parliamentary 
Institutions Create 
Incentives which 
Shape Caseload and 
Participation in Debate 
(Chapters 4 & 5) 
 
Link II: 
Provision of Programmatic 
and Particularistic Benefits 
Shape Representative Link 
(Chapter 5 & 6) 
 
Link III: Popular Public 
Opinion Affects Size of 
Winset and Outcome of 







Arena 1: Parliamentary Institutions (Chapter 4) 
 
The first level or arena of political activity is parliamentary institutions.  In Chapter 4 I 
examine how institutions are shaped by incumbent preferences and affect the dynamics of 
parliamentary politics.   
Parliamentary institutions include both formal rules and informal norms.16  In this project 
I focus on three types of formal laws and rules.  These formal institutions structure: (1) 
Legislative elections (Who will be elected and how?), (2) The internal functioning of the 
parliament (How will members conduct themselves?), and, (3) The external linkages of the 
parliament to other government entities (What powers will the legislature have vis-à-vis the 
executive branch of government and the bureaucracy?).  Formal institutions and rules are 
contained in legal texts, principally the constitution; organic laws governing parliamentary 
functioning (e.g. “Règlement Intérieur de l’Assemblée Popular Nationale”, Algeria); and organic 
laws governing elections and party organization (e.g. “Loi n° 36-04 relative aux parties 
politiques”, Morocco, and “Order Enacting an Organic Law Governing the Electoral System”, 
Algeria).  In Chapter 4, for example, I identify constitutional rules which determine whether 
members are allowed to hold a second public or private function; these rules vary by country and 
help explain differences in caseload. 
 
Arena 2: Representative Behavior (Chapter 5) 
 
The second arena of political activity is members’ representative activities.  In Chapter 5, 
and to an extent in Chapter 4, I explain how representative behavior is shaped by opportunities 
and constraints created by institutions and other characteristics of members and their districts.  I 
use a four-part understanding of representation discussed in Chapter 3.  Generally, by 
representatives’ activities I mean casework (i.e. helping citizens solve problems, including 
problems related to government bureaucracy); participation in debate in parliament; district 
projects; and communication with constituents.  Chapter 3 discusses the tension associated with 
studying the behavior of members in authoritarian institutions as representation.   
 
                                                     
16 March and Olsen define formal institutions as “relatively stable collection[s] of practices and rules 
defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations”.  James G. March and 
Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political 
Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984).: 948.  
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Arena 3: Public Opinion (Chapter 6) 
 
The third arena or level in the map is public opinion.  In Chapter 6 I investigate how 
popular support for a parliament with the power to make laws is formed.  Principally, I examine 
items in the survey which measure whether constituents want their country to have a parliament 
and, if they do, whether the parliament should have the power to make laws or should simply 




 The links in the conceptual map reflect my best guess about the broader relationships 
among the levels.  Although I test micro-level hypotheses within each arena of political activity, I 
do not test the relationships represented by the links.   
 
Link I (Chapter 4) 
 
In analyses corresponding to Level I, I investigate how incumbent preferences for 
capacity and level of debate correspond to particular institutional rules and, in turn, how these 
rules affect the level and combination of representative goods members choose.  I assume that 
parliamentary institutions are the outcomes of elite-level bargaining and that they create 
opportunities and constraints which shape the extent to which members participate in debate and 
provide casework.  The data show that both Moroccan and Algerian members provide 
programmatic benefits within parameters defined by incumbents.  However, because incumbent 
preferences for level of debate differ by regime type, provision of programmatic benefits reduces 
members’ ability to provide particularistic benefits in Algeria, but enhances it in Morocco.  This 
relationship adds detail to our understanding of how and why cooptation of parliamentary elites 
occurs and demonstrates that the dynamics of cooptation vary systematically in two cases with 
distinct regime types.   
 
Link II (Chapter 5) 
 
In analyses corresponding to Level II, I test how incentives to cultivate a personal or 
party reputation, as well as participation in debate and provision of casework, are influenced by 
both institutional and non-institutional factors.  The evidence suggests that all members may 
 
12 
participate in debate and provide casework, but that opposition members in Morocco perceive 
stronger incentives to foster a party reputation and to provide programmatic benefits than their 
non-Islamist counterparts in response to the greater institutional opening in Morocco.  To 
illustrate the broader significance of this finding, I argue that the provision of programmatic and 
particularistic benefits shapes the quality of the representative link members establish (or fail to 
establish) with constituents.  I suggest that this relationship enhances our understanding of how 
Islamist and other opposition groups adopt different strategies to maximize electoral outcomes 
given variation in the institutional structures and rules of the game.   
 
Link III (Chapter 6) 
 
In analyses corresponding to Level III, I test whether casework provision and different 
forms of contact between members and citizens enhance support for having a parliament with the 
power to make laws.  The data suggest that a link exists, but that perceptions of transparency and 
effectiveness among members and institutions, not provision of particularistic benefits, improves 
support for a strong parliament.  Link III reflects an argument about the broader significance of 
these findings for future rounds of elite-level bargaining.  Depressed public support for a strong 
parliament is, in a sense, the final link in a cycle of authoritarian governance in which depressed 
popular support for a strong parliament affects the size of the winset between incumbent and 
opposition elites in future rounds of bargaining over constitutional prerogatives of the legislature 
vis-à-vis the executive.  I suggest that these results add detail to our understanding of why 
constituents in political systems with coopted parliaments do not overwhelmingly support robust 
parliamentary powers and how these conditions may contribute to longer regime tenures.     
  
Legislators as Links 
 
Previous work on legislatures in developed democracies seeks to explain why legislative 
institutions evolve, why legislators engage in particular representative activities (e.g. casework), 
and why these practices affect, or fail to affect, public opinion and voting behavior.  In some 
cases, research makes explicit how two of these arenas of political activity —institutions, 
representative behaviors, and public opinion—are inter-related and affect larger, more significant 
matters such as political development, representation, and accountability.  Few, if any, studies 
link dynamics in all three arenas, however. 
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Here I highlight insights from two bodies of literature.  The first links legislatures with 
political development, suggesting that the legislative strengthening is a core process of 
democratic consolidation;17 that the strength of legislative prerogatives at transition is an 
important factor in democratic survivability;18 and that mass perceptions of the transparency of 
legislative elections is a factor affecting whether transition to democratic governance occurs.19  A 
second group of studies suggests that members of parliament shape attitudes of ordinary citizens 
about institutions.  This project seeks to integrate and extend these insights. 
 
Legislatures and Political Development 
 
Although modernization theory held a central place in studies of democratization for 
some time, Samuel P. Huntington first conceptualized political development as 
institutionalization in a 1965 article, “Political Development and Political Decay”.20  In his later 
work, Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington developed further the notion that 
political development is characterized by “subprocesses”--differentiation, equality, participation, 
capacity, and institutionalization—and not by preconditions, spawned numerous fruitful research 
programs.21  Although Huntington did not explicitly examine legislatures, his ideas contributed to 
a literature from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s which theorized about the process of legislative 
institutionalization.22     
                                                     
17 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1968). 
18 Steven M. Fish, "Creative Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the Electoral Arena?" in 
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 
19 Michael Herb, "Princes, Parliaments, and the Prospects for Democracy in the Gulf," in Authoritarianism 
in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). 
20 Karen L. Remmer, "Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development: The Resurgence of Institutional 
Analysis," World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997). 
21 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.  See, for example, Diamond, Developing Democracy: 
Toward Consolidation.: 93.  In a book devoted to understanding problems of democratic consolidation, 
Diamond also identifies three processes of democratization—democratic deepening, legitimation and 
institutionalization.  Institutionalization refers to the strengthening the state administrative apparatus, the 
institutions of representation, and the structure that ensure horizontal accountability, justice, and the rule of 
law.  While Diamond identifies legislatures and their development as core to the process of democratic 
consolidation, he does not extensively reference empirical studies which test how this occurs.   
22 Richard Sisson defines institutionalization as “the creation and persistence of valued rules, procedures, 
and patterns of behavior that enable the successful accommodation of new configurations of political 
claimants and/or demands within a given organization whether it be a party, a legislature, or a state”.  
Richard Sisson, "Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation," in Legislatures 
in Comparative Perspective, ed. Allan Kornberg (New York: David McKay Company, 1973).   
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Legislators and Legislative Strengthening 
 
Four theories have been posited for how legislative institutionalization occurs.23  First, 
Fred Riggs, Richard Sisson, and Marvin G. Weinbaum argue that changes in the salience or 
viability of the legislature result from external forces out of the control of the legislature.24  
Examples include an abrupt expansion of contraction in executive powers, a radical modification 
in the configuration of parliamentary parties, a revision in formal constitutional procedures, a 
change in societal norms regarding the legislature, or a change in the level of support accorded to 
the legislature by attentive publics.   
Second, changes in the internal capacity of a legislature—increases in “resources and 
expertise that will allow it to perform the functions to which it theoretically is entitled”--could 
improve its independent role in policymaking.25  Abdo I. Baaklini and James J. Heaphey 
examined legislative reforms in Brazil, which they say focused on efficiency, not political 
oriented reforms, and therefore lead to increased salience of the parliament.26  R. B. Jain showed 
that reforms in the Indian Lok Sabha ensured the effective utilization of time, improved the 
committee system, increased the institution’s legislative oversight capacity, and improved the 
effectiveness of individual members of parliament.27   
Two final causes are of particular interest to the present study.  In several essays in 
Comparative Legislative Reforms and Innovations, Baaklini and Heaphey argued that members of 
parliament are important agents in the promoting of legislative viability, durability, 
institutionalization, and salience of the legislature.28  According to Kim, Barkan, Turan, and 
Jewell, “[f]or legislative institutionalization to occur, the activities of the legislature must be 
valued both by the legislature’s own members and by those external to the organization, in this 
instance, members of the public, members of locally based elites, and those members of the 
nation’s ruling elite who determine what the substance of legislative activity shall be”.29  For 
                                                     
23 Ibid.: 19. 
24 Fred Riggs, "Legislative Structures: Some Thoughts on Elected National Assemblies," in Legislatures in 
Comparative Perspective, ed. Allan Kornberg (New York: David McKay Company, 1973), Sisson, 
"Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation.", Robert Weinbaum, in 
Comparative Legislatures, ed. Michael L. Mezey (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979). 
25 Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of 
Democratic Institutions.: 63. 
26 Abdo I. Baaklini and James J. Heaphey, Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and 
Lebanon (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976). 
27 See R. B. Jain in Abdo I. Baaklini and James J. Heaphey, eds., Comparative Legislative Reforms and 
Innovations (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1977). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Chong Lim Kim, Joel D. Barkan, Ilter Turan, and Malcolm E. Jewell, The Legislative Connection: The 
Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey (Durham: Duke University Press, 1983).: 12. 
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these authors, members, by their role in shaping the beliefs of constituents about the importance 
of having a strong, autonomous parliament, are crucial to understanding why legislatures remain 
weak.     
 
The Representative Link and Mass Political Attitudes 
 
A number of studies suggest that legislators serve as unique and consequential links 
between the formal institution of the parliament and the constituents they are constitutionally 
mandated to represent.  Through the 1960s and 1970s, the legislative institutionalization literature 
was concerned with understanding this unique function of legislators in linking the national 
government and local population in a geographical constituency.  In Legislative Connections, for 
example, Chong Lim Kim, Joel D. Barkan, Ilter Turan, and Malcolm E. Jewell argue that 
members of legislatures in Kenya, Turkey, and South Korea link citizens in the periphery with a 
single, centralized state.30  Other studies viewed members of national legislatures as the ideal and 
only intermediary between citizens and national policy elites which served to integrate diverse 
regions and ethnic group and mobilize support for national public policy.31  Robert Weinbaum 
observed that legislators build confidence in the government and strengthen a sense of political 
identity based increasingly on geographic representation and less on sect, clan, or other 
allegiances.  He writes: 
 
Individual legislators, regardless of their performances as lawmakers . . . are customarily 
unsurpassed for their effectiveness as middlemen.  Typically, no other set of national 
actors has a better defined clientele and few are perceived as more accessible or 
legitimate ombudsmen . . . Their interventions are no less consequential, however, 
because they do not regularly raise issues of broad pubic policy.  For the activities of 
elected representatives that help satisfy even unmomentous demands cannot be 
negligible where, as in much of the Middle East, central governments remain remote and 
suspect for large segments of the population.  Any routinization of communications with 
national administrators that brings familiarity and increases trust becomes a suitable, if 
necessary gradual, means of loosing deep-rooted parochial and sectarian allegiances.32  
 
                                                     
30 Ibid. 
31 Michael L. Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World," in Handbook of Legislative 
Research, ed. Samuel C. Patterson Gerhard Loewenberg, Malcolm E. Jewell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985). 
32 Marvin G. Weinbaum, in Legislatures in Plural Societies: The Search for Cohesion in National 
Development, ed. Albert F. Eldridge (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977).: 96. 
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These early studies suggested that legislators act as a link between government 
institutions and ordinary citizens.  Several decades later, work on democratization again turned to 
the ways that formal institutions shape the attitudes and orientations of constituents.   
 
Institutions and Support for Democracy in Consolidating Democracies 
 
Evidence from Latin America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia suggests the importance of 
perceptions of institutional performance in understanding support for democracy.  In Korea, Doh 
Chull Shin and Peter McDonough find that a scale measure of perceived level of democracy and 
the level of satisfaction with the way democracy is working are the most salient predictors of 
support for the legitimacy of democracy.33  Ji-Young Kim finds in Korea that perceptions of poor 
institutional performance, especially corruption, lower the likelihood of voting and levels of trust 
in democratic institutions.34  In this connection, Shin and McDonough find among Koreans that 
the belief that the government affects respondents as individuals is particularly salient in their 
evaluations of democratic institutions.35   
Similarly, evidence from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America demonstrates that 
legitimacy of democracy is threatened by the inability of many states to build institutions which 
safeguard liberty, transparency, and rule of law.  Richard Rose, William Mishler, Christian 
Haerpfer find in Central and Eastern Europe that evaluations of the former regime vis-à-vis 
perceptions of freedom in the current regime are central to predicting why citizens view 
democracy as the most legitimate form of governance.36  In particular, views about corruption—
perceptions that privileged ties to the state unfairly benefit a narrow capitalist elite--are associated 
with lower support for democracy.37   
In Developing Democracy, Larry Diamond summarizes the findings of studies examining 
the impact of institutional performance on constituents’ beliefs about the most appropriate 
political regime for their country.  He writes, “[s]upport of democracy is not strongly correlated 
with perceptions of systemic efficiency or satisfaction with near-term performance, but rather 
with the political performance of the system, or how well it delivers on promises of freedom and 
                                                     
33 Doh Chull Shin and Peter McDonough, "The Dynamics of Popular Reactions to Democratization in 
Korea," Journal of Public Policy 19, no. 1 (1999). 
34 Ji-Young Kim, ""Bowling Together" Isn't a Cure-All: The Relationship between Social Capital and 
Political Trust in South Korea," International Political Science Review 26, no. 2 (2005). 
35 Shin and McDonough, "The Dynamics of Popular Reactions to Democratization in Korea." 
36 Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding 
Post-Communist Societies (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers, 1998). 
37 Judith S. Kullberg and William Zimmerman, "Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, and Problems of Russian 
Democracy," World Politics 51, no. 3 (1999). 
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democracy.”  In his words, “. . . beliefs about the legitimacy of democracy are shaped more by 
political than economic performance and, in fact, have many causal sources, some of which do 
not relate to performance of the system at all”.38   These insights suggest the need to test not only 
the role of perceptions of how institutions are providing reform in shaping support for democracy 
but also how direct interaction between institutions are citizens in the formation of these crucial 
beliefs and attitudes.   
 
Studies of Popular Attitudes toward Democracy in Authoritarian Contexts 
 
Scholars analyzing survey data from authoritarian political settings, mainly Arab 
countries, have recently been concerned with dispelling stereotypes that cultural and religious 
factors best explained why support of democracy was not unequivocal and widespread in Arab 
countries. 39  Analyses of these data, thus, set out to address notions that deterministic cultural 
background induces Middle Eastern peoples to accept patrimonial leaders or to maintain tribalism 
which is at odds with citizenship in a democratic state, or that Islam is incompatible with 
democracy and therefore Muslim-majority nations are unlikely or unable to transition to 
democracy.40  The results of a number of analyses of public opinion data suggest that rather than 
religious factors, political economic and country-specific events are among the most important 
explanatory variables for unconstrained support of democracy among ordinary citizens in Arab 
countries.41    
While this literature demonstrated the extent of support for democracy in the Arab world 
and the role of demographic, cultural and religious, political economy, and country-specific 
factors in shaping support for democracy, it neglected the ways in which institutions shape these 
evaluations.  This literature has not yet fully incorporated insights from other world regions about 
the importance of evaluations of parliaments and parties, as well as political outputs of 
democracy, in explaining variation in individual beliefs in the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions.  Interactions with members of parliaments are absent from all present studies of 
popular support for democracy in authoritarian political settings.   
                                                     
38 Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation.: 200. 
39 See, for example, Jill Crystal, "Authoritarianism in the Arab World," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1994).   
40 Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988).  Moataz A. Fattah, Democratic Values in the Muslim World (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2006). 
41 See, for example, Mark Tessler, "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious 
Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries," Comparative Politics 34 (2002), 
Mark and Lindsay Benstead Tessler, "Why Are Some Ordinary Citizens in Partly-Free Countries 'Security 





 This project seeks to integrate these insights about the role of legislators as links between 
elite and mass-level dynamics and to build upon debates and questions within three additional 
literatures.  These include literatures on authoritarian politics, institutions, and democratization.  
The project should also provide insights about how to understand competing notions of 
representation and clientelism in non-democratic political settings and questions about the role 
and strategies of Islamist parties in parliamentary politics.   
 
Authoritarian Politics Literature 
 
The dynamics of institutions in authoritarian political contexts were, until recently, the 
focus of only a relatively small number of studies.42  The end of the third wave of 
democratization in the 1990s proved to be a watershed, however, as scholars sought to understand 
the diversity of regimes emerging from failed democratic transitions.43  The literature forms 
several interconnected strands and focuses extensively on how electoral institutions are shaped by 
elite-level bargaining.44  The first area of this literature seeks to define authoritarianism and create 
typologies of non-democratic regimes.45   
A second theme concerns how institutions shape and are shaped by political bargaining 
between incumbent and opposition elites and how, under conditions of power imbalance, these 
institutions strengthen regimes’ hold on power.46  Bargaining leads to outcomes such as particular 
electoral systems and differences in state-society relationships which have consequences for elite 
political participation, according to Ellen Lust-Okar.47  Lust-Okar’s work shows how regimes use 
institutional rules to create and maintain different relationships between the regime and 
                                                     
42 See, for example, Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié, ed., Elections without Choice (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978). 
43 Peter Burnell creates a typology of democratic failures and a list of the general approaches scholars have 
taken to explain these approaches.  Bruce Burnell, "Arrivals and Departures: A Preliminary Classification 
of Democratic Failures and Their Explanation," Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 36, no. 3 (1998). 
44 See, for example, Marsha Pripstein Posusney, "Multiparty Elections in the Arab World: Elections Rules 
and Opposition Responses," in Authoriarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance, ed. Marsha 
Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist (Boudler: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). 
45 See, for example, Larry Diamond, "Elections without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," 
Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2001).    
46 See, for example,Posusney, "Multiparty Elections in the Arab World: Elections Rules and Opposition 
Responses."  Ellen  Lust-Okar and Amaney Ahmed Jamal, "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of 
Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation," Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 3 (2002). 
47 Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World. 
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opposition groups and between opponents themselves, which she calls divided or unified 
structures of contestation.     
A third, smaller area focuses on how institutions structure mass political participation.  
Mona El-Ghobashy demonstrates how administrative litigation in Egypt allows news forms of 
expressive participation under authoritarianism.48 
The authoritarian politics literature aims to elucidate how authoritarian politics operates, 
but has thus far been primarily concerned with the foundational work of defining and creating 
typologies of non-democratic regimes and by examining how elite-level bargaining is shaped by 
and shapes electoral institutions.  This project extends the authoritarian politics literature by 
focusing on parliaments as an arena of contestation with important consequences for mass 
political attitudes.    
 
Legislative Politics under Electoral Authoritarianism 
 
 I take as a reference a typology developed by Larry Diamond which classes 
contemporary political systems in six types: (1) liberal democracy, (2) electoral democracy, (3) 
ambiguous regimes, (4) competitive authoritarian, (5) hegemonic electoral authoritarian, and (6) 
politically closed authoritarian.49  Diamond classifies the Moroccan and Algerian regimes as 
hegemonic electoral authoritarianism (as of 2001), following the work of Andreas Schedler (and 
Giovanni Sartori).50  Together competitive authoritarian and hegemonic electoral authoritarian 
make up a broader concept of electoral authoritarianism developed in a book-length project by 
Schedler.  Competitive and hegemonic electoral authoritarianism are distinguished by their 
degree of competitiveness between opposition and ruling elites.51  When I refer to authoritarian 
regimes in this project, I refer to electoral authoritarian regimes (i.e. to both (4) competitive 
authoritarian and (5) hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes). 
  
Electoral authoritarianism.  Electoral authoritarianism (EA) refers to a set of regimes in which 
elections “violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and 
                                                     
48 Mona El-Ghobashy, "Taming the Leviathan: Constitutionalist Contention in Contemporary Egypt" 
(Columbia University, 2006). 
49 Diamond, "Elections without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes." 
50 Along with Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarianism, Competitive Authoritarianism are forms of electoral 
authoritarianism distinguished only by the degree of competition in the party and electoral system and the 
possibility of the opposition taking power, which exists only in the latter regime type.   
51 Andreas Schedler, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation," Journal of Democracy 
13, no. 2 (2002).    
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systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than ‘instrument of 
democracy’”.52  Electoral authoritarianism exists where elections are portrayed as the principal 
institution by which public sovereignty is exercised; however, true sovereignty over 
policymaking lies elsewhere in the regime.  Because of severe electoral manipulation, elections 
are not to a meaningful extent free, failing to meet the following conditions: “ . . . when the legal 
barriers to entry into the political arena are low, when there is substantial freedom for candidates 
and supporters of different political parties to campaign and solicit votes, and when voters 
experience little or no coercion in exercising their electoral choices”.53  Electoral authoritarianism 
is characterized by skilled manipulation of electoral procedures in order to achieve regime 
persistence,54 typically relying on the military, either directly or indirectly.55  Under 
authoritarianism, elections are participative and competitive in form,56 but, serve as a “democratic 
façade covering authoritarian rule”.57  Most work on regime type as electoral competitiveness 
focuses on electoral manipulation, but has less to say about clientelism outside of the electoral 
context.   
 
Legislatures as Arenas of Contestation and a Second Constitutive Feature of Electoral 
Authoritarianism 
 
For Schedler, elections are the central battlefield between incumbents and opposition.  
The conventional wisdom concerning legislatures in authoritarian political settings, as expressed 
by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, is that they are not a major “arena of contestation”.58  
Schedler suggests that while parliaments and other institutions are not “meant to constitute 
countervailing powers” they are nevertheless sources and sites of contestation.59  Parliaments and 
                                                     
52 Schedler, "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism.": 3.  Also citing Bingham G. Powell, Elections as 
Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2000). 
53 Diamond, "Elections without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.": 28 
54 William Case, "Manipulative Skills: How Do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena?" in Electoral 
Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 
55 Elizabeth Spiro Clark, "Why Elections Matter?" The Washington Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2000). 
56 Schedler, "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism." 
57 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).: 34. 
58 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Linkage and Leverage: How Do International Factors Change 
Domestic Balances of Power?" in Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. 
Andreas Schedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 
59 Schedler, "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism.": 12.  I define contestation as a struggle for victory 
between rivals.  Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Competitive Authoritarianism: Origins and Evolution 
of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era,"  (October 11, 2006).: 2.  Bellin’s term “robust 
authoritarianism” is also closely related to new authoritarianism.  See Eva Bellin, "Coercive Institutions 
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elections are “interdependen[t] . . . since parliament derive their legitimacy from the credibility 
and integrity of the electoral processes that shape and define them”.60     
Extending Schedler’s theory of electoral authoritarianism, I suggest that instead of being 
secondary in importance, legislatures are also significant arenas of contestation with effects in 
other parts of the political system.  Candidates and parties contest legislative elections not only 
for access to resources and wasta, but also to influence policy.61  Further, the extent to which 
members provide particularistic or programmatic benefits has implications for how ordinary 
citizens view the parliament.  Regime power-holders employ electoral manipulation and 
patronage to control the outcome of legislative elections because it matters who is elected to 
parliament.   
Thus, I argue that electoral authoritarianism is characterized not only by electoral 
manipulation, but also by weak and coopted national parliaments which fail to fulfill the 
following three criteria: 
 
1. It is constitutionally and politically permitted to operate as an autonomous and influential 
institution; 
2. It is capable of resisting actions emanating from the executive; and, 
3. It is able to formulate its own policy proposals and can affect the decision-making 
process in significant ways.62   
 
Definitions: Democracy, Autocracy, and Transition 
 
 Following Robert A. Dahl and later extensions by Gerardo L. Munck and others, I view 
democracy and authoritarianism as endpoints on continuums of participation and contestation.63  
Dahl has noted that as political liberalization becomes widespread, regimes are less meaningfully 
differentiated by levels of participation than by popular and elite contestation.  Democracy, or 
polyarchy, is a political system characterized by seven institutions: (1) elected officials; (2) free 
and fair elections; (3) inclusive suffrage; (4) right to run for office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Coercive Leaders," in Authoriarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance, ed. Marsha 
Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist (Boudler: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).   
60 United Nations Development Programme, Parliamentary Development: Practice Note (2003 [cited 
Janurary 26, 2008); available from http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/ParlPN_ENGLISH.pdf.   
61 Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan." 
62 Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of 
Democratic Institutions.: 63. 
63 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), Robert A. Dahl, 
Polyarchy Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), Gerardo L. Munck, 
"Drawing Boundaries: How to Craft Intermediate Regime Categories," in Electoral Authoritarianism: The 
Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).  
See, especially, page 33. 
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alternative information; and, (7) associational autonomy.64  The institutions of polyarchy are the 
highest attainable level of democracy in the modern state where, for example, direct democracy is 
not practical.65  Elsewhere, Dahl defines democracy as “the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals”.66 
Authoritarianism is a political system in which individual political and civil rights and 
other institutions of polyarchy are threatened by social control and the requirement of adherence 
to the authority of the state.  Authoritarianism is characterized by oppression and generally 
hierarchical in nature.  Because democracy and autocracy constitute endpoints on continuum of 
the degree to which the institutions of polyarchy have been attained, the intermediary regime 
types then represent aspects of both systems.   
The ways in which authoritarianism contrasts with autocracy may be difficult to 
delineate.  However, autocracy presupposes that power is held by an individual rather than a state, 
and that this power is absolute.  All autocrats need a power structure in order to rule; however, 
allegiance in an autocracy rests with an individual rather than with a state ideology or apparatus.  
Liberalization of political rights, for example in recent decades in Morocco, suggests that even if 
allegiance must be to an individual (i.e. the monarch), his power is not absolute (e.g. contestation 
has led to a relaxation of certain freedoms of expression).  The endpoint in Diamond’s 
continuum, politically closed authoritarian, may be analogous with autocracy, although global 
pressure on regimes to liberalize suggests that autocracy vis-à-vis authoritarianism is a category 
without decreasing resonance in the modern world.   
Just as democracy and autocracy form a continuum with intermediate regime types, our 
understanding of transition and failed transition depends on where the markers between these 
regime-types fall.  To better understand these terms it is useful to define democratization and 
liberalization.  “Political liberalization involves the expansion of public space through the 
recognition and protection of civil society and political liberties, particularly those bearing upon 
the ability of citizens to engage in free political discourse and to freely organize in pursuit of 
common interests”.67  In this way, liberalization results in a narrow expansion of access to 
political positions and resources, even while a meaningful institutional opening for contestation 
over policies is limited, because the underlying structure of decision-making power does not 
change.  Democratization requires a change in the way public policies are made; that is, a 
                                                     
64 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics.: 233. 
65 Ibid.: 218-222.  
66 Dahl, Polyarchy Participation and Opposition.: 1. 
67 Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, ed., Political Liberalization and Democratization in the 
Arab World, vol. Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).: 3. 
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meaningful expansion not only of participation but also contestation.  It is “an expansion of 
political participation in such a way as to provide citizens with a degree of real meaningful 
collective control over public policy.”68 
Democratization is synonymous with democratic transition; transition has occurred when 
a regime moves from one type on the continuum to another.69  If political changes more closely 
approximate liberalization, this constitutes a failed or stalled democratic transition.   
 
The Democratization Literatures 
 
Second, in addition to the authoritarian politics literature, this project draws upon and 
hopes to contribute to theory on the persistence and breakdown of authoritarian regimes.  One 
aspect of this literature addresses the impact of constitutional and institutional arrangements—
including parliamentary versus presidential systems and types of institutional configurations—on 
the longevity of democracy or the likelihood that it will emerge.70  Other work views transition as 
a reconfiguration of institutions, identifying them as a missing variable in studies of democratic 
transition.71  The puzzle at the heart of this project—why authoritarian institutions contribute to 
regime persistence—relates to a growing literature which is beginning to tease out the role of 
institutions in the democratization process.72   
 
                                                     
68 Ibid.: 3.  Entelis (1995), citing Przeworski, suggests that the goal of authoritarian regimes undergoing 
liberalization is to “relax social tension and to strengthen their position in the power block by broadening 
the social base of the regime: to allow some autonomous organization of the civil society and to incorporate 
the new groups into the authoritarian institution” (Przeworski 1991, as cited Entelis 1995, p. 50).   
69 O’Donnell and Schmitter define a transition as “the interval between one political regime and another”.  
Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).: 
6. 
70 For examples of the former, see Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential 
Democracies (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), Matthew Soberg and John M. 
Carey Shugart, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The 
Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).For 
examples of the latter, see Axel Hadenius and Han Teorell, "Pathways from Authoritarianism," Journal of 
Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007).  Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in 
Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political 
Transitions in Africa," World Politics 46 (1994). 
71 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
72 Richard Snyder and James Mahoney, "The Missing Variable: Institutions and the Study of Regime 





Finally, this project seeks to contribute to literature on political institutions, which 
focuses on how institutions shape both other institutional structures as well as the political 
behavior of actors.73  A significant component of the institutions literature addresses constituency 
service of members of national legislatures, especially the American Congress.74  This literature 
provides much of the methodological foundation for the present study and will be reviewed at a 
later stage.  Related to this literature is political theory focusing on representation in the American 
political context.75  Readings of this literature influenced the development of this study and create 
at least an initial tension between democratic representation and anthropological understandings 
of Middle Eastern societies which privilege clientelism as a mode of political representation.76  
This tension will be addressed in Chapter 3 where I develop two contrasting paradigms, which I 
call the “representation” paradigm and the “patron-client” paradigm. 
Overview of the Chapters 
 
 The remaining chapters unfold as follows.   
 
Part I: Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the methodology and comparative framework, highlighting how the 
similarities and differences in the cases inform interpretation of the between-country results in the 
main empirical chapters.  Chapter 3 operationalizes representative behavior and describes 
casework operations in Morocco and Algeria.  It presents two competing paradigms—the 
representation and patron-client paradigms—which highlight the tension created by studying 
casework and other activities of members of parliament in nondemocratic settings.   
 
                                                     
73 For examples of the latter, see Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems a Study of Twenty-
Seven Democracies 1945-1990, Comparative European Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).  
Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering Voting Rules and Political Behavior (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
74 See, for example, Michael A. Smith, Bringing Representation Home: State Legislators among Their 
Constituencies (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003). 
75 See for, example, William T. Bianco, Trust: Representatives and Constituents (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1994).  
76 See, for example, Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, eds., Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean 
Societies (London: Duckworth, 1977). 
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Part II: Empirical Chapters 
 
 Chapter 4 examines the first level or arena of political activity: parliamentary institutions.  
It investigates how formal rules vary by institutional setting and influence members’ participation 
in debate and provision of casework.  Further, it shows how representation is a mechanism of 
cooptation occurring as members choose “baskets” of programmatic and particularistic goods.   
 Chapter 5 examines the second level in the conceptual map: representative behavior.  It 
explains why members differ between and within countries in the incentives they perceive to 
cultivate a personal or party reputation and to provide casework. 
 Chapter 6 examines the third arena or level in the diagram: public opinion.  It considers 
why the attitudes of ordinary citizens vary in their support for a parliament with strong 
constitutional prerogatives.  It investigates whether casework is a form of representation which 
enhances support for a stronger legislature.   
 
Part III: Conclusion 
 
 Finally, Chapter 7 considers the implications of the findings for understanding why 
legislatures enhance authoritarian rule and how policymakers working in the area of legislative 






Research Plan and Comparative Framework 
  
 
Research Methods and Research Plan 
 
While qualitative and quantitative methods are usually combined in research on 
constituency service in American and Comparative politics, there is limited precedence of 
quantitative research on the behavior of parliamentarians in politically-closed countries.  
Conventional wisdom, perhaps appropriately, suggests that: “. . . the behaviour of institutions and 
individuals in North Africa is not subject to easy quantification.”77  However, in order to fully 
address misconceptions of authoritarian politics as “unintelligible to modern political science” 
and to investigate the central questions in this project, both qualitative and quantitative methods 
must be considered as potential tools to investigate political dynamics in these settings.78   
Accordingly, one tension which emerged in the selection of research methods is the need 
to balance the rigors of and potential for statistical control afforded by quantitative survey 
methods while considering the corresponding need to develop and support a convincing causal 
story through in-depth qualitative work.  I sought to combine survey research with semi-
structured interviews in order to determine which of the methods would be most appropriate for 
analysis of parliaments in authoritarian settings. 
Another set of research design decisions concerned the development of the comparative 
framework and the selection of cases.  Although the design offers four levels of within-country 
comparative analysis--the party and parliamentary group, the electoral district, the member of 
parliament, and the constituent—the addition of a fifth level, the country, adds analytical depth to 
the investigation of the project’s central questions.   
At the most basic level, Morocco and Algeria lend themselves to comparison because 
they offer contrasting institutional settings--monarchy and former one-party regime—but similar
                                                     
77David Mednicoff, "Civic Apathy in the Service of Stability? The Cultural Politics of Monarchist 
Morocco," Journal of North African Studies  (1999).: 2. 
78 Quote taken from presentation given by Ellis Goldberg, Yale University, May 6, 2008. 
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levels of electoral competitiveness and legislative prerogatives (i.e. both are cases of hegemonic 
electoral authoritarianism).  Thus, although the first, and primary, objective of the project is the 
prediction of within-country variation in each of three arenas of political activity--institutional 
rules, representative behavior, and public opinion--comparison of dynamics between the two 
cases within these arenas offers an additional opportunity to evaluate the logic of the conceptual 
framework and, thus, to shed light on how elite and mass-level dynamics are linked and inform 
our understanding of the relationship between legislative institutions and longer regime tenure.   
In this chapter I begin by providing an overview of the data collection methods, outlining 
how the surveys were developed and implemented in the field.  I conclude by discussing the 
comparative framework, identifying how the similarities and differences may inform an 
understanding of possible within-country dynamics in the two countries.  
 
The Data and Surveys 
 
 The main source of data is the member and constituent surveys (See Table II. 1.).  The 
design and implementation of the surveys have two advantages.  First, since the design links a 
portion of the member data with constituent data at the level of the electoral district, the effect of 
constituent responsiveness of members on the political attitudes of individual citizens in those 
districts may be estimated. Second, the questionnaire includes a number of items which measure 
self-report political behaviors, such as citizens’ experiences requesting casework and contact with 
members of the national, regional, and local legislative assembly, offering the possibility to 
investigate the effect of these experiences on attitudes.79  Approximately one-third of the 
members and 800 constituents participated in each country.   
 
                                                     
79 Most survey research in the Arab world focuses on political attitudes.  See, for example, the World 




TABLE II. 1. Member and Constituent Surveys in Morocco and Algeria 
 
  










800 constituents in 12 districts 
 
Algeria 




800 constituents in 8 districts 
 
 
Sampling and Implementation: The Member and Constituent Surveys 
 
The member surveys were conducted from August 2005 to May 2007; the constituent 
surveys were conducted from August 2006 to February 2007.  Probabilistic sampling was used 
for both surveys with the exception of the Algerian constituent survey for which quota sampling 




Fifty percent of the sample of members was drawn using random stratified sampling 
where the strata were party (parliamentary group) and gender.  Female members and male and 
female deputies from parties and parliamentary groups with fewer than eight percent of the seats 
in Parliament were over-sampled.  The remaining fifty percent of the sample was comprised of all 
members from a random stratified sample of electoral districts where region and population were 
the strata.  Selected districts ranged from two members to thirty-two members. 
 Access to the parliamentary building was achieved in Algeria by contacting the 
presidents of the parliamentary groups and in Morocco by requesting access from the Secretary-
General of the Parliament.   
 A paper and pencil questionnaire in French and Arabic was used to facilitate data 
collection.  In some cases, the president of the group or another deputy in the group assisted with 
the distribution of the written questionnaire.  Every effort was made to conduct the interviews 
face-to-face with the aid of the questionnaire because of the advantage this provided for response 
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rate and quality of the accompanying open-ended responses.  The interview took approximately 




 Although sixteen electoral districts in Algeria and twenty-four districts in Morocco were 
selected for the member survey, only half of these were selected as sites for the constituent 
survey.  While region and population were respected as strata, factors such as location of 
interviewing staff and local permissions were important in the selection of the eight Algerian and 
twelve Moroccan districts where the household survey would be conducted.   
 The number of respondents in each district was equal to the proportion of the nation’s 
total population living in that district.  Respondents in two sparsely-populated and one densely-
populated district in Algeria were under and over-sampled and, as with the member survey data, 
component weights were computed.  While respondents within districts were selected in Morocco 
using standard household survey sampling practices, quota sampling was used in Algeria.  The 
latter technique created further need for weighting due to an over-reliance in the sample of men 
and more well-educated individuals.  Challenges in the Algerian sampling suggest the need for 
caution particularly in comparing univariate distributions between the countries without 
appropriate multivariate statistical controls. 
 The survey was conducted by Moroccan and Algerian teams face-to-face.  The survey 
had 130 questions and took approximately 80 minutes to complete.  The response rate was 59 and 
75 percent in Algeria and Morocco respectively (See Appendix 1). 
 
Subsystem Units of Analysis: Members and Constituents by District 
 
 Morocco and Algeria serve as the system-level units in the comparative framework.  
Below the level of the country, there are four units of analysis (See Table II. 2.). 
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West    North    
   1 4 3 (75%) 56    1 4 3 (75%) 85 
   2 6 4 (67%) 59     
    Center    
Center       2 4 3 (75%) 86 
   3 32 10 (31%) 227    3 5 4 (80%) 102 
       4 2 2 (100%) 25 
East       5 3 3 (100%) 61 
   4 12 6 (50%) 113     
   5 16 7 (44%) 150 East    
   6 7 4 (57%) 66    6 2 1 (50%) 42 
       7 3 3 (100%) 47 
South        
   7 4 3 (75%) 50 South    
   8 6 3 (50%) 59    8 4 4 (100%) 80 
       9 4 2 (50%) 69 
Other 
Districts 
302 57 (19%) 0    10 4 2 (50%) 89 
       11 4 2 (50%) 72 
        
    Sahara    
      12 2 1 (50%) 42 
        
    Other 
Districts 
284 82 (29%) 0 
        
Total 389 97 (25%) 780 Total 325 112 (34%) 800 
 
 
The Electoral Districts 
 
 Algeria is divided into 48 multi-member electoral districts equivalent to its states 
(willayat).  In addition to the 381 members elected in geographical districts, eight members are 
elected in overseas districts in which a large number of Algerians reside.  Eight electoral districts 
within Algeria were selected into the study: two from the west, one from the center, three from 
the east, and two from the south.  Probabilistic sampling was used to selected districts.   
Morocco is divided into ninety-five multi-member districts drawn within the country’s 16 
administrative districts; an additional thirty seats are reserved for national party lists of women.  
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295 members represent the geographical districts, each with a magnitude of two to five in 
addition to the thirty-member national district.  Twelve electoral districts within Morocco were 
selected for the study: one from the north, four from the center, two from the east, four from the 
south, and one from the Sahara.   
 
The Moroccan Chambre des Répresentants (Upper House) 
 
The Seventh Chambre des Répresentants (al-Majlis al-Nouwab), elected on September 
27, 2002, was made up of twenty-two parties, and for the first time since the recent introduction 
of a quota, included a significant number of women and a strong showing for the Islamist Party of 
Justice and Development (PJD) in the districts in which it fielded candidates (See Tables II. 3. 
and II. 4.).  Of the 26 parties which contested the elections, eleven were created in 2001 and 
2002.80  The Socialist Union of Socialist and Popular Forces (USFP) won 50 seats; the oldest, 
Istiqlal (Independence) Party received 48 seats; the Islamist PJD gained 42 seats; the conservative 
party of the makhzen the National Rally of Independents (RNI) took 41 seats; and the People’s 
Movement and the National People’s Movement, which subsequently formed a single Popular 
Movement (MP), received 27 and 18 seats respectively; and, the Constitutional Union (UC) had 
16 seats.  The remaining fifteen parties received 83 seats. 
Although contrary to organic law, party-switching during the session is not enforced and 
it is a relatively common practice.  Nine (9.9 percent) of respondents reported having changed 
their parliamentary group since begin elected in 2002.  Party-switching during the parliamentary 
mandate does not occur in Algeria.  At the time of the study, the make-up of the parliamentary 
groups was as follows: the MP group was now in the majority with 72 deputies; the Istiqlal group 
had increased to 60 deputies; the USFP lost two members, leaving 48 deputies; the PJD, which 
does not allow switching, remained with 42 deputies; the RNI group decreased by two to 39 
deputies; the CD group comprised 28 deputies; the Socialist Alliance grouped 21; the FFD had 8 
members; and other smaller parties and members without a party affiliation numbered 11. 
In Morocco, the democratic bloc (Koutla) was comprised, at the time of the study, of 
USFP, Istiqlal, PPS, and the GSU, although the make-up of Koutla and other party alliances shifts 
from time to time.81       
 
                                                     
80 J. C. Santucci, Les Partis Politiques Marocains a L'epreuve Du Pouvoir (REMALD, 2001). 
81 As of May 21, 2003.  A.c., "Maroc: La Koutla Condamne Et Appelle a Une Manifestation," Liberation, 
May 21, 2003 2003.  The lowest response rate in Morocco was from the RNI, (17.9 percent responding) 
and the highest among the Istiqlal (40 percent) and the PJD (38.1 percent). 
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TABLE II. 3. Legislative Election Results, 2002 
 
 Morocco Algeria 
 
 
Date of Election 
 
September 27, 2002 
 





22 parties and three 
independents 
 
9 parties and 30 independents 
Largest Party USFP (50 of 325 seats) FLN (199 of 389 seats) 
 











Source: Journal Officiel de la Republique Algérienne; Bulletin Officiel du Royaume du Maroc; “Arab 
Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Algeria”, 2008 
(http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Algeria_APS.doc); “Arab Political Systems: Baseline 
Information and Reforms – Morocco”, 2008 (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Morocco_APS.doc) 
 
 
The Algerian National Popular Assembly (Lower House) 
 
In Algeria, the May 30, 2002 elections to the Assemblée Nationale Popularie (APN, al-
Majllis ash-Sha’bi al-Watani) resulted in the election of nine parties and thirty independents.  
Because the Berber Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) and Gathering for Culture and Democracy 
(RCD) boycotted elections, the fifth mandate was less diverse than the fourth.  Further, the 
government-created National Rally for Democracy (RND), which won a majority in the fourth 
parliament in results generally attributed to rigging, lost its majority to the FLN, the former single 
party with significant allegiance within the population which gained 51 percent of the seats in 
parliament.  There are 25 women elected to parliament in Algeria on party lists, but no quota 
system is in place at the national level.82   
The National Liberation Front (FLN) received 199 seats; the RND won 47 seats; the 
moderate Islamist parties el-Islah and the Movement for Society and Peace (MSP) gained 43 and 
38 seats respectively; the socialist Workers’ Party (PT) received 21 seats; four minor parties 
                                                     
82 The 4th National Assembly, elected in 1997, had 389 members and was made up of 10 parties and 11 
independents.  These included the new government-created Democratic National Rally (RND), 156 seats; 
the National Liberation Front (FLN), 62 seats; the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP, formally 
HAMAS), 69 seats; Ennahda (MN, formerly MNI), 34 seats; and two Berber parties, FFS and RCD, 20 and 
19 seats respectively.   
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(FNA, ME, PRA, and MEN) gained 11 seats; and, there were 30 independent candidates which 
formed a parliamentary group.  In Algeria at the time of the study, the majority FLN was in a 
ruling coalition with the government-created RND and one of the Islamist parties willing to enter 







                                                     
83 In the survey, the lowest response rates were among the FLN (14.1 percent participating) and the PT 





TABLE II. 4. Representation of Parliamentary Groups in the Population and Sample 









National Liberation Front (FLN) 199 28 (14.1%) Movement Group (MP) 72 15 (20.8%) 
National Rally for Democracy (RND) 47 12 (25.5%) Independence Group of Unity and 
Equality (Istiqlal) 
60 24 (40.0%) 
Movement for National Reform (el-
Islah) 
43 20 (46.5%) Socialist Group (USFP) 48 11 (22.9%) 
Movement for the Society of Peace 
(MSP) 
38 12 (31.6%)  Justice and Development Group 
(PJD) 
42 16 (38.1%) 
Workers' Party (PT) 21 3 (14.3%) Group of the National Rally of 
Independents (RNI) 
39 7 (17.9%) 
Independents 30 8 (26.7%) Group of the Constitutional Democrat 
Union (CD) 
28 9 (32.1%) 
   Group of the Socialist Alliance 21 7 (33.3%) 
   Deputies of the Democratic Forces 
Front (FFD) 
8 3 (37.5%) 
      
Small Parties without Groups   Small Parties without Groups   
Algerian National Front (FNA) 8 Deputies of the Unified Socialist Left 
(GSU) 
3 2 (18.2%)b 
 
Islamic Renaissance Movement  
(En-Nahda) 
1 Deputies of the Alliance of Freedoms 1 
Party of Algerian Renewal (PRA) 1 Deputies without Party Affiliation 7 













Party (Missing Data)  11 (11.3%)    
      
Total 389 97 Total 325 112 
a At the time of the study, April to August 2006 
b Total of three respondents from FNA, En-Nahda, PRA, and MEN; party not reported in table to protect respondent identity.  In Morocco, responses are 
combined for GSU, Alliance of Freedoms, and deputies without party affiliation. 
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The Comparative Framework: Similar Features 
 
Morocco and Algeria share important similarities, among them their historical and 
political backgrounds, parliamentary history, the electoral system in effect at the time of the 
study, and the general level of electoral competitiveness and prerogatives of the parliament vis-à-
vis the executive (See Table II. 5.).  These similarities reduce the number of possible factors 
which could explain differences in between-country results.  More specifically, Chapter 4 will 
suggest that institutional rules pertaining to whether members can hold a second public function 
help account for differences in aggregate levels of participation in debate and casework provision.  
While conclusions based on two country cases are necessarily tentative, the case selection holds 
many other electoral and legislative institutional rules constant, thereby reducing the number of 










Historical and Cultural 
Characteristics 
 
Populous countries, Sizeable 
Berber populations, Influence 
of Islamic and Arab culture, 
French colonization 
(Independence 1956) 
Populous countries, Sizeable 
Berber populations, Influence of 
Islam and Arabic culture, French 
colonization (Independence 1962 
after Revolutionary War) 
 
Political Characteristics 
     Parliamentary  
     History 




Years of Parliamentary 
Absence/Dissolution: 9 years, 
1966-1969 and 1972-1976. 
 
 
First Chamber: 1962 (Constituent 
Assembly) 
 
Years of Parliamentary 
Dissolution:  11 years, 1965-1976 
     Legislative Electoral     
     System (at Time of   
     Study) 
System: Closed-List 
Proportional Representation, 
Chamber of Representatives 
(325 seats) is upper house of 
bi-cameral Parliament 
 
District Magnitude: Two to 
five in 95 geographical 
constituencies, 30 in national 
constituency for women 
 
Mandate: Five years (2002-
2007) 
  
System: Closed-List Proportional 
Representation, National Popular 
Assembly (389 seats) is lower 
house of bi-cameral Parliament 
 
District Magnitude: Two to five 
in 48 geographical constituencies, 




Mandate: Five years (2002-2007) 
 
     Electoral  
     Competitiveness and 





Preponderance of Executive 






Preponderance of Executive 






Historical and Cultural Characteristics 
 
In States and Women’s Rights, Mounira M. Charrad applies a comparative framework to 
understanding the role of tribe and state formation in the promulgation of personal status codes in 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.  In it, she refers to the countries of the Maghreb as a “geocultural 
entity”, emphasizing the ways in which their peoples, cultures, and histories share common 
roots.84  Contiguous states in the Arab West (Maghreb), Morocco and Algeria share sizable 
indigenous Berber populations comprising several distinct language groups.  Although estimates 
of the size of the Berber population vary, nearly all people in both Morocco and Algeria share 
both Arab and Berber roots.   
Morocco and Algeria today are the most populous countries in the Arab world and face 
on-going challenges of a young population and high unemployment rate.  Algeria’s population 
numbers approximately 34, 000, 000 (July 2008); 26.3 percent of its population aged 14 years and 
under (2008) (See Table II. 6.).85  Morocco’s population also numbers approximately 34, 000, 
000 (July 2008) in a country one-fifth the size of Algeria (not accounting for the disputed territory 
of the Moroccan/Western Sahara); 30.5 percent of Moroccans are 14 years or under.86  Serious 
economic difficulties—chief among them unemployment—pose on-going challenges to social 
development and political stability.87  Economic crisis, especially unemployment, in the 1980s 
unleashed popular protest leading to political liberalization.  The October 1988 riots in Algeria 
which hastened political liberalization alone cost an estimated 1,000 lives.88    
 
 
                                                     
84 Mounira M. Charrad, States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Morocco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
85 Demographic figures appear in CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/. 
86 Almost two-thirds of women in Morocco are illiterate.  Among rural girls aged 7-15 years, about 55 
percent have never attended school.  Guilain Denoeux and Rhys Payne, "Democracy and Governance: 
Assessment of Morocco,"  (Washington, DC: ARD, 2003).: 22. 
87 Abdelbaki Benziane, "Islam, Democracy and the State in Algeria: Lessons for the Western 
Mediterranean and Beyond," Journal of North African Studies 9, no. 2 (2004).  Benziane shows the 
massive demand for university positions but no jobs to absorb graduates. 
88 Mouloud Hamrouche, "Hamrouche Va Loin: Les Clans, Le Pouvoir, L'armee Et La Crise," La Nation, 8 -
14 August, 1995 1995.  Lahouari Addi, "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions," Journal of Democracy 3 (1996). 
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TABLE II. 6. Key Social, Economic and Political Indicators 
 
Indicator Morocco Algeria 
 
   






   GDP Per Capita (PPP), 2006 est. $4,400 
 
$7,700 
   Barrels of Oil Produced per Day,  
   2005 
 
300 barrels 1.4 million barrels 
   Literacy Rate, 15 Years and Older 
 
52.3 percent (2004) 69.9 percent (2002) 
   Human Development Index Rank,     
   UNDP, 2006a 
123  
(out of 177 countries) 
 
102  
(out of 177 countries) 
   Freedom House Rating, 2006b 
      Political Rights 








   Corruption Index Rank, Transparency  
   International, 2007c 
72  
(out of 180 countries) 
99  
(out of 180 countries) 
Source: “Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Algeria”, 2008 
(http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Algeria_APS.doc); “Arab Political Systems: Baseline 
Information and Reforms – Morocco”, 2008 
(http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Morocco_APS.doc); World Factbook 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
a  Lower rank indicates higher level of development 
b  See http://www.freedomhouse.org.  Political and civil rights scores range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least 
free). 
c  Lower score corresponds to lower levels of corruption. 
 
 
Morocco and Algeria are predominately Arabo-Islamic societies with less than two 
percent of their populations identifying as non-Muslim.  Both countries are influenced by Arab 
language and culture, having come under Arab conquest beginning in the 700s A.D., 
approximately ten years after the death of the Muslim Prophet.  Both have a long history of 
politically powerful religious confréries (Sufi brotherhoods) and ‘ulama (religious scholars), 
though the degree to which they have been brought under the control of the regime differs.89  
                                                     
89 Michael J. Willis, "Between Alternance and the Makhzen: At-Tawhid Wa Al-Islah's Entry into Moroccan 
Politics," Journal of North African Studies 4, no. 3 (1999).  Baber Johansen, "Des Institutions Religieuses 
Du Maghreb," Arabica 35, no. 3 (1988).  See also Korany and Amrani, "Explosive Civil Society and 
Democratization from Below: Algeria."  In Morocco, Saints held a privileged status and played an 
important role in legitimizing the political order, including the role of the bureaucracy (makhzen) 
(Johansen: 240).  In Algeria, religious congregations and probably more powerful and can achieve a certain 
form of representation by promising the political support to candidates seeking power at the national level.  
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Both were colonized by the French, among other invaders and colonizers, and gained 
independence in the same era: July 3, 1962 in Algeria, after more than 130 years of colonial rule 
beginning in 1830, and March 2, 1956 in Morocco, after less than fifty years as a protectorate 
beginning in 1912.   
 
Some Related Differences 
 
Despite these similarities, Morocco and Algeria’s historical, cultural, and economic 
characteristics also engender differences which do not compete with explanation in later chapters, 
but should be noted.  These include aspects of social development and economic resources.   
 
Socioeconomic development.  Although both Morocco and Algeria face enormous social 
challenges, the effect of which is a large demand for casework, Algeria ranks higher on 
conventional indicators of social and economic development than Morocco.  GDP is higher in 
Algeria: $7,600 (per capita PPP, 2006), compared with $4,600 in Morocco (2005).  The UNDP 
Human Development Index (2006) ranks Algeria 102st and Morocco 123rd among 177 countries.  
Population growth rate is lower in Algeria than in Morocco: 1.51 children per woman (2008) 
compared with 2.57 children per woman (2008).   
Years of socialist policy in Algeria produced better developed infrastructure and higher 
rates of schooling.  Fewer Moroccans than Algerians, 15 years and older, are literate: 52.3 percent 
(2004) in Morocco compared with 69.9 percent (2002) in Algeria.  These differences in social 
development, while important to keep in mind, should not come to bear on inferences in future 
chapters.    
 
Natural resources.  Morocco and Algeria differ significantly in their access to natural resources, 
particularly oil.  Algeria has sizable oil revenues.  Over 60 percent of budget revenue in Algeria 
comes from oil—1.4 million barrels are produced per day (2005)--compared with only 300 
barrels per day (2005) in Morocco, where iron and phosphates are less lucrative natural resources.  
Oil exploration is taking place at present in the Western Sahara, a disputed territory annexed by 
Morocco in the 1970s.  Differences in the availability of rents may come to bear on analyses of 
the determinants and effects of casework provision.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Given the peaceful orientation of sufi brotherhoods, President Boutiflika and other national leaders 
arranged conferences with them following the Algerian civil war. 
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Colonial history.  Although it is less relevant to understanding the present study, it is useful and 
important to note differences in colonial history.  Although both Morocco and Algeria were 
colonized by the French, the nature of occupation and of the political orders which prevailed in 
the pre-independence period differed in significant ways.  Beginning in 788 A.D., Morocco was 
ruled by successive Moorish dynasties which achieved a delicate territorial integration through 
alliances between tribes and kin groupings.  The current Alaouite dynasty traces its history to 7th 
century Morocco and to the Prophet Mohammed through his daughter, Fatima Zahra, and her 
husband, the cousin of the Prophet and fourth Calipha (successor), Ali.90  The son Moulay Ali 
Cherif, the Sultan of Tafilalt in 1631, Moulay Rashid was able to unite and bring a measure of 
peace to the country in 1660, establishing its capital in Meknès and driving out British and 
Spanish competitors. 1890-1900 was characterized by considerable tribal resistance against the 
Sultan.91  By the 20th century, Moroccan elites demanded greater rights from the French 
protectorate, but Morocco’s destiny was to be affected by geo-political events to the East in 
Algeria.  A short period of resistance to French colonialism characterized also by inter-party and 
faction fighting among Moroccans was followed by independence in 1956.  France gave up 
control of Morocco more easily due to its stronger desire to hold Algeria, which was then 
engaged in the early part of a bloody revolutionary war what would last from 1954-1962.   
Algeria’s pre-independence history was characterized not by dynasties, but by successive 
invasions and intense European colonization.  Berber territory experienced the arrival of foreign 
powers beginning with Phoenician traders (900-146 B.C.), Romans (98 to 117 A.D.), who 
annexed the territory to the Roman Empire; Germanic Vandals (429 A.D.), Byzantines (429 to 
536 A.D.), Spanish, who set up outposts (1504 through 1792), and the Ottomans, who held 
Algiers from 1554 to 1830 until the arrival of the French.  The arrival of Islamic armies, which 
began in 642 and lasted until the arrival of the French at Sidi Ferruch in 1830, had, along with the 
French, the greatest impact on contemporary Algeria.  Family and kin groupings and indigenous 
political institutions were among the structures decimated by a long colonial rule of the French, 
which has been described as the Arab world’s most intense, owing to the large number of 
European settlers (approximately 1.5 million on the eve of the revolutionary war) and the often 
brutal divide-and-conquer strategies of the French colonial powers.92  The 130-year occupation 
                                                     
90 Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World. 
91 Rahma Bourqia and Susan Gilson Miller, eds., In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics 
in Morocco (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
92William Quant, "Islam, Democracy and the State in Algeria: Lessons for the Western Mediterranean and 
Beyond," Journal of North African Studies 9, no. 2 (2004). 
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ended in 1962 after eight bloody years of revolutionary conflict which resulted in 1.5 million 
displaced people and 150, 000 deaths.93    
Morocco gained independence in 1956 and, by 1962, King Hassan II and the pro-palace 
National Consultative Council established a multiparty political system under the supreme power 
of the monarchy.  Algeria’s 1962 independence was followed shortly thereafter with the 
establishment of a single party, the National Liberation Party, and a strong president.  Both 




Despite important differences in colonial history, the nature of the political struggles 
during regime consolidation, and the development of state-society relations in the years following 
independence, there are also important similarities in the parliamentary histories of the two 
countries (See Tables II. 7. and II. 8.).     
 
Establishment of the Parliaments 
 
Algeria.  Following Algeria’s July 5, 1962 declaration of independence, elections to the first 
Constitutional Assembly were held on September 20, 1962.  Although the Assembly had the 
formal role of elaborating the country’s first constitution, the document was created largely 
outside of the institution.  On August 14, 1962, Abbas Ferhat: 
 
“. . .resigned as President of the Algerian Assembly . . . in order to mark his 
disagreement with the constitutional project of the FLN.  The Constituent Assembly saw 
[the powers of the Parliament] reduced.  The Constitution itself had been elaborated 
outside of it, whereas Ferhat Abbas and Krim Belkacem wanted to make it an instrument 
of control of the government.”
94
   
  
The primary power struggle at the time was between groups from different regions of the 
newly-formed country; the group of Tlemcen (Ahmed Ben Bella and Colonel Houari 
Boumediène) eventually gained the upper hand.  The constitution granted the parliament very 
limited powers and on October 3, 1963 it was dissolved.   
 
                                                     
93 Michael Bonner, Megan Reif, and Mark Tessler, "Introduction," Journal of North African Studies 9, no. 
2 (2004). 
94 Benjamin Stora, Algerie: Histoire Contemporaine 1830-1988 (Alger: Casbah Editions, 2004).: 240.  
Translated from French by the author.  
 
 42 
Morocco.  The French saw the monarch as the leader most capable of uniting the tribes.  The first 
Consultative Assembly was created by decree with members chosen by King Mohammed V, but 
it was not until March 10, 1962 when his successor, Hassan II, promulgated the first 
constitution.95  Although the Istiqlal party proposed itself as a single party, the constitution 
established a multiparty system.  As in Algeria, the assembly participated in drafting the 
constitution, but formal authority outside the assembly ensured that the legislative branch had few 




 Interview evidence suggests that efforts by incumbents to recruit “loyal” and acquiescent 
members are similar in the two countries.  Both regimes sought, at parallel stages of 
parliamentary history, to create a loyal parliamentary membership in Morocco during the “years 
of lead”, which began in the 1960s and ended in the early 1990s, and in Algeria in the years 
following the annulled elections of 1992, which would be easy to work with and not pose a 
danger to the executive’s hegemony over the legislative (and judicial) branches.96  While the 
parliaments were an arena for political liberalization strategies in both countries, the Algerian 
Parliament was at the center of political change, whereas in Morocco it was affected by gradual 
reform, including opposition appointments, electoral reform, and constitutional amendments over 
several decades.  In neither country, however, was the underlying structure of power changed; 
rather, elections and parliaments provide regime legitimation and distribution, but not to a 
meaningful extent for representation and popular sovereignty. 
 
Periods of Parliamentary Politics 
 
Both Morocco and Algeria have experienced periods of parliamentary absence of 
approximately similar lengths.  Morocco’s Parliament was dissolved from 1966-1969 and 1972-
1976; the Algerian Parliament was dissolved from 1965-1976 and in 1991 when the results of the 
elections were annulled and two Legislative Institutions of Transition established from 1992-
1996.  Morocco experienced two coup attempts (July 1971 and August 1972) and Algeria two 
coups (1976 and 1992).    
                                                     
95 Susan E. Waltz, Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997).: 108-9. 






TABLE II. 7. Legislative Bodies in Algeria since Independence (1962-2007) 
Body Year Constitutions and Major Events Seat in APN Parties 
Single-Party Legislatures     
Constituent Assembly 1962-
1963 
Independence (1962); Rules of Procedure 196 FLN 
     
Constituent Assembly, (National 
Assembly   renewed one year) 
1963-
1964 
Constitution of 1963 
Oct 3, 1963 suspension of legislature 
138 FLN 
     
Regime of Ordinance, no legislature 1965-
1976 
1975 Coup; Constitution of 1976  FLN 
     




 261 FLN 
     




 276 FLN 
     




Constitution of 1988 open up possibility of 
multi-party elections (Revised Feb 23, 1989) 
205 FLN 
Legislative Institutions of Transition     
National Consultative Council 1992-
1994 
Civil War begins after second round of 
legislative elections are annulled (1991 Coup) 
430 FLN 
     
National Transitional Council 1994-
1997 
Constitution of 1996  FLN 
Multi-Party Legislatures     
National People’s Assembly 
(Bicamercal), (4th)         
1997-
2002 
 389 Ten parties and 
11 independents 
     










TABLE II. 8. Legislative Bodies in Morocco since Independence (1956-2007) 
Body Year Constitutions and Major Events Members 
Late 1950s    
National Consultative Assembly Late 1950s  Members Appointed 
by Royal Decree 
 
1963-1977    




    
Legislature 2 (Unicameral) 1970-1971 1970 Constitution; July 1971 and August 
1972 coup attempts  
240 Members, 
1/3 Directly Elected 
 
1977-1992    
Legislature 3 (Unicameral) 1977-1983 1972 Constitution; May 30, 1980 
Constitution 
267 Members, 
2/3 Directly Elected 
    
Legislature 4 (Unicameral, Prolonged 2 years) 1984-1992 1992 Constitution 306 Members, 
2/3 Directly Elected 
 
1992-1996    
Legislature 5 (Unicameral) 1993-1997 September 23, 1996 Constitution 333 Members,  
2/3 Directly Elected 
 
Post-1996    




Legislature 7 (Bicameral) 2002-2007  325 Members, 
Directly Elected 
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Legislative Electoral System  
 
At the time of the study, Morocco and Algeria had similar electoral systems: a closed 
party-list proportional representation system to legislatures with overlapping mandates (2002-
2007) (See Table II. 9.).97  While the closed party-list proportional representation system in 
Morocco replaced a system of plurality in single-member districts only in the year prior to the 
September 2002 elections, the electoral rules at the time of the study were substantially similar.  
Variation exists in district magnitude, however, providing one competing explanation for 
between-country differences in caseload addressed in Chapter 4.  Analyses of caseload in Chapter 
5, which control for district magnitude, find that it does not account for individual-level variation 
in caseload. 
 
                                                     
97 A law passed on June 26, 2006 in Morocco established a seven percent threshold in the 2007 elections 
for a party to enter parliament.  It further barred parties from participation if they did not receive at least 
three percent of the vote in the 2002 elections.  See "Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and 
Reforms -- Morocco," in Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms (Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace and Fride, 2008).: 8-9. 
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TABLE II. 9. Electoral System for Moroccan House of Representatives and Algerian 
National Popular Assembly, As of 2002 Legislative Elections 
a 
 
 Morocco Algeria 
 
Electoral System 
    
Closed-list proportional 
representation (PR)  
 





Independent candidates: Yes, with 
100 signatures 
 
List: Equal to the number of seats 
 
 
Ballots: Single ballot 
 
Independent candidates: Yes 
 
 
List: Equal to the number of seats 
plus three 
 
Ballots: Multiple, one per party list 
 
Seats/Districts 295 seats in 95 multi-member 
geographical districts; 30 seats for 
women in national constituency 
 
381 seats in 48 geographical districts; 
8 seats in overseas districts 
Threshold 3 percent, 2002 elections 5 percent, 2002 elections 
 
Suffrage Individuals 20 years and older, 
excludes expatriates 
 
Individuals 18 years and older, 
includes expatriates 
Term 5 Years (2002-2007) 5 Years (2002-2007) 
 
Source: Barwig, 2007; NDI 2007; “Order Enacting an Organic Law Governing the Electoral System”, 
Algeria. 
a Several minor amendments in Morocco during the 2002 mandate will apply to the 2007 elections. 
 
 
Degree of Electoral Competition 
 
Finally, although Morocco and Algeria have different institutional settings, both are 
characterized by flawed electoral competition which allows incumbents to influence the 
membership of parliament and, thus, its role in policymaking.  In both countries, elections are 
“little more than a theatrical setting for the self-representation of self-reproduction of power,”98 
“designed to give opposition enough seats to stay in the system, but not enough to change or 
challenge it.”99  Elections are better thought of as a tacit bargain between contesting factions 
                                                     
98 Schedler, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation.": 47. 
99 Bourqia and Miller, eds., In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco, Henry 
Munson, Jr., "The Elections of 1993 and Democratization in Morocco," in In the Shadow of the Sultan: 
Culture, Power and Politics in Morocco, ed. Rahma Bourqia and Susan Gilson Miller (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999).: 273-4. 
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aimed at maintaining the political status quo; a ”mechanism of elite control and renewal from 
above through an administrative process of restructuring, reward, exclusion, and co-optation.”100   
 Although both countries are undergoing a process of political change, these changes are 
best understood as political liberalization: “risk-free, cosmetic reforms that give their citizens and 
outlet to vent but little more.”101  While there have been recent improvements in human rights 
among other reforms in Morocco, change is limited and not intended to bring about sustained 
democratization.102  Mohamed Tozy writes that the 2007 elections, which took place a few 
months after the data collection for this project ceased, brought contradictory signs of both 
“progress and regression.”103  In his words, “The 2007 elections were not about putting 
competing political project or societal options before the voters in order to let them choose among 
them . . . the elections were mainly about changing the methods by which the system can adapt in 
the face of a crisis among its elections.”104  In Algeria, as in Morocco, recent changes have not 
altered the basic structure of political decision-making.  President Boutiflika may have removed 
some of the most prominent generals in July 2004, for example, Mohammed Lamari, but little has 
changed the “power of the shadowy elite that has held way in one form or another since 
independent in 1962”.105     
 These statements about the competitiveness of elections are reflected in freedom 
measures.  According to Freedom House, Morocco is partly free, with political rights of 5 and 
civil rights of 6 on a scale of 1 to 7, where 7 is unfree.  Algeria is not free, with political rights of 
6 and civil rights of 5.  Algeria’s press is commonly cited as one of the freest in the Arab world; 
however, in both countries, taboos exist which limit the ability of the media to discuss the most 
sensitive issues.  In Morocco, Article 41 of the press code imposes a three-to-five year jail 
sentence for statements challenging the monarchy, Islam, “national integrity”, public order, or the 
                                                     
100 Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, "Monarchy and Political Reform in Morocco," Journal of Democracy 12, no. 
1 (2001). 
101 Shadi Hamid and Jeb Koogler, "The Myth of Moroccan Democracy" (paper presented at the A Better 
Deal, September 20, 2007 2007). 
102 Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, " Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition?" 
in Middle East Series, ed. Carnegie Papers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).: 3.  See 
also Michael McFaul and Tamara Cofman Wittes, " Morocco's Elections: The Limits of Limited Reform," 
Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1 (2008). 
103 Mohamed Tozy, "Morocco's Elections: Islamists, Technocrats, and the Palace," Journal of Democracy 
19, no. 1 (2008).: 34. 
104 Ibid.: 37. 
105 John P. Entelis, "The Democratic Imperative Vs. The Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State 
between Transition and Terrorism," Strategic Insights 4, no. 6 (2005). 
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“morale of the army”.106  Threats to civil liberties and freedom of speech include the closure of 
Al-Jezeera’s Algiers bureau.107   
 
Powers of the Moroccan and Algerian Parliaments 
 
The Moroccan and Algerian parliaments are subordinated to the executive branch of 
government and cannot legislate independently of it.  In both Morocco and Algeria, non-elected 
individuals exercise considerable lawmaking power, giving the executive hegemony over the 
legislative branch and, thus, de facto legislative power (See Tables II. 10. and II. 11.).  In 
Morocco, Articles 45, 46, 55, and 58 of the Constitution allow non-elected entities within the 
executive to amend laws.  Most bills considered in the parliament are projets de loi, meaning that 
they emanate from the executive, not the membership of the parliament.  In Algeria, the ruling 
clique of military generals shapes the weightiest matters of policy through the president who is, in 
practice, their choice although officially elected by the people (Article 71).  The role of the 
monarch in lawmaking is clearly defined by the constitutions; the role of the military in Algeria is 





Powers of the King and the executive.  In Morocco, the monarchy exercises considerable 
influence over the legislative (as well as executive) branch of government through his 
constitutional prerogatives and role in structuring parliament debate.  The King is the Commander 
of the Faithful, Supreme Representative of the Nation, and Symbol of its unity (Article 19).  The 
King can dissolve parliament.  He can request a second reading of a bill and submit any bill to 
national referendum.108  With the permission of the Constitutional Council, he can amend any 
legislation passed by the parliament (Article 48).  Once laws are passed by the parliament they 
must be promulgated by royal decree.109 
 
                                                     
106 Payne, "Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco.": 18-9.  Since 2000, instances of 
newspaper seizure have been reported (Demain and Le Journal).  Newspaper editor Moustafa al-Alawi (al-
Ousbouu) charged for printing claims of responsibility with May 16, 2003 bombings in Casablanca.   
107 Entelis, "The Democratic Imperative Vs. The Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State between 
Transition and Terrorism." 
108 Payne, "Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco." 
109 "Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms -- Morocco." 
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Role of King in defining parliamentary debate.  The King structures parliamentary debate in 
two ways; one, in his speech at the opening of Parliament, as well as other speeches and royal 
decrees and, two, through the program of the executive branch which is responsible for most bills 
brought before the parliament.  Through these addresses, as well as through the parliamentary 
administration which establishes the parliamentary agenda, the issues upon which the parliament 
focuses are clearly defined.  
 
Role of the Chamber of Deputies in policymaking and oversight.  The prerogatives of the 
parliament include approving the budget, voting on bills, questioning ministers, and forming ad 
hoc commission to questions members of the government.  Legislation can be proposed by the 
prime minister or by any member of either house.  In practice, nearly all bills debated in the house 
originate with the government.   
The constitution allows for a vote of non-confidence.  A member of the government may 
be indicted if one-quarter of the relevant chamber sign.  Members have immunity except for 




Powers of the president and the executive.  The Algerian president “exercises supreme 
magistracy within the limits defined by the constitution” (Article 72).  The president and prime 
minister sign decrees (Article 85) and my pass the annual budget, even if rejected by the 
parliament.110  The president is solely responsible for matters of armed forces, national defense, 
and foreign policy (Article 77).  The president appoints (and dismisses) the prime minister and, in 
concert with him or her, chooses a government which can meet in the president’s presence or 
absence and approve legislation (Article 77, 78, and 79).  Further, the Constitutional Council, 
appointed by the president, can turn back and amend laws passed by the parliament.  The passage 
of laws in the second chamber requires a three-quarters majority; one-third of its members are 
appointed by the president, making any law with which the executive does not agree impossible 
to pass.  The president, in consultation with the speakers of the APN and the Council of the 
Nation and the prime minister, can dissolve parliament.   
 
                                                     
110 "Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms -- Algeria," in Arab Political Systems: 
Baseline Information and Reforms (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Fride, 2008). 
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Role of the president in defining parliamentary debate.  The prime minister “executes and 
coordinates the programme adopted by the National Popular Assembly” (Article 83).  The 
government presents a “general policy declaration” to the APN each year (Article 84).  In this 
way, the executive shapes the issues the parliament will address. 
 
Role of the National Popular Assembly in policymaking and oversight.  The government’s 
program is prepared by the prime minister and presented to the Cabinet, over which the president 
presides (Article 79).  The program is then submitted to the APN for “general debate” (Article 
80); if the program is not approved, the government and the APN are dissolved (Article 82).  
 
 Morocco and Algeria are both cases of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism.  That is, 
they are the same regime type in the sense that their elections are semi-competitive and their 
legislatures may shape policies through debate, but cannot challenge the program of the 
executive.  However, the Moroccan and Algerian political systems constitute different 
institutional settings (i.e. Morocco is a monarchy and Algeria is a republic) and, thus, we expect 
corresponding differences in parliamentary rules to shape the behavior of members of parliament 
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TABLE II. 10. Formal Distribution of Domestic Power:  Legislative Branch 
 
 Morocco Algeria 
 
Legislative Branch 
   Houses of Parliament 
    
Bicameral since 1996 
 
Majlis al-Nuwab (House of 
Representatives, Upper House), 
325 Members, Directly elected, 
Laws Passed by 2/3 Majority 
 
Majlis al-Mustasharin (House 
of Counselors, Lower House), 
270 Members, 2/3 elected by 
local and regional assemblies, 
1/3 elected by trade and 
agricultural unions, 9-year 
terms (one-third renewed each 
three years), Laws passed by 
3/4 majority 
 
Bicameral since 1996 
 
Al-Majlis al-Shabi al-Watani 
(National Popular Assembly, 
Lower House), 389 Members, 
Directly elected, Laws Passed 
by 2/3 Majority 
 
Majlis al-Oumma (Council of 
the Nation, Upper House), 
144 Members, 2/3 elected by 
local assemblies and 1/3 
appointed by President, 6-
year terms (half renewed each 
three years), Laws passed by 
3/4 majority  
 
   Initiation of Legislation Prime Minister or either House 
of Parliament 
 
Prime Minister or either 
House of Parliament 
   Promulgation of  Legislation By royal decree, May be 
returned to Parliament, 
submitted to referendum, or 
amended with consent of 
Constitutional Council 
 
President may approve 
budget if rejected by 
Parliament 
   Parliament May Dissolve  
   the Cabinet by Vote 
   of No Confidence  
 
Yes Yes 
   Parliament May Indict 
   Members of Government 
 
Yes No 
  Functions Mentioned in  
   Constitution 
Legislation (budgets, social and 
economic matters, excludes 
foreign policy), questioning 
ministers, fact-finding 
commissions to investigate 
government 
Legislation (budgets, social 
and economic matters, 
excludes foreign policy),  
oversight, and transmission of 
needs of citizens to central 
government 
 
   Deputy May Hold Second    
   Public or Private Function, 
   Serve Simultaneously as 
   Minister or Mayor 
Yes, amended in 2002 to limit 
to one additional presidency of 
a local council, urban 
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TABLE II. 11. Formal Distribution of Domestic Power:  Executive Branch 
 Morocco Algeria 
 
Executive Branch 
   Head of State 
 
    
 
       
      May Rule by Decree 
 
       
 
      May Dissolve Parliament,  
      Call for Early Elections 
 
 
King, whose person is “sacred 
and inviolable” (Article 21), 










President of the Republic, 
who “exercises the supreme 
magistracy” (Article 72), 
elected by popular vote 
 
Yes, between sessions of 
Parliament and on specified 




   Prime Minister Appointed by King, Presents 
government’s program to 
Parliament 
Appointed and dismissed by 
President, Presents 
government’s program to 
Parliament 
 
   Cabinet Appointed by King on proposal 
of the Prime Minister, Formally 
responsible to President and 
Parliament 
 
Appointed by King on 
proposal of Prime Minister, 
Formally responsible to 
President and Parliament 
 
Source: Moroccan and Algerian Constitutions; Payne 2003; “Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information 
and Reforms – Algeria”, 2008 (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Algeria_APS.doc); “Arab 






The cases also differ in other important respects, providing an opportunity to evaluate and 
assess the reasons for differences and similarities in between-country results.  Morocco is a 
monarchy and Algeria is a military-backed republic; the nature of the political elite and its 
relationship to other parts of the bureaucracy differ; and the pace and role of the parliament in 
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Arbitration of family and kin 





Division of yield between the 
clans by the ruling clique of 
generals; Political power 




     Parliamentary  









Many new elites, narrowly 
expanding 
     Second Function 
 
 
Member can Hold a Second 
Public Function 
 
Member cannot Hold a 
Second Public Function 
 
Parliamentary Liberalization  
History 
Gradual, connected principally 
with freedom of expression and 
human rights, less clear political 
regime change 
 
Abrupt, closely linked to 
introduction of multiparty 
legislative elections, more 





 Although cases of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism, Morocco and Algeria are 
characterized by different institutional settings: in Morocco, a hereditary monarchy allied with a 
powerful political and economic elite, the makhzen, and, in Algeria, a former one-party system in 
which a clique of military generals wields control and arbitrates the division of yield between the 
clans.111  While the Moroccan king stands atop of the political system as an impartial arbitrator 
among competing interests of family and kin grouping, high-ranking generals in Algeria use state 
resources and institutions to maintain a delicate balance between regions and clans.  In Algeria, 
the identity of the most powerful individuals is obscured for most ordinary citizens, even while 
the role of the military in the policymaking process is hidden or, in the words of Hugh Roberts, an 
                                                     
111 John P. Entelis, Comparative Politics of North Africa: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1980).  Aylin Guney and Aslihan Celenk, "The European Union's Democracy 
Promotion Policies in Algeria: Success or Failure?" Journal of North African Studies 12, no. 1 (2007). 
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“occult” power.112  The president and the state are not the real power: “The state, then, exists in 
two dimensions: in one it is visible, official, obedient to rules; in the other it is obscure, hidden 
from public view, guided by a changing balance of forces that only initiates can discern”.113  
“Official political life is no more than the tip of the iceberg.”114   
 While both countries have an arbitrator whose power is exercised through a strong 
executive, there are important differences between the preferences of incumbents for politics and, 
thus, institutional rules in monarchical and former one-party institutional settings.  Chapters 4 and 
5 will identify one contrasting institutional rule—whether members can exercise a second public 
function—and assess the likelihood that it produces observed differences in members’ 




 The Moroccan King is the Commander of the Faithful (Amir al’Mu’minin) whose 
subjects perform an annual ceremony of allegiance (bay’a).115  The King enjoys a high level of 
legitimacy.  This legitimacy has two sources: the divine right as a descendent of the Prophet 
Mohammed, and the Sunni elected Caliph and a representative of the collective will.116  
Traditionally, the King was thought to possess baraka, or “charismatic power—combustible and 
extravagant—the power of God in the exploits of powerful men.”117  The King presides not only 
over chorfa, but also religious leaders (ulama).  Morocco’s political system also includes sharif, 
or individuals with particular family names who also trace their bloodline to the Prophet 
Mohammed and enjoy moral and political standing as a result.   
 It is useful to describe the nature of family and kin groupings in Morocco as a preface to 
understanding other topics of significance, including the role of the makhzen in contemporary 
political affairs.  Mounira M. Charrad argues that strong family and kin groupings played a role in 
state formation in Morocco rather than in Algeria.118  These groupings remain salient, in 
particular since Moroccan politics can be read as a single history of consolidation of political 
allegiances of the tribes, kin groupings, and later political parties around the person of the King.  
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Although there is considerable discord among family groups within the political sphere—and the 
king is thus an indispensable part of solving these disagreements in the absence of a strong 
political system—their strength probably played an important role in the production of a small, 
political class.  In later chapters, discussions of constituency responsiveness and the potential 
tensions posed by the clientalistic logic of the political system will be enhanced by a greater 
understanding of the differences between family and king in Morocco and the clan and large 
family tree in Algeria. 
 Abdeslam M. Maghraoui argues that Morocco is characterized by a weak formal political 
process in which the executive exercises hegemony over weak political parties and a discredited 
political process exists to ensure continuation of the political and economic status quo.119  This 
assessment is accurate insofar as it highlights the weak role of the legislative branch in 
policymaking and the salience of patron-client relationships in the everyday working of 
government.  The makhzen, a word literally meaning storehouse, but connoting in contemporary 
usage the state or administration, “refers to the individuals and institutions that carry out the 
king’s rule”.120  It is comprised of a group of well-connected families, landowners, high-ranking 
military officers, security forces, army hierarchy, corrupted elements of the business elite, high 
levels of the bureaucracy, the parastatal managers, and the parties of the administration, who are 
the palace’s clients who served the sultan since colonial times.121   
 The makhzen have become synonymous with the state and are well positioned to advance 
their political and economic interests through the state structure.122  Their control extends to the 
Royal Cabinet, an extra-constitutional body which governs alongside the government cabinet 
comprised of advisors and senior army officers close to the palace, as well as the Ministries of 
Sovereignty—Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Religious Affairs—which are appointed by 
the King and answer to the king and the Royal Cabinet, rather than to the prime minister.123  
Local governance of sixteen administrative regions created in 1997 constitutes a form of 
decentralization, but one must note that the powers of these units is limited by oversight of the 
decisions of locally-elected officials in a system of tutelle, and the considerable power remains in 
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important local extensions of executive power: the caid and wali (governor) is the local official of 




Observers remark that there are only two parties in Algeria: the army and the 
administration.125  In this view, political parties, ministers, and the bureaucracy are extremely 
weak groups of “civil servants who work for the army” and are subordinate to those in the most 
powerful government position, including the President, the Minister of the Interior, and the 
governors (walis).  Roberts has characterized the Algerian multiparty experience as “an extremely 
limited form of pluralism managed and manipulated by an executive dominated by the 
military.”126  The role of the ruling clique within the army is so important, Eva Bellin writes that 
“every state has an army but in Algeria the army has a state”.127  Algeria is a republic, however, 
as noted, real power on the weightiest matters is not vested in the president but in a “ruling 
clique” referred to as le pouvoir (the power or authority) or les décideurs (the decision-
makers).128  Policies are made in: “(1) closed circles in the capital city and (2) in the interior 
regions where family names and religious congregations hold sway over their representatives in 
the capital”.129       
 The basis of the Algerian regime’s legitimacy is historical, built on the revolutionary 
credentials of the National Liberation Front and strengthened by democratic legitimacy as a result 
of the political liberalization process.  At independence, the Army of National Liberation became 
the National Popular Army.  The single vanguard national party, the National Liberation Front 
(FLN), was created and former resistance leaders Boumedienne, Benjedid, Zeroul, Ben Bella, 
Boudiaf, and Bouteflika served as presidents.  Regime legitimacy is built upon Revolution, 
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Nation, Socialism, Arab-Islamic, and People’s democracy, rather than on democratic pluralist 
theory.130   
 The gap in legitimacy founded on participation in the liberation fight began at 
Boumedienne’s death in 1978 and continued to widen until the riots of the late 1980s made 
political reform necessary.131  The Algerian regime sought to foster “democratic legitimacy” in 
order to replace “revolutionary legitimacy” in a context in which nearly seventy percent of the 
country’s population was born after the revolution.132  It does so, however, while hanging on to 
power, maintaining a weak, puppet legislature subordinated by a strong presidency dependent on 
the military.  Ait Ahmed, the leader of the FFS and one of Algeria’s “chefs historiques,” has 
likened Boutiflika’s presidency to a “constitutional dictatorship” in which “incumbent rulers 
agree to open up the political system as long as their interests are preserved”.133   
  Evans and Phillips describe the Algerian political regime as an entrenched oligarchy 
which enriches itself through kickbacks from oil and gas deals; the political system serves to 
arbitrate the division of the yield.  In Algeria, clans compete with one another and “structures, 
apparatus, and institutions . . . are run in total accordance with the principle of equilibrium 
between the groups and the clans”.134  Personal and clan interests pervade the administration and 
crucial decisions are made based on factional struggles rather, than on legitimate differences in 
policy or ideology rather than on requirements of good policy.  
 Charrad writes that family and kin groupings were less important in state formation in 
Algeria, in part because of the decimation of indigenous groupings and institutions as a result of 
French divide and rule policy.  Tribe or clan may be thought of as a politically relevant unit 
which cannot be ignored in a study of legislative representation and constituent service.135  
Politically relevant groupings in Algeria are not based primarily on kinship or tribe, as in 
Morocco, but rather on large family trees in the North African sense of tribe.136  Observers often 
refer to the clan in the sense of region or original and political clan, denoting a group that is 
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linked in the hierarchy of political power by personal relationships.137  These differences in the 
nature of clan and family come to bear on aspects of political institutions, including on the nature 




 Two features of parliamentary institutions should be relevant to between-country 
hypotheses at all three levels in the conceptual framework.  These include the nature of 





 There are certain differences in the nature of the parliamentary membership in the two 
countries which are important to note, particularly as we assess the relationship between the 
action of members of parliament and the perceptions of these attitudes by ordinary citizens.  The 
first is that in Morocco the parliamentary membership is drawn mainly from the makhzen: 
members of well-connected families, wealthy landowners, and tribal leaders.  Parliamentary 
rosters in Morocco share a number of common family names and this membership is not seen by 
many ordinary citizens as expanding or departing from the status quo of the past despite regime 
claims of democratization.  The makhzen are the real government administration whose interests 
are ensured by the political process.   
 In Algeria, access to the parliament is narrowly expanding to individuals who were at the 
margins but who successfully used their relationship to powerful individuals in the regime or 
standing with the local community to obtain seats.138  Even if the structure of political power—or 
the hegemony of powerful generals in policymaking and the role of the administration in 
executing it—has not changed, there is a sense in which access to political power is changing.  A 
member of parliament in Algeria might have been previously unknown, but was selected via a 
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connection to the president or his family prior to liberalization.  In Algeria, many members have 
had little political experience; some were teachers, doctors, or were unemployed prior to 
election.139   
 As a consequence of differences in the memberships, members of parliament in Morocco 
are more likely to have access to ministers; for example, to seek help with casework requests.  
Further, constituents may be more likely to view parliamentarians negatively as being part of the 
same privileged class that has dominated politics for some time. 
  
Second Public Function 
 
 A second difference in parliamentary institutions concerns the nature of the bureaucracy 
and its relationship to the parliament.  As noted, this difference will be presented and assessed as 
a factor explaining both between and within-country variation in casework provision in Chapters 
4 and 5.  Although both countries have a strong bureaucracy,140 the parliament is not functionally 
distinct from the executive and bureaucracy in Morocco in that members can be named as 
ministers while retaining their seats.  Many members of parliament are also elected to municipal 
or provincial assemblies or are elected as mayors or heads of provincial councils.  Survey data 
suggests that as many as 40 (40.9 percent) of the sample also hold a second public function.  
Individuals in the bureaucracy and the parliament represent the interests of a single elite class of 
which they are a part.       
 In Algeria, the constitution prohibits deputies not only from exercising a second function, 
but also from engaging in a number of types of paid work.  Algerian members can continue to 
engage in business, which generally becomes easier with the status and connections afforded by 
their public position. 
 The single political class and, more specifically, the relationship between the parliament 
and the bureaucracy in Morocco has consequences for the potential capacity of the parliament to 
provide (and resolve) casework requests and to provide district projects. 
 
Parliamentary Liberalization History 
 
 The political liberalization experiences of the two countries, which began at 
approximately the same time, differ in a number of important respects.   
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 Moroccan liberalization experience has been gradual--“cycles of political opening 
followed by varying degrees of return to repression”141—and has been associated with freedom of 
expression, human rights, and continued liberal economic reform, and has been less clearly linked 
to the parliament.142  According to Amy Young, although Mohammed VI released political 
prisoners, “…scholars today have cast doubt on whether there is actually substantial change in the 
area of promoting democracy and human rights”.143  In terms of economics, the size of the most-
traditional rural notables is shrinking and the king is increasingly appointing reform-minded, or at 
least liberal economic reform minded elites, to technocratic positions which characterize the same 
“reserved domains” outside of electoral politics.144   
 Because of the pace of political change since King Mohammed VI took the throne in 
1999, many observers indicate that liberalization is further along in Morocco, owing to the 
gradual but sustained opening which began with the appointment of the first opposition Prime 
Minister, Abderrahmane Youssoufi, in 1998.  The Moroccan multiparty parliamentary experience 
has been longer, and inclusion of opposition parties less abrupt, while the Algerian experience is 
associated with a violent and tumultuous period of transition.  Its longer history of multiparty 
politics has led to a more institutionalized party system in Morocco than in Algeria.  Although it 
serves at the pleasure of the king, who can dissolve it at any time, the parliament was first directly 
elected in the late 1970s and since that time has gradually gained some measure of influence in 
some areas of national debate and policymaking.  In Morocco’s 1997 legislative elections, 
candidates from the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) ran, and in 2002 a national 
list for women was created.  Nevertheless, observers both within and outside the parliament view 
it as dominated by the executive and unable to play an independent role in control and 
policymaking.    
                                                     
141 Laurie A. Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1998).: 31. 
142 These include: the establishment of a Consultative Council in 1990 and Ministry of Human Rights in 
1993; a Constitutive Council for Social Dialogue in 1994; an anti-drug campaign in 1994; the creation of a 
Moroccan chapter of Transparency International in 1995; successive improvements to the transparency of 
elections, at least on election day, improvements in human rights and expression, and the reform of the 
Personal Status Code in 2004.  See Saloua Zerhouni, "Elite Et Transition Democratique Au Maroc: Les 
Parliamentaires De La Legislature 1997-2002" (Universite Hassan II - Ain Chok, 2001-2002).   
143 Amy Elizabeth Young, "Meeting the Quota: Cooperation among Leftist and Islamist Women to Promote 
Political Participation in Morocco" (paper presented at the Fifth Mediterranean Social and Political 
Research Meeting, Florence & Montecatini Terme, 24-28 March 2004 2004).: 3. 
144 See also Tozy, "Morocco's Elections: Islamists, Technocrats, and the Palace.": 38>  Unpublished 
BJMES paper.  A countervailing trend has been the rise of the intelligence services (Direction de la 
Surveillance du Territoire, DST) since September 11, 2001 and the rise of the head General Laanigri who 
is becoming more prominent than Interior Minister Ahmad Midaoui.  An ARD report notes that the King’s 
cousin, Moulay Hishem, has been persecuted for advocating a constitutional monarchy. See Payne, 
"Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco.": 9. 
 
  61 
 In Algeria, where liberalization has been more limited and characterized by abrupt starts 
and stops, the parliament has been at the center of the recent democratic experiment, which 
resulted in civil war during the 1990s.  Though it existed as a forum for discussion among 
members of the country’s single vanguard party since independence in 1962, the Algerian 
political system was opened to multiparty elections in 1990. Following the 1992 victory of the 
Islamic Salvation Front, the military annulled the elections, plunging the country into a ten-year 
civil war that took the lives of more than 150,000.  In Algeria, multi-party elections resumed in 
1997 at the height of the civil war which engulfed the nation following the constitutional coup in 
1991 of the military of the Islamic Salvation Front who was posed to win a majority in 
Parliament.  Human rights and freedoms have eased as a wave of controversial amnesty 
referendum moved Algeria closer to political stability, even while it remains in a state of 
emergency.  These changes, nevertheless, have effect on the intention of ruling elites to hold only 
power indefinitely.  In Algeria, it is clear that the military-backed regime increasingly 
consolidated in a strong executive.  However, these changes are really a narrow expansion of 
access to the yield without changes to the political status quo or structure of power, for example, 
by including 1000 more people.  The parliament remains controlled by the executive and by a 
institutional culture of support for the program of the president. 
 Three legislatures were elected in Algeria after the resumption of multiparty elections in 
1997, 2002, and 2007.  Although the parliament plays an extremely limited role in policymaking, 
parties representing a range of perspectives, including moderate Islamist, socialist, nationalist, 
and Berber, have held seats in the last two sessions.  Nevertheless, the military has played a 
strong role in manufacturing a political class by dismantling political parties and creating new 
ones which mirror the original political landscape of the 1991 elections.  The FLN, and a number 
of created parties which are its allies, remains the dominant political force giving assent to the 
program of the executive and largely acquiescing to its use of decree powers between sessions. 
 Because of these differences, Algerians may be more likely than Moroccans to believe 
that their country has undergone a change in regime, owing to the recent introduction of a 
multiparty legislature.  William Mishler and Richard Rose show that popular support for 
democracy in post-communist Europe depends on both fears of the old regime and prospective 
evaluations or hopes for the future under the new democratic regime.  It follows that constituents’ 
views about the desirability of democratic political institutions may depend on whether they 
associate present, weak parliament with democracy, or with a non-democratic status quo which 
has remained the same under political liberalization.   
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Conclusion 
 
 These differences in institutional setting, nature of the parliamentary membership, 
relationship between the bureaucracy and the parliament, and parliamentary liberalization history, 
will come to bear in future chapters as I present and assess competing explanations for 
similarities and differences in within-country effects.  While incumbents in these two institutional 
settings have contrasting preferences for legislative politics—here I focus on level of debate and 
casework capacity--they have similar preferences for parliaments with limited independent 
influence on policymaking.  Thus, in the first, elite-level arena we expect to find variation in 
parliamentary institutions--external, internal, or electoral rules—which reflect incumbent 
preferences for legislative politics and which generate higher levels of debate and casework 
capacity in the case of monarchy, compared with the case of a former one-party regime.  In the 
third, mass-level arena, however, we expect similarities in electoral competitiveness and 
legislative prerogatives to generate very similar conditions of mass opinion: depressed popular 
support for having a strong parliament with the power to make laws, as a result of weak and co-
opted parliaments and the poor quality of the representative link.  These popular attitudes should 
be driven by conditions of electoral manipulation and weak parliaments characterizing hegemonic 
electoral authoritarianism, but unaffected by the particular institutional setting.  Taken together, 
these expectations will be relevant to assessing the logic of the conceptual map (Figure I. 1.).  
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CHAPTER III 
 
Legislative Responsiveness or Legislative Patronage?    





The area studies controversy in Middle East studies brought into focus the tension 
between two competing goals: first, to generate in-depth knowledge of the political systems of a 
region and, second, to develop and test theories explaining political dynamics across multiple 
areas of the world.  Work which seeks to address, or at least respect, both of these goals 
simultaneously may meet both practical as well as conceptual challenges.  The notion of 
representation, studied in clientalistic political systems, is one conceptual tension.  On the one 
hand, because formal political institutions exist in a wide variety of regime types and world 
regions, they may serve as “analytical bridges” in cross-national and cross-regional analysis.145  
On the other hand, characteristics of these institutions differ across regions and cases, casting 
doubt on whether comparison of political dynamics between them is really meaningful.   
Here I consider how the application of theoretical and empirical work from western 
democracies creates a tension with notions of patronage and clientelism central to mainstream 
understandings of authoritarian politics and to the political logic of Moroccan and Algerian 
politics.  Representation implies responsiveness to the preferences of constituents; yet electoral 
manipulation and patronage challenge the notion that casework, or any other actions of members 
of parliament in authoritarian settings, constitutes representation.  I argue that rather than 
obfuscate our understanding of the dynamics of legislative politics, application of theories and 
definitions of representation from democratic political contexts to other political settings sharpens 
not only our understanding of how institutional arrangements affect political behavior, but also 
how and why the failure of representation contributes to the robustness of authoritarian regimes. 
                                                     
145 Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative 
Perspective. 
 
  64 
In this chapter, I define representation and patron-client relationships, suggesting how the 
differences between the two may be recognized.  Second, I describe the representative link from 
the perspective, first, of the deputy and, then, from the perspective of the citizen.  From these 
descriptions emerge two ways of viewing the casework request: one, as a form of clientelism 
which perpetuates political activities with precedence in the pre-liberalization period or, two, as a 
form of representation which may bolster satisfaction with the political system, and possibly also 
confidence in the parliament, as an important political institution.  In Chapters 4 and 5 I consider 
a whole universe of particularistic demands (i.e. casework) and distinguish them only from public 
policymaking (e.g. member participation in parliamentary debate).  I return in Chapter 6 to the 
question of whether, and to what extent, casework is clientelistic, and assess how this informs an 
understanding of the effects of casework on popular attitudes.   
   
Defining and Operationalizing Representation: The Representation Paradigm 
 
In contrast to direct democracy, polyarchy necessitates modern political institutions 
which imply representation of aggregated interests by elected officials.  In keeping with this 
understanding, modern literature in American politics defines representation as policy 
“congruence”, or the degree to which representatives advocate for the opinions of the 
constituency on specific legislation.  Hanna Pitkin was among the first to argue that 
conceptualization of representation solely as policy congruence is problematic; because of 
interest aggregation, congruence between representatives and constituents is not always possible 
on every issue.146   
Thus, Pitkin argued that representation ought to be conceptualized not as policy 
congruence, but as responsiveness to citizens needs’ and, if necessary, explanation of alternative 
actions on policy matters.  Eulau and Karps further developed a four-part conceptualization of 
representation behavior as “responsiveness” of members to constituents.147   
Eulau and Karps’ conceptualization influenced several decades of research on 
representation in American politics, including a body of literature on constituency service.  Three 
major strands of empirical research examine variation in representative behavior and constituent 
service behavior in the U.S.  First, Fenno’s early qualitative work examines qualitatively how 
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Members of Congress conceptualize their constituency and allocate time and resources 
accordingly.148  A second body of literature uses National Election Study (NES) data and 
qualitative interviews to examine how and why constituency service behavior varies in the 
national legislatures of U.S. and Britain.149  Finally, numerous quantitative studies measure and 
explain variation in the amount of and importance placed on casework among state legislators.150  
These studies provide an intellectual foundation for survey question-wording and hypothesizing 
in this project.  More importantly, they provide the basis of what I call the representation 
paradigm, or the notion that the actions of members, including casework, are a form of 
representation with the potential to bolster satisfaction with the political system and possibly also 
confidence in the parliament as an important political institution.  Viewed from this perspective, 
casework and other forms of constituency responsiveness in Morocco and Algeria could play a 
role in promoting democratic transition and consolidation if they raise public confidence in and 
demand for a strong parliament. 
 
Operationalizing the Four Components of Representation 
 
In Eulau and Karps’ work, representation had four components: policy responsiveness, 
symbolic responsiveness, allocation responsiveness, and service responsiveness.  Policy 
responsiveness comprises actions of representatives to vote according to the preferences of 
constituents.  This is referred to as the lawmaking function.  Symbolic responsiveness is 
psychological, implying a relationship “built on trust and confidence expressed in the support that 
the represented give to the representative and to which he responds by symbolic, significant 
gestures, in order to, in turn, generate and maintain continuing support”.151  It involves 
communicating with constituents about work of the member in the House.  Allocation 
responsiveness comprises project assistance, “assisting state and local governments in their 
attempts to secure federal grants from agencies that possess discretion in allocation of such 
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funds”.152  Allocation responsiveness generally refers to projects for development in a member’s 
district.  Finally, service responsiveness, the primary subject of this present study, refers to taking 
care of individual requests.  Often called casework, it describes in the Algerian and Moroccan 
surveys, “. . . requests received from citizens relative to housing, employment, or  
education . . .”153   
Finally, constituency service, and particularly casework, is significant for several reasons.  
First, the legitimacy of legislatures is based on the claim of members to represent citizens.154  
Therefore, the extent to which members provide casework and other potential forms of 
representation will have consequences for how citizens evaluate the parliament and its importance 
in the policymaking process.  Second, constituency service is extremely consequential because 
new authoritarian regimes restrict the parliament by circumscribing its role in lawmaking.  
Casework is one of the only forms of representation open to many members of parliament in 
order to generate popular support; virtually all research on parliaments in developing countries 
identifies constituency service, especially casework, as the major tasks in which members 
engage.155  Third, the resolution of casework requests requires resources and networks.  Given the 
firm grasp that incumbents hold on sources of patronage, members’ ability to provide casework 
may depend on whether they acquiesce in the legislature.  Finally, in contrast to aggregate 
measures, the representative link and the provision of casework provides a means by which to 
directly access the impact of representative institutions on citizens’ political attitudes.   
I use these four terms (Column 1) and their common appellations (Column 2) from the 
American politics literature (See Table III. 1.).  Further, in my analysis, I divide representation 
into two forms: policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness, which includes the three 
constituency-oriented activities of communication, projects, and casework (Column 3).  Column 
4 lists ways of conceptualizing these activities from the perspective of the patron-client paradigm, 
which I discuss next. 
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TABLE III. 1.  The Representation and Patron-Client Paradigms 
Type of 
Representation 
Other Terms in 
Representation 
Literature 












Policy Responsiveness Contestation/ 
Moderation/ 
Acquiescence 


























The Representation Paradigm in the Moroccan and Algerian Member Survey 
 
I used Eulau and Karps’ stylized forms of responsiveness in the member survey, asking 
members to rank their activities in terms of the time they devote to each.  I ask further questions 
about each type of representation; however I focus on casework.  Members generally agreed that 
the categories are appropriate, but differed in their responses to them.  After reading the four 
categories of legislative activities, one Moroccan member said: “You know what we do.  This is 
what we do.”156  An Algerian member noted, however, that: “Some members are reluctant to 
respond because they know that they are not doing what they are supposed to be doing.”157  These 
statements should not be viewed as contradictory, but rather as indicative of the fact that the 
functions of Moroccan and Algerian parliamentarians are parallel, in certain respects, to those of 
democratic legislatures.  
The member data yield the following distributions.  Overall, casework is ranked the most 
time-consuming activity (2.4 in Morocco and 2.1 in Algeria), followed by lawmaking (2.5 in 
Morocco and 2.3 in Algeria), and projects (2.9 in Morocco and 2.8 in Algeria) in both countries 
(See Table III. 2.).  Communicating with citizens about legislative work is a low priority in both 
countries.  Overall, these data suggest some commonalities in the way members spend their time 
                                                     
156 Morocco, Member Interview #1, January 2006. 
157 Algeria, Member Interview #1, April 2006. 
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in the two countries, but also differences; for example, the greater importance of projects among 
Moroccan members.  The reason for the latter might be investigated in future research.  If taken 
alone, these data suggest that members are engaged in important representative activities and, 
accordingly, that the representation paradigm is appropriate for the Moroccan and Algerian cases. 
 
TABLE III. 2. Representative Activities among Moroccan and Algerian Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
Most Time-Consuming Task:   
     Projects for the District 26 (28.6%) 14 (17.3%) 
     Debating and Writing Laws/Policies 32 (35.2%) 35 (43.2%) 
     Providing Help with Individual Requests 23 (25.3%) 30 (37.0%) 
     Communicating with Constituents 4 (4.4%) 1 (1.2%) 
     Meeting with Members of Party 6 (6.6%) 1 (1.2%) 
Total 91 81 
   
Mean Rank (1=Most time to 5=Least time):   
     Projects for the District 2.9 (1.6)a 2.8 (1.3) 
     Debating and Writing Laws/Policies 2.5 (1.4) 2.3 (1.5) 
     Providing Help with Individual Requests 2.4 (1.1) 2.1 (1.1)b 
     Communicating with Constituents 3.4 (1.1) 3.6 (1.0) 
     Meeting with Members of Party 3.7 (1.3) 4.0 (1.1) 
Total 92 84 
 
 
The Representation Paradigm in the Moroccan and Algerian Constituent Survey 
 
Moroccans and Algerians constituents want deputies, first, to obtain funds for 
development projects; second, to take care of citizens’ request; third, to work on writing and 
debating laws; and fourth and fifth, to communicate with citizens and organize meetings with 
party members (See Table III. 3.).  However, they believe that deputies prioritize these tasks in 
nearly the reverse order.   
Even among those who believe elections are now democratic, there is an expectation that 
deputies will contribute to real social and economic change: “There won’t be any fraud this time.  
But people still won’t have confidence until they see something concrete.”158  Qualitative 
evidence suggests that citizens expect members to be close to them in the district and to solve 
social and economic problems in their community.  Taken together, interview and survey 
evidence from constituents suggests a representative gap: citizens believe that members are not 
present and that they do little to solve problems in the district.  This evidence casts doubt on the 
                                                     
158 Algeria, Constituent #2, April 2007. 
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appropriateness of the representation paradigm for understanding parliamentary politics in 
Morocco and Algeria. 
 
TABLE III. 3.     Expectations and Perceptions Moroccan and Algerian Constituents 















Obtaining Funds 1 5 1 3 
Writing and Debating Laws 3 2 3 2 
Taking Care of Citizens’ Requests 2 4 2 1 
Informing Citizens 4 3 4 4 
Organizing Meetings with Party 5 1 5 5 
Questions: Please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the 
following statements: (1) Only people with a connection to a deputy can ask for help with a personal 
problem (2) People around here do not trust the outcome of elections. 
 
 
Defining and Operationalizing Patronage and Clientelism:  
The Patron-Client Paradigm 
 
While operationalizing representation as a set of tasks may be a useful way of analyzing 
political institutions and outcomes, it is not reflective of legislative politics if it presupposes 
wrongly that the legislature as a whole is representative, or that casework requests themselves are 
not merely forms of patronage or clientelism.  In other words, casework could have positive 
affects in the political system, as scholars writing on developing polities in the 1960s and 1970s 
believed, by building popular support for the parliament and contributing to its development.  
But, the fact that partisan legislatures appear to contribute to the robustness of authoritarian 
regimes casts doubt on the hypothesis that casework promotes mass-level confidence in the 
parliament, or contributes to oversight of the bureaucracy.  In both of these ways, the 
representation paradigm can be placed in doubt by the politics of patronage and clientelism.   
 
A Representative Legislature 
 
Whereas democratic legislatures “. . . fundamentally serve to provide stable patterns of 
popular representation . . . [t]he raison d’etre of authoritarian institutions is not to constrain 
‘despotic power,’ but to supply a regime with the ‘infrastructural power’ necessary to implement 
its command over potential opposition in civil society and within the multiple layers of the state 
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apparatus itself.”159  A representative legislature presupposes that elections provide genuine 
democratic choice and achieve a distribution of parties (and independents) which, according to a 
set of agreed-upon electoral institutions free from institutional bias, matches the preferences of 
the electorate.160  
Since electoral authoritarianism circumscribes democratic choice through electoral 
manipulation and maintains a loyal parliament through patron-client relationships, it will be non-
representative by definition.  In Chapter 1 I argued that weak legislatures, along with non-
competitive elections, are a second constitutive feature of electoral authoritarianism.  Here I argue 
that patronage, along with the violations of democratic norms in electoral structuring (i.e. 
electoral manipulation), is a second tool that incumbents use to maintain “loyal”, acquiescent 
parliamentary membership. 
 Clientelism and patronage in the parliamentary system—whether the member is serving 
as a client of incumbent elites or as a patron of political supporters—challenge the representative 
nature of the legislature, limiting “its effectiveness in pursuing policy goals . . . [by feeding] into 
a pattern of factions” and by violating personal equality and individual rights within the political 
system.161  Put another way, representation refers to the alignment of the interests of 
policymakers to those of the general public; when members privilege narrow interests rather than 
those of the general public, they challenge the representative nature of the parliament.162   
 
Defining Patronage and Clientelism 
 
In the literature and in this project, clientelism and patronage are used interchangeably.163  
Patron-client relationships are hierarchical relationships between two people of unequal status 
and resources for which both parties find mutual benefit in an exchange of interests.164  
Waterbury suggests that they are asymmetrical and durable in the sense that the patron keeps 
                                                     
159 Dan Slater, "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in 
Malaysia," Comparative Politics 36, no. 1 (2003).: 81-2. 
160 Schedler, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation.": 39. 
161 Sa'eda Kilani and Basem Sakijha, Wasta: The Declared Secret (Amman: Jordan Press Foundation 
Printing Press, 2002). 
162 M. Castanheira and H. S. Esfahani, "Political Economy of Growth: Lessons Learned and Challenges 
Ahead," in Explaining Growth: A Global Research Project, ed. M. Gary and S. Lyn (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003). 
163 See, for example, Nicolas van de Walle, "Presidentialism and Clientalism in Africa's Emerging Party 
Systems," Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 2 (2003).: 297-8. 
164 Landé, 1977, xx, as cited in Jean and Yves Schemeil Leca, "Clientélisme Et Patrimonialisme Dans Le 
Monde Arabe," International Political Science Review 4, no. 4 (1983).: 455. 
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track in order to continue to extract benefits by providing discriminatory access to resources.165  
Different forms of clientelism may exist; for example, political or electoral clientelism, defined as 
the exchange of goods for political support.166  Authoritarian clientelism draws particular 
attention to coercion, in that it involves “enduring political subordination of clients . . . reinforced 
by the threats of coercion.”167 
In the literature on the Arab world, wasta is also used interchangeably with both 
patronage and clientelism.  In contemporary spoken Arabic, wasta can refer to both the one who 
acts as an intermediary and the act of providing the favor itself.  Wasta is a social tool with deep 
historical precedence in which loyalty to family, tribe, religion, and sect is used to achieve a 
mutually beneficial exchange of interests.168  In this sense, wasta simply means using an 
intermediary to solve a problem and it could apply to a purely private matter; for example, 
helping someone get a job in the private sector.  The one who seeks the favor, the one who acts as 
a mediator, and the one who provides the benefit or service all gain something, but the latter 
benefits most, arguably, from the prestige of having provided the service and from the open-
ended “tacit power and . . . social debt” which results from the “exchange.”169  In its 
contemporary usage, however, wasta generally refers to the use of an individual’s position within 
a state bureaucracy and the resources of the state to gain power and influence (for the giver) to 
solve a problem or gain preferential treatment (for the receiver).  In this sense it is similar to 
notions of the patron-client relationship in literature from a number of world regions.170    
 
Particularized Demands versus Patronage and Clientelism 
 
Research on constituency service in American Politics generated debate on the benefits 
and drawbacks for democracy of members providing particularistic benefits to individuals and 
associations, especially through casework.  In a certain sense, these requests are preferential in 
                                                     
165 Gellner and Waterbury, eds., Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies. 
166 Javier Auyero, "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account," Latin American 
Research Review 35, no. 3 (2000), Leonard Wantchekon, "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence 
from a Field Experiment in Benin," World Politics 55, no. 3 (2003), John Waterbury, "An Attempt to Put 
Patrons and Clients in Their Place," in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, ed. Ernest and John 
Waterbury Gellner (London: Duckworth, 1977).Wantchekon: 400.Auyero: 58. 
167 Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," World 
Politics 46, no. 2 (1994).: 153. 
168 Kilani and Sakijha, Wasta: The Declared Secret.: 21. 
169 Sa'eda Kilani and Basem Sakijha, Wasta: The Declared Secret (Amman: Jordan Press Foundation 
Printing Press, 2002).: 21.  See also Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab 
Society. 
170 See, for example, Auyero, "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account." 
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nature.  On the one hand, benefits for districts, organized interests, and individuals and 
associations (“pork-barrel politics”) may diverge from the interests of the broader population in 
favor of the interests of a particular constituency.  On the other hand, casework was justified as a 
means of oversight--a means by which to determine when individuals are not getting those rights 
and privileges to which they are entitled by law.  How can we recognize the difference between 
particularistic demands, which exist in most democratic political settings, and patronage?     
The state apparatus in both Morocco and Algeria—along with the parliamentary 
system—operates via the logic of patron-client relations, reproducing itself in the various 
structures of governance.171  Members of parliament can and do use both personal and state 
resources, including both material resources and personal connections, to solve casework 
requests.  The difference between particularistic benefits and clientelism may not always be clear-
cut. 
Sa’eda Kilani and Basem Sakijha suggest that the need for wasta arises from bureaucratic 
bottlenecks which are out of the control of the seeker, and that the act of providing wasta 
contradicts “norms and laws”.172  This occurs when the request is legal (though preferential) or 
illegal to “go around the law . . . regain a lost right . . . or avoid routine and administrative 
complications.”173  I argue that a casework request is clientalistic if it breaks a law, or, if it 
involves inequality, reciprocity, and proximity.174  In the words of a Jordanian elite: “Wasta 
violates the individual’s rights who feels betrayed, and insecure.  It creates chaos in the country 
and overall dissatisfaction”.175  A request would break a law if it violates, in some way, individual 
rights and equality as guaranteed by the constitutions of Morocco and Algeria, inter alia.  If it 
does not involve one of these two conditions, I suggest that it is particularistic, not clientalistic. 
 
Member Perspectives on the Legislative Link 
 
Three general patterns emerge in the interview and survey data concerning the 
representative link from the perspective of the member.  First, members express their view of 
their role and the nature of their constituency in very diverse ways.  Second, to the extent to 
                                                     
171 See, for example,Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization, Azzedine Layachi, State, 
Society & Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life (Washington, DC: The Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1998), Hugh Roberts, "The Algerian Bureaucracy," 
Review of African Political Economy  (1982). 
172 Kilani and Sakijha, Wasta: The Declared Secret, Sakijha, Wasta: The Declared Secret.: 21. 
173 Sakijha, Wasta: The Declared Secret.: 20.  Algeria, Member #27, March 2007. 
174 Leca, "Clientélisme Et Patrimonialisme Dans Le Monde Arabe.", Waterbury, "An Attempt to Put 
Patrons and Clients in Their Place.": 337. 
175 Dr. Maysoun Bdour., cited in Kilani and Sakijha, Wasta: The Declared Secret.. 79. 
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which patterns emerge in open-ended responses to questions about the role of a deputy, these 
patterns reflect language in the constitution pertaining to the role of the parliament and 
parliamentarian.  Finally, basic notions of role types emerge in the open-ended interviews, but 
these types appear clearer among Moroccan than Algerian members, suggesting that the longer 
length of multiparty experience leads to the emergence and differentiation of representative types. 
 
The Role of the Deputy  
 
Parliamentarians describe their role in diverse ways, although their answers cluster 
around constitutional prerogatives.  Algerian members often describe their mandate as “national” 
(Article 105), but highlight the importance of having a presence in the constituency in order to 
“remain faithful to the trust of the people and be permanently aware of their aspirations” (Article 
100).  Moroccan members cite the functions of oversight and legislation prescribed by the 
constitution (Articles 45 and 60, inter alia).176 
When asked how he sees his role, one Islamist deputy in Algeria stated that: “Deputies 
have the following responsibilities: Legislation, following the program of the executive, and 
bringing the preoccupations of citizens to the authorities.”177  For another, the “Role is to defend 
the interests of citizens and the state”.178  For a member of the FLN, the role of the deputy is:  
 
First to legislate—to elaborate the laws that are proposed by the government.  The second 
role is to transmit the complaints of citizens to government.  The deputy must live among 
the citizens.  He must have a parliamentary office in the district.  The deputy does not 
have the power to solve problems.  They try to intervene at the willaya to solve the 
problem.  We ask a lot from a deputy, but they have no resources to solve problems.179   
 
For another Algerian deputy, the role of the deputy is to:  
 
. . . legislate according to the needs of population, to promulgate texts.  Second it is to be 
a link between people and the pouvoir that takes into consideration their demands.  
Finally, it is to question and control the government.  Just like the constitution.180   
 
 The Moroccan Constitution defines the legislative and control function (e.g. Fact-finding 
committees, Article 42) of the legislature, but does not prescribe other roles or functions.  A 
                                                     
176 Morocco, Observer #3, July 2006. 
177 Algeria, Member #17, December 2005. 
178 Algeria, Member #20, December 2005. 
179 Algeria, Member #22, December 2005. 
180 Algeria, Member #19, March 2005. 
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socialist member in Morocco described the role of the parliamentarian as oversight and 
legislation, but did not name representation and accountability within those roles. 
While there is some consensus concerning the role of the deputy, that is, those tasks upon 
which he or she should focus, there is much less consensus within the parliament and the political 
system concerning the prerogatives appropriate for the parliamentarian and parliament.  More 
importantly, however, there has been insufficient public debate concerning the prerogatives of the 
parliamentarian and the parliament; disagreement exists between reformist and traditionally-
minded factions within both parliaments which stymies such a debate.181    
Table III. 4. demonstrates the diversity of opinion concerning whether there is agreement 
among members about the proper role of the deputy, whether there is agreement in other branches 
of government about the role of the deputy, and whether the parliament has adequate power vis-à-
vis these branches.  For each of these statements, deputies are almost evenly split between 
agreement and disagreement.  Further, there is variation in satisfaction levels with the legislative 
experience; satisfaction level does not tend to vary by party.   
 
                                                     
181 Zerhouni, "Elite Et Transition Democratique Au Maroc: Les Parliamentaires De La Legislature 1997-
2002". 
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TABLE III. 4.     Attitudes toward Legislative Development among Moroccan and Algerian 
Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
In House, Agreement about Role of Deputy:   
     Strongly Disagree (1) 6 (6.9%) 6 (7.2%) 
     Disagree 23 (26.4%) 33 (39.8%) 
     Agree 50 (57.5%) 31 (37.4%) 
     Strongly Agree (4) 8 (9.2%) 13 (15.7%) 
Total/Mean 87 (2.7)a 83 (2.6)d 
   
In the Political System, Agreement about Role of Deputy:   
     Strongly Disagree 6 (7.1%) 6 (7.4%) 
     Disagree 20 (23.8%) 34 (42.0%) 
     Agree 49 (58.3%) 32 (39.5%) 
     Strongly Agree 9 (10.7%) 9 (11.1%) 
Total/Mean 84 (2.7)b 81 (2.5)e 
   
Lawmaking Power of the Legislature Sufficient:   
     Strongly Disagree 12 (14.5%) 8 (9.6%) 
     Disagree 34 (41.0%) 25 (30.1%) 
     Agree 24 (28.9%) 38 (45.8%) 
     Strongly Agree 13 (15.7%) 12 (14.5%) 
Total/Mean 83 (2.5) 83 (2.7)f 
   
Level of Satisfaction with Legislative Work:   
     Very Dissatisfied 2 (2.3%) 6 (7.1%) 
     Dissatisfied 38 (43.7%) 41 (48.8%) 
     Satisfied 39 (44.8%) 32 (38.1%) 
     Very Satisfied 8 (9.2%) 5 (6.0%) 
Total/Mean 87 (2.6)aa 84 (2.4)c 
Questions: (1) In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with parliamentary work? (2) At the House 
of Representatives, there is an agreement on the role of the deputy.  (3) At all levels of the political system, 
there is an agreement on the role of the deputy.  (4) The House of Representatives has a constitution power 
that is great enough to permit it to propose bills. 
aa In Morocco, Makhzen party (UC and RNI) deputies are more likely to be satisfied (P Chi2 < .051).   
a In Morocco, Makhzen party (UC and RNI) deputies are more likely to be believe there is an agreement in 
the House about the role of deputies (P Chi2 < .022).   
b In Morocco, Makhzen party (UC and RNI) deputies are more likely to be believe there is an agreement in 
the political system about the role of deputies (P Chi2 < .040).   
c In Algeria, Islamist deputies are less satisfied with parliamentary work (P Chi2 < .050).  
d In Algeria, Islamist deputies are less likely to believe there is an agreement in the House about the role of 
deputies (P Chi2 < .035).    
e In Algeria, government parties (FLN and RND) are more likely to be believe there is an agreement in the 
political system about the role of deputies (P Chi2 < .054).   
f In Algeria, Islamist deputies are less likely to agree that the power of the parliament has enough power to 
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Deputy Role Types 
 
 The beginning of a theory of role types emerges similarly in both countries.  Among 
members who are most active in the parliament, there are those who believe that serving 
constituents through casework provision is appropriate while others believe that it should be 
secondary to work on larger community projects (district projects) affecting many people or on 
legislation for the public good.   
 
Deputy Role Type 1:  Citizen-Orientation  
 
 The first role type, which I call the citizen-orientation, reflects a deputy who is focused 
on the constituency and on having a high level of contact with the constituent and knowledge of 
his or her needs and problems.  For a socialist Moroccan deputy: “the deputy has a mission to 
offer services to solve citizen problems.”182  And for an Islamist deputy in Morocco: “I am in my 
district everyday except for the days that parliament is in session.  I have a daily relationship with 
the district where I live.  I meet ordinary citizens everyday in my house and outside my house and 
in the party headquarters.”183   
 Similarly, in Algeria, for an Islamist deputy: “It is rare that someone will go far to seek 
out a deputy. The deputy must be close and attached to the people.  We try to solve their 
problems and to be faithful to the electoral campaign.  We represent the party.  We risk losing the 
next election.”184  For a deputy from the FLN: “I am in charge of their problems—I consider them 
my own problem.  Our party head advised me to open an office.  If you are not from the district, 
you cannot be elected.  You could never be reelected if you were not there and you are not known 
by the people of the district.”185   
 The citizen-orientation has roots in traditional understandings of the deputy as the 
intermediary between the citizen in the periphery and the government in the capital. 
 
Deputy Role Type 2:  Legislative-Orientation 
 
 By contrast, other members believe that solving citizen requests, while necessary at times 
to maintain electoral support or to assist the party, is fundamentally contrary to democratic 
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practices, or is secondary in importance to the legislative function.  For deputies fitting the 
Legislative-Orientation, one should spend time solving district problems affecting numerous 
people (e.g. lack of electricity in a neighborhood) or writing and debating legislation which they 
view as serving the public interest.  Role types are more clearly differentiated in Morocco, 
perhaps owing to its longer history of multiparty politics.  Moroccan members often appear to be 
clearly in one of these two categories, whereas Algerian members often make statements which 
share aspects of both orientations.  Further, the Legislative-Orientation appears, at least 
tentatively-speaking, to be more common among Moroccan than Algerian members. 
For example, in the words of a socialist deputy in Morocco: “. . . people pushed us to 
move the government to change illegal laws in order to solve their problems.  I am a lawyer so I 
can solve these problems.  By these laws they are suffering under corruption and lack of 
infrastructure.  I choose to be in the committee on legislation in order to change these laws.”186  
And for an Istiqlal deputy: “People don’t understand our role in revising laws.  They want to ask 
for individual problems, personal interests, not collective interests.”187  A USFP deputy said: 
“There are too many problems—the system is ineffective.  I prefer to work on regional, not 
individual problems.  But we are obliged.  We must do this for elections and for the party.  
Citizens don’t even care about big projects.  What they want are their individual problems 
solved.”188  One woman from a small party in Morocco paused and said that she does not take 
care of many individual requests: “I serve globally.  All my action is aimed at serving at the 
national level.”189  A PJD deputy from Morocco added that the: “role of a deputy is not to serve 
citizens.  This can lead to clientelism and pervert the system.  The citizens are many and they 
want help with personal problems, but our real role is to legislate.”190  In the words of an Istiqlal 
member: “I am a deputy of the nation.  I serve, in a collective fashion, 1000 people.  I must be 
effective.  I prefer to ask the government for large projects.  I cannot help with employment.  I 
can’t intervene unfairly for one person.”191  And for a USFP deputy: “I generally try to solve 
problems affecting at least 800 people.  The legislative work is first priority.”192 
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The Nature of the Constituency 
 
  
Members also vary, to a great extent, in terms of the way in which they define their 
constituency.  Although we might expect deputies to identify their electoral district or country as 
the primary identity represented, they do not always do so.  Among the groups and identities 
members could choose as their primary focus of representation—their commune, region, country, 
state or province, electoral district, religious community, ethnic or language group, family or clan, 
party or ideology, social class, or an organized interest—a considerable number of combinations 
of first and second choices were selected.  Even when space is given to select a primary and 
secondary identity, responses range for “country only” to a selection of five or more answers.  
Some also add additional answers such as “women”, “young people in youth associations”, 
“humanism and egalitarianism”, among other responses.  Although this diversity is not inherently 
problematic, it may reflect the lack of discussion and debate about the nature of representation, or 
rather the development of consensus over a long period of parliamentary experience.  
In Algeria, deputies are most likely to say that they represent the country first (48.8 
percent) and the electoral district second (26.8 percent), although many other choices were also 
selected and in various combinations.  In Morocco, deputies are most likely to say that they 
represent their country first (51.1 percent) and their region second (17.1 percent).  The electoral 
district was the first identity represented by 26.8 percent of Algerian members and 11.4 percent of 
Moroccan members.  The electoral district ranked as the second community among 36.2 percent 
of Algerian members and 25.8 percent of Moroccan members.193   
 
“Home Style”: Deputies and Attention to the District 
 
“Home style” reveals much about a member’s awareness of constituents’ wishes and the 
importance attributed to district matters.194  Here again there is considerable diversity in terms of 
the days spent in the district, frequency of speeches and meetings, office hours, types of offices, if 
any, and number of assistants (See Table III. 5.).  Although members in both countries spend 
about the same number of days per month in the district, 16.5 in Morocco compared to 17.4 in 
Algeria, Moroccan members give more speeches per month; 2.1 on average, compared to 1.3 
                                                     
193 In terms of five-point scale measure of representation of the district (1) through the country (5), there is 
diversity along the scale in both countries but the mean is the same, about 3.3 in Morocco and 3.2 in 
Algeria (See Table 5).   
194 R. E.  Infall  and Brian Crisp, "Determinants of Home Style: The Many Incentives for Going Home in 
Columbia," Legislative Studies Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2001).: 487. 
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among Algerian members.  Further, they offer more office hours per week; about 22.3 hours per 
week in Morocco, compared with 19.4 in Algeria.  They have more assistants, on average, and 
they are more likely, on average, to have each of the different types of offices.  In Chapter 4 I 
discuss why differences exist in the capacity of the Moroccan parliament and why it is an 
outcome of elite-level bargaining and reflective of the preferences of monarchs and presidents. 
 There is considerable diversity in the locations deputies receive casework requests, 
including public places such as cafes or mosques, homes, the parliament, party offices, local 
parliamentary offices, businesses, and associations.  In the case of Morocco, members often have 
a dual function in the government administration and, therefore, handle requests at the offices of 
regional or local government.   
 Although most members are presented with individual requests at a number of locations 
as well as by telephone, when asked to identify which of seven types of offices they have, only 
6.4 percent of Algerian and 14.6 percent of Moroccan deputies responded that they do not have 
any of the types of offices listed in the survey.  The plurality, 71.8 percent of Algerian deputies 
and 43.4 percent of Moroccan deputies, use one type of office, while 21.8 percent and 41.8 
percent, respectively, use two or more of these types of offices.   
In Algeria, 19.2 percent claimed to have no or “very little” office hours.  In Morocco, this 
figure is 23.6 percent.  There is a considerable range in the other responses, from 1 to 75 hours 
per week, with several deputies noting that the office is always open.  In Morocco, this figure is 1 
to 24 with some saying “unlimited”.  In both countries, the most common modes are by 
telephone, by self-presentation at the home or office of the deputy or his or her party, by mail, 
and via an intermediary.  
Further, only about half of deputies, 59.0 percent in Algeria and 49.1 percent in Morocco, 
do not employ assistants.  In Morocco, where the multiparty experience is longer, party 
headquarters and assistants, as well as party militants, appear to provide a stronger and better 
developed framework for helping with casework requests.  By contrast, Algerian deputies appear 
to organize themselves on a more individual basis to work for re-election.   
 
 
  80 
TABLE III. 5.     “Home Style” 
 Morocco Algeria 
Mean Geographical Focus of Representation 3.3 (1.2) 3.2 (1.0) 
   
Mean Days in District 16.5 (8.3) 17.4 (6.7) 
   
Mean Speeches/Meetings per Month 2.1 (2.0) 1.3 (1.7) 
   
Mean Office Hours per Week 22.3 (33.5) 19.4 (28.8) 
   
Proportion with Type of Office:   
     Office in Home 38 (41.3%) 34 (40.0%) 
     Office in Party Headquarters in Capital 22 (23.9%) 5 (5.6%) 
     Office in Party Headquarters in District 27 (29.4%) 22 (25.9%) 
     Separate Parliamentary Office in Capital 17 (18.5%) 2 (2.4%) 
     Separate Parliamentary Office in District 38 (41.3%) 24 (28.2%) 
     Office Shared with Another Function in Capital 9 (9.8%) - 
     Office Shared with Another Function in District 5 (5.4%) - 
     Parliamentary Office in Capital (Shared with Other Deputy) - 5 (5.9%) 
     Parliamentary Office in District (Shared with Other Deputy) - 11 (12.9%) 
   
Mean Full-time Assistants .6 (1.1) .3 (.7) 
   





The data reveal that taking care of individual requests is an important function for many 
deputies in both Algeria and Morocco, and that members vary considerably in their provision of 
casework.  The perception among members in both countries is often that they are bombarded by 
requests.  According to one Islah deputy in Algeria, deputies receive “all problems imaginable—
even a headache.”195  A USFP deputy in Morocco described himself as the “eternal assistant,” 
saying that citizens often return with one request after another, and that many come with 
emotional appeals for help based on having voted for the deputy in the previous election.196   
Table III. 6. shows that Moroccan members have higher caseloads on average than do 
Algerian members: 98 requests per month on average in Morocco and 44 requests per month in 
Algeria.   
 
                                                     
195 Algeria, Member #3, December 2005. 
196 Morocco, Member #11, November 2006. 
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TABLE III. 6.     Average Caseloads per Month among Moroccan and Algerian Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
   
Number of Requests per Month (Range) 0 to 1600 0 to 210 
   
Mean Number of Requests per Month 97.8 (215.1) 44.3 (41.1) 
Total 85 70 
 
 
Types of Requests  
 
The types of requests received by Algerian and Moroccan deputies are similar, although 
there are some minor differences reflecting variation in social issues between the two countries.  
For example, the magnitude of the housing crisis makes lodging one of the most common 
casework requests in Algeria, whereas in Morocco it is important, but not mentioned as 
frequently by deputies.  In Algeria, there are also a number of requests connected with the black 
decade, such as social services for bombing victims and their families.   
In Algeria, the majority of requests are social in nature (e.g. employment, housing, and 
health), but often also stem from problems with the corrupt and unresponsive bureaucracy and 
lack of justice in the court system.  Citizens do not generally approach deputies about matters of 
policymaking or their voting record.  Given that housing is in part administered by the 
government, hospitals are public, and jobs, both public and private, are generally doled out on the 
basis of personal relationships, the provision of many services being susceptible to corruption and 
favoritism.  As an example, a young person shared that he could not use the government program 
providing loans for young people to start businesses because he did not have a personal 
connection and that, if approved, the bank manager will expect a cut of the loan.197  A young 
medical student stated that it is now common for doctors in the public hospitals to take bribes for 
beds, which are in short supply, and for members of influential families to receive preferential 
treatment.198  In these matters, the influence of a deputy may be effective in helping citizens 
obtain a service to which they are by law entitled.  There is also a perception among deputies that 
citizens view them as well-paid and this explains why they are so frequently asked for monetary 
handouts.  According to an Independent deputy in Algeria, over 30 percent of the requests he 
receives are for money.199    
                                                     
197 Algeria, Constituent #3, July 2004. 
198 Algeria, Constituent #4, July 2006. 
199 Algeria, Member #5, May 2006. 
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 The most common problems in Morocco also mirror its socioeconomic situation, with 
jobs and basic infrastructure, medicine, education, electricity, and requests for money common 
requests.  An Istiqlal deputy in Morocco, who stated that he receives requests daily for housing 
and medicine, described his casework requests: “This is a rural area and people lack basic 
infrastructure.”200   
At his local parliamentary office in a large Algerian city in the East, an Independent 
deputy showed me an elaborate application and filing system for taking requests and keeping 
records.201  Among the requests received that day was one from a man who was a victim of a 
bombing during the 1990s and needed housing.  The deputy said he would contact the 
government, which administrates several housing programs, about this need.  Another request 
was from a youth sports team in need of funds to participate in a competition.  By contacting an 
association, the deputy was able to procure the needed resources.  Here, both knowledge and 
influence, in additional to an open door driven by electoral incentives, provided a highly efficient 
casework operation which actively seeks requests from citizens. 
An hour in the office hours of a USFP deputy in Morocco provides a further snapshot of 
the requests with which many members are presented.  The deputy stated that he held offices 
hours once a week, and, that he employs a secretary to manage citizens arriving and waiting their 
turn to see the deputy.202   
  
Request 1:  Four middle-aged men who created an association seeking to help people find 
housing asked the deputy to act as an intermediary with the government to register the 
association.  The deputy promised to talk to the quaid, the local representative of the 
King, in order to facilitate the process and obtain the permission. 
 
Request 2:  Three middle-aged men asked for help promoting a business they have just 
started.  When I asked why they came to the deputy, they said that they had gone to 
several parties and other elected official in regional and local government.  One said he 
has known the deputy for four years and considers him educated and capable of helping 
with their request.  He hoped the deputy would have some contacts that could be of use in 
expanding business. 
 
Request 3:  A young woman with a diploma in economic sciences came in for help 
finding a job.  The deputy agreed to contact the Ministry of Work to see if they can help 
find her a job. 
 
Request 4:  A middle-aged woman asked for the deputy’s help in getting a room at the 
university so that her son could defend his thesis.  The deputy said he would speak to the 
administration of the university. 
                                                     
200 Morocco, Member #12, March 2006. 
201 Algeria, Member #6, June 2004. 
202 Morocco, Member #2, April 2006. 
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Request 5:  A middle-aged woman who says she is an old friend of the deputy came in 
with her daughter.  It appeared that they did not have a specific request on that day, and 
may just have been visiting, but stated that the deputy previously helped the young 
woman find a dorm room while she was in university in Rabat.   
 
Request 6:  A middle-aged couple asked for help solving a tax problem related to their 
car.  They stated that the deputy already helped them solve one legal problem when a 
former business partner embezzled money from the company. 
 
Request 7:  Four elderly members of a Berber cultural association asked for help 
obtaining financial resources.  The deputy said he would write a letter to the Ministry of 
Culture to request money for clothing and other needs to develop the association. 
 
Request 8:  A young, unemployed man asked for money.  A heated exchange ensued as 
the deputy explained his role as a Member of Parliament and suggested that the man ask 
for help from associations. 
 
Request 9:  Another young man requested the use of the fax and the phone in the office in 
order to search for a job.  The deputy said that he does not have a phone or a fax machine 
in the office because he used those of his group at the Parliament. 
 
 
Several clear themes emerged from these office hours.  In addition to the diversity of age 
and gender represented by the citizens, the majority of the requests involved asking the deputy to 
play the role of an intermediary, or perhaps even defender, before the government administration.  
The deputy was seen not only to have an open door, but also to have an influence with the 
government that the citizen does not enjoy.  “I am the porte-ecouté”, said the deputy, “None of 
the other deputies in this district work for citizens.  I want people to learn that they can vote for 
someone and that person will work for them.  People don’t have much confidence in deputies 
because many of them get elected and never come to the district.”203   
Like many others I visited in their districts, this deputy makes citizens feel supported and 
represented, even though their requests reveal two pervasive needs; the first socioeconomic, and 
the second for an intermediary to help with seemingly banal administrative requests.  Several 
deputies explained that they must attend weddings and other social events to maintain popularity 
in their party, as well as to foster a sense among citizens that their leaders are defending their 
interests before the government.  One deputy in a rural district in Morocco began the interview 
and then within a few moments a citizen approached him, told him that they were burying the 
citizen’s mother, and the deputy left immediately to be at the funeral with members of his 
constituency.204   
                                                     
203 Ibid. 
204 Morocco, Member #13, June 2006. 
 
  84 
Characteristics of Citizens Who Make Requests 
  
As these brief observations demonstrate, impressions of casework as a privilege of 
wealthy and influential citizens are not by-and-large characteristic of casework operations in 
either country (See Table III. 7.).  Over 80 percent of members in both Algeria and Morocco 
disagree that sometimes only rich citizens can make demands.  The same result holds for the 
statement that only citizens of the same family can ask for help, which is asked only in Morocco.  
As an MP deputy in Morocco commented: “No, friends and family aren’t enough to win an 
election,” and for a USPF colleague, “The rich do not need [to ask] a deputy.  They have other 
means.”205   
Most deputies agree that they are sometimes confronted with illegal requests from 
citizens wishing to find a shortcut or special treatment (e.g. getting a license without taking a 
driving test, etc.) and others admit the existence of abuses of power by deputies in order to help 
family and personal contacts solve personal problems.  There is a relatively high level of 
consensus among deputies that citizens sometimes make baseless claims.  61.0 percent of 
Algerian members and 71.5 percent of Moroccan members agree on this point.  An MSP deputy 
in Algeria said that some requests, while founded, are based on poor knowledge of the law and 
that sometimes citizens ask for help to make an exception above the law.206  In Morocco in 
particular, the integration of legislators into local government position fosters confusion in the 
general public about the role of a deputy, whose role is to legislate on national issues, and a local 
official, whose job is to attend to local problems such as lack of infrastructure. 
 
                                                     
205 Morocco, Member #14, May 2006; Morocco, Member #15, September 2005 
206 Algeria, Member #7, December 2005. 
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TABLE III. 7.     Attitudes of Members Concerning Constituency Responsiveness 
 Morocco Algeria 
Sometimes Only Rich Citizens Can Make Demands:  
     Strongly Disagree (1) 48 (52.8%) 48 (56.5%) 
     Disagree 34 (37.4%) 25 (29.4%) 
     Agree 5 (5.5%) 8 (9.4%) 
     Strongly Agree (4) 4 (4.4%) 4 (4.7%) 
Total/Mean 91 (1.6) 85 (1.6) 
   
I Sometimes Receive Baseless Requests:   
     Strongly Disagree  8 (8.8%) 6 (7.3%) 
     Disagree 18 (19.8%) 26 (31.7%) 
     Agree 41 (45.1%) 35 (42.7%) 
     Strongly Agree  24 (26.4%) 15 (18.3%) 
Total/Mean 91 (2.9) 82 (2.7) 
   
Serving Citizens Improves Government Functioning (Oversight):  
     Strongly Disagree  3 (3.3%) 5 (6.0%) 
     Disagree 4 (4.4%) 10 (11.9%) 
     Agree 47 (52.2%) 28 (33.3%) 
     Strongly Agree  36 (40.0%) 41 (48.8%) 
Total/Mean 90 (3.3) 84 (3.3) 
 
  
Finally, deputies generally receive a large number of requests from women suggesting 
casework operations are relatively open to the general public.  The mean proportion of requests 
coming from women is approximately 30-39 percent and the mode is less than 10 percent in both 
countries.  Deputies fall in all the response categories ranging from less than 10 percent to over 
70 percent.  Percentage of requests from women is not related significantly to the party or to the 
gender of the deputy in either country.  One female deputy in Algeria, in particular, stated that 
“It’s clear.  Women are more comfortable coming to female deputies”.207  In Morocco, many 
male deputies claimed that more women than men make requests of them and those women 
generally come seeking help for their sons and daughters.  In rural areas, some deputies suggest 
that few women come to them directly; instead, a male family member acts as an intermediary, 
but this appears to be an exception rather than a rule.  There appears, therefore, to be diversity in 
the degree to which deputies receive requests from women, but it is clear that both male deputies 
in these societies do not receive requests from men only. 
 
                                                     
207 Algeria, Member #8, June 2004. 
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Rationale for Solving Requests 
 
 There is broad agreement among members that serving citizens is important for 
maintaining electoral support (See Table III. 8.).  In Algeria, 17.6 percent of deputies disagree 
and 84.4 percent agree with this statement.  In the words of an el-Islah deputy from Algeria: 
“Citizens think we don’t bring problems to the government.  They demand results, not an 
effort.”208  A USFP deputy in Morocco who disagreed stated that: “Even if you help citizens [with 
problems], they will forget.  They won’t vote [for you].”209  Other deputies, according to an 
observer, avoid going more often than once a year, or even only at the end of the mandate, 
because of the high expectations that they will solve personal problems and that they will demand 
resources and help arguing that they voted for the deputy.210   
 There is also agreement, though with variation, that serving citizens is the most important 
thing that the deputy does.  This indicator is a proxy for the role-types, Citizen-Orientation and 
Legislative-Orientation.  In Algeria, 85.5 percent of members agree with this statement.  In 
Morocco, this percentage is about 82.5 percent.  Some deputies disagreed with this statement and 
explained their response by stating that their job is to legislate for a national interest--not to serve 
citizens.  Many others, especially in Morocco, agreed, but said that they served citizens by 
legislating for the public good.   
 
TABLE III. 8.     Attitudes of Members Concerning Constituency Responsiveness 
 Morocco Algeria 
   
Serving Citizens Important for Electoral Support (Electoral Basis): 
     Strongly Disagree (1) 0 (0.0%) 4 (4.7%) 
     Disagree 6 (6.5%) 11 (12.9%) 
     Agree 23 (25.0%) 31 (36.5%) 
     Strongly Agree (4) 63 (68.85%) 39 (45.9%) 
Total/Mean 92 (3.6)b 85 (3.2)d 
   
Serving Citizens Most Important Think I Do (Role Type):   
     Strongly Disagree (1) 1 (1.1%) 4 (4.8%) 
     Disagree 15 (16.5%) 8 (9.6%) 
     Agree 30 (33.0%) 23 (27.7%) 
     Strongly Agree (4) 45 (49.5%) 48 (57.8%) 
Total/Mean 91 (3.3) 83 (3.4) 
   
 
                                                     
208 Algeria, Member #27, July 2006. 
209 Morocco, Member #4, May 2006 
210 Morocco, Observer #2, September 2005. 
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Solving Casework Requests 
 
At times, resolution of casework requests is informal.  However, members often handle 
casework through a relatively formal process requiring citizens to present a written file, or in 
some cases the deputy or his staff prepares a file, containing information on the person’s 
qualifications for a job, housing program, or other government service.  Based on this 
information, the deputy assesses the qualifications and makes a written or verbal recommendation 
to a member of the government, contacts private party, or uses his or her own money to help with 
the need.   
Good personal relationships, both in the public and private sector, say deputies, are key to 
solving citizen problems and many regret that they are unable to solve many problems.  
According to an MP deputy in Morocco, members use relationships to find the citizen a job in the 
government, and for a CD deputy in Morocco, professional contacts or relationship with 
associations are a means to provide help for citizens: ”We can’t usually do anything—we write 
oral questions.  If the administration worked, these requests wouldn’t exist.”211  According to a 
USFP deputy: “the administration does not always respond to our requests for help with citizen 
problems, but associations, foundations, and business, many which are run by deputies, provide 
some resources by which to solve requests.”212  “We have a business—that’s why they come to 
me.  We hire”, says one PJD deputy.  Another socialist member in Morocco has a foundation 
funded by his business and uses this as a means to help citizens.  For an MP deputy: “It helps if I 
have a friend in the administration.”213  In Morocco, when the minister leaves the oral question 
session each Wednesday, deputies approach him to hand stacks of dossiers as he descends from 
the parliamentary chambers.  An observer suggested that some deputies attend oral questions on 
Wednesday alone for this opportunity to present requests to the Minister.214 
Deputies vary in their success; direct connections with ministers and bureaucrats (e.g. 
members of the same party), and connections in associations or business are important for solving 
casework requests.  In Algeria, where deputies generally enjoy, on average, a more distant 
relationship from the power, many find the doors of the commune and willaya closed, and 
ministers do not return their phone calls.  Overall, Algerian members appear to be less effective 
than Moroccan deputies at solving casework requests.  This may be the reason they receive fewer 
requests on average.  Although deputies from a variety of parties mentioned the same issue, one 
                                                     
211 Morocco, Member #16, August 2006. 
212 Morocco, Member #17, April 2006. 
213 Morocco, Member #14, May 2006. 
214 Morocco, Observer #3, June 2007. 
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PT deputy said that his calls to ministries and oral questions rarely, if ever, receive a response.  
An Islah deputy in Algeria said: “People think deputies have influence, but we don’t.  We write 
many letters and receive no response.  You must have personal relationships with someone in the 
government, or private relationships, in order to help citizens with problems.”215  One way that 
the regime exercises control over deputies is by their ability to reach their goals, including solving 
citizen requests and influencing development projects in their district.  One Moroccan deputy 
stated that as a result of raising questions concerning human rights abuses in a parliamentary 
committee meeting, the doors are shut for him and he can only use personal, private relationships, 
including his business, to achieve his goals as a member.216  
 
Effects of Casework on Government Functioning 
 
 Although few could provide examples, many deputies agree that taking care of citizen 
requests improves governance or provides oversight of the bureaucracy; 92.2 percent in Morocco 
and 82.1 percent in Algeria.  According to an Islah deputy in Algeria: “If a citizen does not know 
about a right or is blocked, we have the right to plead on their behalf.  This is our role to 
control.”217  But for a PT deputy from Algeria, casework is a stop-gap function--we “need to 
legislate [to improve the system of] governance.”218   
The foregoing summary of casework practices from the perspective of the deputies 
suggests that members are engaged in activities which, although not without obstacles and 
although an outgrowth of an unrepresentative legislature, constitute some form of responsiveness 
to citizens.  Taken alone, this data provides evidence that members engage in activities which 
might have a positive effect in the system, including enhancing the public’s confidence in 
parliamentary institutions. 
But the members’ perspectives also provide details which cast doubt on the representative 
paradigm.  Citizens face barriers to obtaining what they are entitled to because of a culture of 
personal relationships in the provision of public and private goods.  Citizens faced with an 
inefficient and ineffective bureaucracy go to deputies for help, further reinforcing the lack of 
fairness in the provision of government services.  Viewed in this way, the ombudsman role might 
actually reinforce traditional patron-client relations and fail to enhance confidence in democracy 
and democratic institutions.  The perspectives of citizens on the representative link, to which I 
                                                     
215 Algeria, Member #3, December 2005. 
216 Morocco, Member #18, July 2006. 
217 Algeria, Member #9, December 2005. 
218 Algeria, Member #10, July 2006. 
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turn, cast even greater doubt on the usefulness of the representation paradigm for understanding 
the effects of casework in the political system, including its effect on the attitudes and 
orientations of ordinary citizens concerning the appropriateness of parliamentary institutions for 
their society. 
 
Constituent Perspectives on the Legislative Gap 
 
Although some members admit shortcomings in their ability to serve citizens through 
both national lawmaking and local constituency service, most have a more favorable image of the 
legislative link than do citizens.  “There isn’t much of a deputy-citizen relationship”, according to 
a deputy from a majority party in Algeria.  “Many deputies do not have a good reputation because 
they are not close to the population”.219  A Moroccan member from a socialist party suggested 
that: “most deputies don’t bother to do anything during the mandate.”220  Another claimed that 
there is “no link at all between deputies and citizens”.221   
One reason for the gap is that deputies lack staff, resources, and, in most cases, 
responsive bureaucracies to solve citizens’ problems.  “Local offices didn’t work because 
deputies were spending a lot of money and not being able to solve problems,” according to a 
deputy from a majority party in Algeria.  “We are elected but have no resources to stay next to 
them, to listen to them, to help them.  We listen even if we cannot solve everything,” according to 
an Islamist deputy in Algeria.  Another problem is that the historical nature of clientelism in the 
political system, including in the parliament, induces citizens to bring both valid as well as illegal 
requests to members.  According to an Islamist deputy in Algeria, “[m]any requests are valid 
when someone does not know the law they are entitled to, but others are the result of someone 
wanting something outside the law, an exception.  This happens often.” 222 
Some deputies are aware of their poor image, although they tend to argue that citizens 
misunderstand them and their efforts to work within the constraints of their resources.  According 
to an Islamist deputy in Algeria: “[c]itizens think we don’t bring problems to the government.  
People think deputies do nothing.”223  Another said: “[p]eople think deputies earn a lot.  This 
creates conflict.  They think we are the bank and can ask for money for medicine and other 
                                                     
219 Algeria, Member #11, May 2006. 
220 Morocco, Member #10, May 2007. 
221 Morocco, Member #1, January 2006. 
222Algeria, Member #12, December 2005 
223 Algeria, Member #13, May 2006. 
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things.”224  A third Islamist deputy in Algeria said: “[m]any people have a prejudice that it’s hard 
to see a deputy.  He advertises his office.  There is hesitation.  Will he really listen?  Welcome 
me?”225    
Despite these overwhelmingly negative views, some constituents, particularly those 
living in the vicinity of a local parliamentary office, which some members maintain, express a 
positive opinion about the job that particular member is doing.  One Moroccan man outside a PJD 
office said: “these deputies are the only ones who work for us.”226  A number of Algerians 
interviewed also saw deputies as effective in getting resources for their districts.  One Algerian 
man said that he liked one of the deputies from his district because he has “a strong personality 
and can get resources for the willaya”.227   
 
Satisfaction with the Parliament and its Members  
 
 Reflective of these statements are survey data concerning evaluations of the parliament 
and its members, which Moroccans and Algerians view in very critical terms.  Only 9.4 percent 
of Moroccans and 10.1 percent of Algerians think the parliament is doing a good or excellent job.  
Slightly more—16.9 percent in Morocco and 15.0 percent in Algeria—think that members from 
their district are doing well (See Table III. 9.).  
 Among the functions of the parliament, Moroccans believe their parliament is most 
effective at debating national issues (1.6) and worst at communicating with citizens and solving 
their personal problems (1.3).  Algerians view the parliament as best at debate and solving 
economic problems (1.8) and worst at solving their personal problems (1.6).  Overall, however, 
these satisfaction scores are low.  
                                                     
224 Algeria, Member #4, March 2005. 
225 Algeria, Member #13, May 2006.  
226 Morocco, Constituent #1, July 2006. 





TABLE III. 9.     Specific Support for the Parliament and its Members among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents 
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Questions: (1) Overall, how would you evaluate the job the House of Representatives is doing? Etc. 
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Salience of and Contact with the Parliament and its Members 
 
Awareness and knowledge of the parliament seems relatively high in Morocco and 
Algeria.  Salience is higher in Morocco than in Algeria which may be due to the higher level of 
media coverage of the parliament, especially of parties and programs, than in Algeria.  In 
Morocco and Algerian respectively, 46.2 and 33.2 percent believe they have a good or excellent 
knowledge of the House of Representatives and how it functions.  In 2006 and early 2007, 78.4 
percent of Moroccans and 74.2 percent knew the year of the next election (2007).  Although 
similar proportions of Moroccans and Algerians—60.1 percent and 62.6 percent respectively—
never read about the parliament in the last month, the mean number of times was 1.5 in Morocco 
and 0.9 in Algeria.  46.1 percent of Moroccans and 39.4 percent have watched a live debate of the 
parliament, reflective of the higher coverage of live debates in Morocco than in Algeria.  
Moroccans are similarly more likely to pay less attention to the current parliament than to the 
present parliament: 58.3 percent in Morocco and 50.1 percent in Algeria (See Table III. 10).228   
                                                     
228 In 1976, about one-half of Koreans were generally familiar with the legislature.  Chong Lim Kim and 
Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean 
National Assembly," Legislative Studies Quarterly I, no. 3 (1976).: 371. 
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TABLE III. 10.     Salience of the Legislature among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents  
 Morocco Algeria 
Knowledge of House of Representatives:   
     Poor (1) 158 (20.1%) 149 (20.0%) 
     Fair 266 (33.8%) 349 (46.9%) 
     Good 283 (36.0%) 215 (28.9%) 
     Excellent (4) 80 (10.2%) 32 (4.3%) 
Total/Mean 787 (2.4) 745 (2.2) 
   
Knows Year of Next Legislative Election:   
     Yes 323 (78.4%) 245 (74.2%) 
     No 89 (21.6%) 85 (25.7%) 
Total 412 330 
   
Number of Times in Last Month Read about House:   
     None 418 (60.1%) 396 (62.6%) 
     Once 701 (10.1%) 101 (16.0%) 
     Twice 75 (10.8%) 87 (13.7%) 
     Three Times 33 (4.8%) 24 (3.8%) 
     Four or More 99 (14.2%) 25 (3.9%) 
Total/Mean 695 (1.5) 633 (0.9) 
   
Ever Watched a Live Debate:   
     Yes 339 (46.1%) 300 (39.4%) 
     No 396 (53.9%) 462 (60.6%) 
Total 735 762 
   
Follow Debate of Current House:   
     Less Than Previous House (1) 284 (58.3%) 247 (50.1%) 
     About the Same 113 (23.2%) 125 (25.4%) 
     More than Previous House (3) 90 (18.5%) 121 (24.5%) 
Total/Mean 487 (1.6) 493 (1.7) 
Questions: (1) What is your level of knowledge of the role and functioning of the House of 
Representatives? (2) What is the year of the next election? (3) How many times in the last month have you 
read about the House of Representatives? (4) Have you ever watched a live debate of the parliament? (5) 
Do you follow the debate of the current House of Representatives less than the previous House, about the 
same, or more than the previous House? 
 
 
According to interviews, people often recognize deputies in the streets, particularly in 
Algeria and in rural areas.  Moroccans and Algerians are more likely than one might imagine to 
know the name of a member or to have contacted him or her in each of the six ways measured by 
the survey.  About one-third of Moroccans, compared with one-half of Algerians, know the name 
of at least one deputy from their district. 
Several factors may explain these differences.  Relationships with members in Algeria 
appear more informal, likely due to the fact that Algerian members are more accessible because 
many are new elites.  Hugh Roberts suggests that bureaucracy in Algeria, unlike the notables and 
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landowners in Morocco, is mass and popular.229  Members in Morocco say that citizens do not 
understand the difference between a member of parliament and a local official.  The ability of 
Moroccan members to perform two public functions may help explain why fewer Moroccans say 
they know the name of a deputy.  Further, the district magnitude is higher in Algeria than in 
Morocco, which may help explain differences in level of contact.  District magnitude and percent 
of the population that is urban is positively related to whether an Algerian knows the name of a 
member; however, the two are negatively related in Morocco.   
The proportion of Moroccans who have contacted a current member from their district in 
one of the six ways ranges from 3.9 percent (seen a member in his or her home or office) to 19.0 
percent (have seen a member in a public place).  In Algeria, this proportion ranges from 10.0 
percent (seen a member in a party office or home or office) to 33.2 percent (heard of a member 
second hand).  65.2 percent of Moroccans and 43.6 percent of Algerians have never contacted a 
member in any of these ways, while the mean number of ways is 0.7 in Morocco and 1.3 in 
Algeria.  6.4 percent of Moroccans and 16.6 percent of Algerians say a member is a friend or 
family member (See Table III. 11.).      
                                                     





TABLE III. 11. Level of Contact between Citizens and Deputies in Morocco and Algeria, Current Mandate from This 
District 
 Morocco Algeria 
 Yes No Total Yes No Total 
Know Name 235 (32.6%) 487 (67.5%) 722 (100.0%) 343 (50.3%) 339 (49.7%) 682 (100.0%) 
       
From of Contact:       
   Heard of Second Hand 128 (16.2%) 664 (83.8%) 792 (100.0%) 248 (33.2%) 499 (66.8%) 747 (100.0%) 
   Seen in Public Place 151 (19.0%) 642 (81.0%) 793 (100.0%) 200 (27.1%) 539 (72.9%) 739 (100.0%) 
   Seen at a Meeting 90 (11.4%) 703 (88.7%) 793 (100.0%) 162 (21.5%) 592 (78.5%) 754 (100.0%) 
   Seen in Party Office  31 (3.9%) 764 (96.1%) 795 (100.0%) 74 (10.0%) 666 (90.0%) 740 (100.0%) 
   Visited Home or Office 33 (4.2%) 762 (95.9%) 795 (100.0%) 74 (10.0%) 669 (90.0%) 743 (100.0%) 
   Is a Friend or Family Member 50 (6.4%) 737 (93.7%) 787 (100.0%) 122 (16.6%) 611 (83.4%) 733 (100.0%) 
       
Summary of Contact:       
   None 538 (65.2%)    344 (43.6%)   
   One 114 (13.8%)   188 (23.8%)   
   Two 85 (10.3%)   107 (13.6%)   
   Three 51 (6.2%)   62 (7.9%)   
   Four 23 (2.8%)   34 (4.3%)   
   Five 7 (0.9%)   28 (3.6%)   
   Six 7 (0.9%)   26 (3.3%)   
Total/Mean 825 (0.7)   789 (1.3)   
Questions: (1) Please do not tell me his or her name, but do you know the name of a current deputy from this district? (2) Have you heard of a current 
deputy from this district second hand?  Etc. 
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 Although more Algerians than Moroccans know the name of or have come into contact 
with a deputy in the six ways listed in the table, more Moroccans—14.3 percent compared to 9.4 
percent of Algerians—have actually contacted a current member from their district to ask for help 
with a personal or community problem or to express an opinion.   Moroccans and Algerians are 
both most likely to have contacted an elected official from the commune, with about twenty 
percent in each country having done so.  On average, Moroccans and Algerians who have 
contacted an official have contacted a local official twice as many times as a deputy.  Moroccans 
and Algerians were about as likely to be satisfied with the outcome of the request, and slightly 
more likely to be satisfied than dissatisfied with any particular request.  Overall, 2.9 percent of 
Moroccans have had a satisfying experience contacting a member about a problem while 2.0 
percent have had a dissatisfying experience.  5.0 percent of Algerians have had a satisfying 
experience while 4.5 percent have had a dissatisfying experience (See Table III. 12.).   
 The reasons that citizens chose to contact officials differs across country and level of 
government.  In Morocco, while constituents are most likely to contact a deputy because he or she 
is a member of his or her tribe or family (48.7 percent), they are most likely to contact a 
provincial or communal official just because he or she is an elected official (55.3 and 55.7 percent 
respectively).  In Algeria, constituents are most likely to contact a deputy because he or she is a 
member of the same party (29.3 percent), but just because he or she is elected is also an important 
reason (24.0 percent).  Like in Morocco, Algerians are most likely to contact provincial and local 








TABLE III. 12.     Asking Elected Official for Help among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents 
 Morocco   Algeria   
Legislator National Provincial Municipal National State Municipal 
   Has Contacted to:       
      Ask for Help with a Personal Problem 96 (12.0%) 29 (3.6%) 87 (10.9%) 46 (5.8%) 44 (5.6%) 138 (17.5%) 
      Ask for Help with a Community Problem 16 (2.0%) 9 (1.1%) 74 (9.3%) 16 (2.0%) 12 (1.5%) 52 (6.6%) 
      Express an Opinion 2 (0.3%)  1 (0.1%) 3 (0.4%) 12 (1.5%) 13 (1.6%) 12 (1.5%) 
Total
a 114 (14.3%) 39 (4.9%) 164 (20.5%) 74 (9.4%) 69 (8.8%) 163 (20.7%)b 
       
Number of Times:       
   1 73 (64.0%) 16 (43.2%) 51 (32.7%) 9 (17.7%) 12 (20.0%) 18 (12.0%) 
   2 14 (12.3%) 6 (16.2%) 31 (19.9%) 17 (33.3%) 20 (33.3%) 48 (32.0%) 
   3 9 (7.9%) 0 (0.0%) 16 (10.3%) 11 (21.8%) 12 (20.0%) 68 (45.3%) 
   4 or More 18 (15.8%) 15 (40.5%) 58 (37.2%) 14 (27.5%) 8 (13.3%) 16 (10.7%) 
Total/Mean 114 (2.0) 37 (3.0) 156 (3.7) 51 (3.2) 16 (3.5) 150 (6.6) 
       
Level of Satisfaction:       
   Very Dissatisfied (4) 26 (22.6%) 8 (21.6%) 28 (17.7%) 7 (10.6%) 8 (11.8%) 18 (12.0%) 
   Dissatisfied 16 (13.9%) 7 (18.9%) 35 (22.2%) 16 (24.2%) 24 (35.3%) 48 (32.0%) 
   Satisfied 61 (53.0%) 12 (32.4%) 72 (45.6%) 30 (45.5%) 28 (41.2%) 68 (45.3%) 
   Very Satisfied (1) 12 (10.4%) 10 (27.0%) 23 (14.6%) 13 (19.7%) 8 (11.8%) 16 (10.7%) 
Total/Mean 115 (2.5) 37 (2.7) 158 (2.6) 66 (2.5) 68 (2.5) 150 (2.7) 
       
Reason for Selecting This Official:       
   Tribe or Family 57 (48.7%) 1 (2.6%) 5 (3.1%) 5 (6.7%) 7 (9.6%) 13 (7.3%) 
   Friend 10 (8.5%) 4 (10.5%) 15 (9.2%) 13 (17.3%) 10 (13.7%) 16 (9.0%) 
   Party 5 (4.3%) 2 (5.3%) 2 (1.2%) 22 (29.3%) 16 (21.9%) 9 (5.1%) 
   Another Connection (e.g. Business) 9 (7.7%) 10 (26.3%) 43 (26.4%) 9 (12.0%) 5 (6.8%) 28 (15.7%) 
   Just Because Elected 31 (26.5%) 21 (55.3%) 94 (57.7%) 18 (24.0%) 35 (47.9%) 102 (57.3%) 
Total 117 38 163 75  73 178 
a Total of 800 in Morocco and 788 in Algeria 
b Some respondents in Algeria have contacted a local official about more than one type of issue.  The total reports only the number of unique 




Member and Citizen Perspectives on Election Manipulation and Patronage 
 
Finally, I turn to consider citizen perceptions of electoral manipulation and patronage.  
Interview evidence suggests that, as a consequence of these tools, Moroccan and Algerian 
constituents have an overwhelmingly negative view of the parliament and its members, although 
this image is especially negative in Morocco.  Many Moroccans and Algerians refer to their 
parliaments as “theaters of democracy” and “international publicity” for democracy.  Algerians 
are commonly ambivalent, expressing the notion that deputies are “suits and blah blah” whereas 
Moroccans commonly express fear of, or anger, toward members whom they perceive as serving 




Maintaining a weak legislature involves numerous strategies on the part of regime 
incumbents.  Schedler suggests that these strategies may be categorized as seven basic violations 
of democratic choice in elections and electoral structuring.231  In both countries, lack of 
transparent procedures for choosing electoral lists, and interference by the Ministry of Interior, in 
some cases, to influence or change lists profoundly shapes parliament’s membership and thus the 
shape of legislative politics.232  These procedures create “safe seats” in districts of up to thirty-
two members such that, even a perfectly free and fair election, some individuals will be elected 
by the regime, not by the people.233  Regime type, structure of the political elite, and liberalization 
history lead to some differences in strategy; however, the aim is the same.  Regime power-holders 
must ensure that the distribution of parties—and individuals—will not yield enough members 
with the will and ability to challenge the hegemony of the executive over all aspects of 
policymaking.  Legislative elections are primarily designed to: “balance the political playing 
field” between incumbent and opposition factions contesting for political power.234  Generally, 
this involves tacit negotiation and quotas.235   
                                                     
230 Algeria, Constituent #12, April 2007. 
231 Schedler, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation." 
232 Algeria, Member #14, May 2006. 
233 Gideon Rahat, "Candidate Selection: The Choice before the Choice," Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 
(2007). 
234 Ibid. 
235 See, for example, Henry Jr. Munson, "The Elections of 1993 and Democratization in Morocco," in In 
the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power and Politics in Morocco, ed. Rahma and Susan Gilson Miller 
Bourqia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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The importance of tribe and class in Morocco and kin and clan in Algeria are reflected in 
statements made by ordinary citizens about the parliamentary membership.236  According to a 
Moroccan man, “[t]he candidates are all from the same families.  Our vote will bring nothing.  
The political map is already drawn.”237  In Algeria, many members are new elites, but ordinary 
citizens are aware of important connections between many elected officials and powerful 
members of the “ruling clan”.  Previously “unknown” individuals are elected, prompting 
politically savy citizens to suggest that they have been selected by a powerful force: “. . . a person 
with no reputation and he wins third position in the party?  This means that a powerful force put 
him there.  Maybe the Secretary-General or the President.”238  According to an Algerian 
opposition party member, “[i]t’s not that people don’t want change.  The pouvoir blocks change . 
. . All Algeria belongs to a [political] clan, not to citizens.”239  According to one Algerian man, 
“there is a total lack of confidence in elections and the parliament.”240  Another recounted the 
arrival of a man at the polling station he oversaw in the 1997 legislative election who handed him 
fifty sealed votes for the RND, presumably one of many such moves, which led to that party’s 
landslide victory just a few months after it was created.241  A Moroccan woman described the 
2002 elections in which she talked with many neighbors over the course of the campaign and had 
a general sense of which party appeared to be popular in her neighborhood.  The results, she said, 
were opposite, suggesting that, “Something must have happened.  I think parties purchased votes 
so that people would not vote for their choice.  I don’t know, but that seems to be what 
happened.”242  Electoral manipulation—despite claims in western media and academic work that 
Moroccan and Algerian elections are now relatively free and fair—has simply evolved and, to the 
detriment of the parliament’s credibility, is very much perceived by ordinary citizens (See Table 
III. 13.). 
 
                                                     
236 Charrad argued that in Algeria, these networks are “kin-based forms of association”, rather than tribes 
and in that sense differ from the stronger kin-based allegiance than in Morocco (p. 169).  Kin-based 
networks appear to have been stronger in pre-independence Morocco than Algeria, whereas clannishness 
pits parts of the administration against others and patronage in Algeria (Roberts 1982).  Colonialism re-
enforced both blood descent and clientelism and an “autochthonous clientelism parallel to another evoked 
by the colonial presence” emerged in which the new clienteles are the pre-independence ALN and post- 
independence FLN (Etienne 1977).  Mournia M. Charrad, States and Women's Rights: The Making of 
Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), Bruno 
Etienne, "Clientalism in Algeria," in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranian Societies, ed. Ernest and John 
Waterbury Gellner (London: Duckworth, 1977).: 291.  Roberts, "The Algerian Bureaucracy." 
237 Morocco, Constituent #3, November 2006. 
238 Algeria, Constituent #6, April 2007. 
239 Algeria, member #13, May 2006. 
240 Algeria, Constituent #7, May 2006. 
241 Algeria, Constituent #6, April 2007. 
242 Morocco, Constituent #3, July 2007. 
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TABLE III. 13.     Perceptions of Legislative Elections and the Legislative Connection among 
Moroccan and Algerian Constituents 
 Morocco Algeria 
People Around Here Do Not Trust the Outcome of Elections:   
     Strongly Agree 337 (43.9%) 243 (36.6%) 
     Agree 346 (45.1%) 329 (49.6%) 
     Disagree 55 (7.2%) 69 (10.4%) 
     Strongly Disagree  30 (3.9%) 23 (3.5%) 
Total/ Mean 768 (1.7) 664 (1.8) 
   
Only People with a Connection to a Deputy can Ask for Help:   
     Strongly Agree (1) 199 (51.6%) 155 (46.8%) 
     Agree 120 (31.1%) 107 (32.3%) 
     Disagree 46 (11.9%) 49 (14.8%) 
     Strongly Disagree (4) 21 (5.4%) 20 (6.0%) 
Total/Mean 386 (1.7) 331 (1.8) 
Questions: Please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the 
following statements: (1) Only people with a connection to a deputy can ask for help with a personal 
problem (2) People around here do not trust the outcome of elections.  These measure of efficacy are highly 





Patronage is a second tool of regime power-holders to maintain a weak parliament.  Most 
work on patronage networks focuses on how members of parliament or other officials serve as a 
patron and citizens as clients.  In both Morocco and Algeria, citizens frequently perceive a need 
for an intermediary to help with government agencies.  According to an Algerian man, “You need 
help with ordinary things.  You need someone to help you with everything like an ordinary piece 
of paper to a bank loan”.243  In Morocco, citizens came to a members’ local office to seek an 
intermediary with everything from a room for a thesis defense to using the fax machine.   As 
noted, citizens and members alike see the role of the deputy as an intermediary: “[m]y job is to 
contact the ministry of commerce to get money for a business or for a job . . . . We have the right 
to play this intermediary role.”244   
Survey data indicate that citizens perceive that securing help from a member of 
parliament as an intermediary requires a personal connection with him or her: 82.7 percent of 
Moroccans and 79.1 percent of Algerians agree that such a connection is needed in order to ask 
for help with a personal problem (See Table III. 14).   
                                                     
243 Algeria, Observer #2, April 2006. 
244 Algeria, Member#2, May 2007. 
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However, members of parliament are not generally a first or most effective choice when 
faced with a problem with the government.  When asked what they would be most likely to try 
first, both Moroccans and Algerians were most likely to take the issue straight to the agency 
involved: 48.6 and 59.5 percent respectively said they would be most likely to do this.  About a 
third would go to a family or friend while less than ten percent would try another strategy first.  
About one third of Moroccans believe that taking the issue directly to the agency would be most 
effective and about one third asking a family member or friend would be most effective.  
Similarly, about a quarter of Algerians think taking the issue directly to the agency involved 
would be most effective while forty percent think asking a family or friend would be best.  Only 
2.5 percent of Moroccans and 1.5 percent of Algerians would go to a Member of Parliament first; 
8.0 percent of Moroccans and 7.7 percent of Algerians believe that taking the problem to a 




TABLE III. 14.     Strategies for Dealing with a Problem with the Government among 
Moroccan and Algerian Constituents 
 Morocco Algeria 
Would Ever Try:   
     Take Directly to Agency 648 (82.7%) 291 (80.2%) 
     Ask Family or Friends 70 (9.0%) 66 (19.0%) 
     Ask Local Government 480 (60.8%) 270 (74.0%) 
     Ask Religious Person 201 (25.7%) 148 (41.9%) 
     Ask Courts 387 (50.1%) 96 (27.4%) 
     Ask Member of Parliament 111 (14.3%) 100 (28.6%) 
     Ask Minister Government 48 (6.2%) 86 (24.8%) 
     Ask Political Party 61 (7.9%) 72 (21.7%) 
Total Varies Varies 
   
Would Try First:   
     Take Directly to Agency 373 (48.6%) 141 (59.5%) 
     Ask Family or Friends 236 (30.7%) 65 (27.4%) 
     Ask Local Government 52 (6.8%) 8 (3.4%) 
     Ask Religious Person 12 (1.6%) 6 (2.5%) 
     Ask Courts 25 (3.3%) 5 (2.1%) 
     Ask Member of Parliament 19 (2.5%) 3 (1.3%) 
     Ask Minister Government 16 (2.1%) 9 (3.8%) 
     Ask Political Party 4 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
     Other  31 (4.0%)a 0 (0.0%) 
Total 768 237 
   
Thinks Would Be Most Effective:   
     Take Directly to Agency 241 (31.6%) 78 (24.2%) 
     Ask Family or Friends 233 (30.6%) 126 (39.0%) 
     Ask Local Government 77 (10.0%) 26 (8.1%) 
     Ask Religious Person 4 (0.5%) 5 (1.6%) 
     Ask Courts 26 (3.4%) 9 (2.8%) 
     Ask Member of Parliament 61 (8.0%) 25 (7.7%) 
     Ask Minister Government 65 (8.5%) 53 (16.4%) 
     Ask Political Party 10 (1.3%) 1 (0.3%) 
     Other  45 (5.9%) 0 (0.0%) 
Total 762 323 
a 31 respondents offer “corruption” as a response. 
Questions: (1) If you had a problem with the government, would you: take the issue directly to the 




Further, according to several measures, Moroccans are less likely than Algerians to 
expect deputies, state and provincial legislators, and local legislators to be helpful with a personal 
problem.  Moroccans are less likely than Algerians to believe that deputies would be interested in 
hearing their opinion about a law.  In both countries, citizens believe deputies would be more 
interested in hearing about an opinion about a law than helpful with a personal problem.  
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Moroccans and Algerians expect elected officials at the levels of government to be about as 
helpful (See Table III. 15.).   
 
 
TABLE III. 15.     Expected Helpfulness of Elected Officials among Moroccan and Algerian 
Constituents 
 Morocco Algeria 
Expected Helpfulness with Personal Problem: 
   National Legislators 
  
      Not Very Helpful (1) 443 (67.2%) 193 (38.8%) 
      Somewhat Helpful (2) 165 (25.0%) 254 (51.1%) 
      Very Helpful (3) 51 (7.7%) 50 (10.1%) 
Total/Mean 659 (1.4) 497 (1.7) 
   
   State/Provincial Legislators   
      Not Very Helpful  394 (69.2%) 191 (37.5%) 
      Somewhat Helpful  155 (27.2%) 270 (53.1%) 
      Very Helpful  20 (3.5%) 9.4 (9.4%) 
Total/Mean 569 (1.3) 509 (1.7) 
   
   Municipal Legislators   
      Not Very Helpful  326 (54.9%) 190 (35.7%) 
      Somewhat Helpful  223 (37.5%) 272 (51.0%) 
      Very Helpful 45 (7.6%) 71 (13.3%) 
Total/Mean 594 (1.5) 533 (1.8) 
   
Expected Interest in Opinion about Law:   
      Not Very Helpful  533 (80.0%) 582 (48.3%) 
      Very Helpful  11 (1.7%) 22 (3.8%) 
Questions: (1) If you had a personal problem that a deputy from this district/an elected official from this 
willaya or province/a local official from this commune could help with, how helpful do you think he or she 
would be? (2) If you had an opinion about a law being debated in parliament, how interested do you think 
deputies from this district would be? 
 
 
Table III. 16. suggests that a relatively high number of Moroccans and Algerians—80.34 
percent and 63.7 percent respectively—have an opinion about the way that deputies vote in 
parliament.  Nearly 20 percent of Moroccans and 40 percent of Algerians have never thought 
about it.  Only 2 respondents in Morocco and 12 in Algeria had contacted a member from their 
district during the 2002-2007 mandate to express an opinion. 
Moroccans are less approving of how members vote and less likely to express an opinion 
to deputies than are Algerians (See Table III. 16.).  A Moroccan political party member argued, 
“We try to show our program, but people only care about personality, popularity, financial 
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resources, and affiliation”.245  In general, individuals want help that will directly affect them and 
are not interested in contacting members about policy issues.   
 
TABLE III. 16.     Knowledge of Policy Outputs among Moroccan and Algerian 
Constituents 
 Morocco Algeria 
Approval of Voting (Members from this district):   
     Have Never Thought of It 139 (19.66%) 239 (36.3%) 
     Disapproved 374 (52.9%) 237 (36.0%) 
     Approve 194 (27.4%) 183 (27.8%) 
Total 707 659 
   
Has Contacted Deputy to Express an Opinion 2 (0.3%) 12 (1.5%) 
Total 800 788 
Questions: (1) Do you approve or disapprove of the way deputies from this district vote in parliament or 
have you never thought about it? (2) Have you ever contacted a deputy to express an opinion about a law? 
 
  
The clientelism literature does not always emphasize the role of the member as a client of 
regime power-holders.  However, the Moroccan system is built on patron-client relationships, 
reproduced in the parties.  In it, parties are clients of the state.246  A parliament, like a 
bureaucracy, is only free from this form of patronage to the extent that its members are “selected 
for their posts by fair and public criteria, are constrained to observe impartial rules, are 
accountable for what they do and can be removed from their positions without undue difficulty 
and in accordance with recognized procedures”.247  When a member owes her position or success 
in that position to a powerful client—in this case regime power-holders—she is not fully free to 
exercise oversight over the executive and to play an independent role in policymaking.  Because 
of the power of the patronage system, regime power-holders can give or remove privileges; thus, 
deputies differ both between and within countries to the extent which they can solve problems.  
The ability of deputies to solve citizens’ problems, for example, depends on compliance in 
parliament and on exchanges of interests.   
 Citizens do not typically perceive manipulation of the parliamentary membership by 
regime power-holders.  They believe that most deputies present themselves for their own family 
interests: “[t]hey receive a business card so that they can make money in business and get 
                                                     
245 Morocco, Member #9, June 2006. 
246 Layachi, State, Society & Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life.: 76.  See also note 3 
pg. 81. 
247 Ernest Gellner, "Patrons and Clients," in Patrons and Clients, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury 
(London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., 1977).: 1. 
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privileges.”248  According to a Moroccan man employed by a deputy, “[t]hey are thieves.  Don’t 
believe what he tells you.  Some people say there has been change, but I don’t see it.  They are 
there for their own interests.  Maybe they do some good.  I don’t know.”249  A woman stated that, 
“[d]eputies are there for pay only, for a free lunch, and then they will leave.  They don’t represent 
citizens.”250 
 These perceptions of elections and patronage in the deputy-citizen suggest strongly that 
parliamentary politics are best understood through the patron-client paradigm and that it may be 
naïve to think that casework and other deputy-citizen interaction constitutes representation.  But 
can casework, even if it is particularistic at best or clientalistic at worst, improve popular support 
for democratic institutions?  Or, does it make citizens less sure that democracy is the best system 
of governance for their country?  I return to this question in Chapter 6.   
 
                                                     
248 Morocco, Constituent #4, July 2007. 
249 Morocco, Constituent #5, July 2007. 










Representation as Bargaining in Multiple Arenas: 





Why do multiparty legislatures lengthen the tenure of authoritarian regimes?  Jennifer 
Gandhi and Adam Przeworski suggest that autocratic institutions lengthen tenures because they 
reduce internal threats to rule by coopting opposition and bringing it into the regime.  Rulers in 
nondemocratic regimes, they argue, “cannot win competitive elections, because their preferences 
diverge from those of the majority of the population”.251  To maintain autocratic rule, autocratic 
rulers must respond to the threat of rebellion with one of several strategies.  
The first tool incumbents use is force and repression.252  Risk perception determines how 
regimes choose whether to use force, in what measure, and with which opposition groups.  Holger 
Albrecht and Eva Wegner show that the particular containment strategies incumbents use to 
negotiate participation of Islamist opposition, whether repression or inclusion, depend on the 
institutional setting (i.e. monarchical versus presidential regime) and strength of the opposition
                                                     
251 Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.": p. 1281.  See also 
Martin C. McGuire and Mancur Olsen Jr., "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible 
Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature 34 (1996). 
252 Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats."  Dmitriy Gershenson 




groups.253  Other work suggests that the effectiveness of force varies by type of opposition and 
may not be effective for some groups (e.g. universities, bureaucracy, etc.).254   
The Moroccan and Algerian regimes use force and repression against Islamist groups 
which demand an Islamic State.  The Moroccan Justice and Charity movement, which challenges 
the right of the monarch to serve as a religious leader and openly criticizes the monarchy’s wealth 
is repressed because it cannot be coopted into the regime.255  In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation 
Front became an illegal political party, many of its leaders and members jailed, following its 1991 
victory in the first round of elections and subsequent annulment of the results by the Algerian 
government.  Although most of its leaders were amnestied following the subsequent civil war, 
former FIS leaders are banned from participation in politics.     
While some level of coercion is always required to maintain autocratic governance, the 
use of outright force or repression may be less effective than cooptation strategies which 
encourage and entice opposition groups to cooperate in negotiated political institutions slanted in 
favor of the interests of incumbents.  Distributing spoils and making policy concessions are two 
mechanisms of cooptation.   
Thus, incumbents may use a second strategy: distributing spoils.  In exchange for policy 
acquiescence, opposition members receive privileges and material rewards.  In this sense, 
liberalization may be thought of primarily as an expansion in access to resources from which 
incumbent and opposition elites—even new elites—may benefit, so long as they abide within the 
negotiated limits of policy contestation and oversight.   
Third, to coopt opposition groups, autocratic rulers make policy concessions in issue 
areas which do not threaten the basic political system.  Jillian Schwedler argues, for example, that 
the Jordanian King offered the Muslim Brotherhood influence over social policy in exchange for 
its participation and cooperation in other policy areas.256  Nominally democratic legislatures are 
ideal institutional settings, Gandhi and Przeworski argue, for policy concessions to be negotiated 
and, thus, for cooptation to facilitate regime stability.  The Workers’ Party in Algeria is a vocal 
                                                     
253 Holger Albrecht & Eva Wegner, "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and 
Morocco," Journal of North African Studies 11, no. 2 (2006). 
254 F. H. Cardoso, "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," in The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America, ed. D. Collier (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).: 48.  
As cited in Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." 
255 Marlise Simons, "Morocco Finds Fundamentalism Benign but Scary," New York Times, April 9, 1998 
1998. According to Mohammed Tozy, membership is Justice and Charity was between 50,000 and 500,000 
in 1998.  See also Saloua Zerhouni, "Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between 
Islamists and Leftists in Morocco," in Fifth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting 
(Florence -- Montecatini Terme: 2004). 
256 Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
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opposition group.  However, it does not threaten the regime because its major area of contestation 
concerns workers’ rights’ and it does not have the national popularity to govern, according to 
interview evidence.  In Morocco, the Islamist PJD is widely viewed as having been coopted, or 
makhzenized, because of its agreement with palace laws in parliament.257  
The mechanisms of cooptation suggest a puzzle.  Why does cooptation of political elites 
elected to parliament work?  McGuire and Olson suggest that the outcome of cooptation makes 
both incumbent and opposition elites better off.258  But why should this be the case?  If one tool 
of cooptation is policy concessions—and opposition elites wish to govern—why do they 
cooperate or acquiesce in exchange for limited policy concessions?   
One neglected part of the answer, I argue, lies in the preferences of ordinary citizens 
whose support constitutes a second arena in bargaining over reelection.  Members of parliament 
are not merely engaged in negotiation with incumbent elites who prefer policy acquiescence and 
who control the outcome of elections through election structuring.  Citizens influence (though 
they do not determine) the outcome of semi-competitive elections by giving or withholding 
political support.  Viewed this way, the preferences of constituents serve as a contextual factor in 
elite-level bargaining over the outcome of elections.  According to survey data, citizens have 
preferences for constituency responsiveness (i.e. casework and district projects) and, to a lesser 
extent, policy responsiveness (i.e. contestation).  Incumbents who control the levers of patronage 
influence access to resources needed by members to provide constituency responsiveness and 
may use it to entice members to acquiesce on policy issues in order to mobilize support among 
constituents. 
I add detail to Gandhi and Przeworski’s assertion that: “[c]o-opting by distributing spoils 
and co-opting by making policy concessions entail different institutional mechanisms.”259  I argue 
that for elected members, the two mechanisms, although analytically distinct, are interconnected 
via the mechanism of representation.  One mechanism by which cooptation occurs is through the 
strategic choices members make between representative activities.  I develop a visual 
representation of cooptation in which policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness are 
substitute goods between which members make a conscious choice under conditions of electoral 
uncertainty as they seek to maximize their chances of reelection.  
 
                                                     
257 See, for example, Amr Hamzawy, "Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its 
Discontents," Carnegie Papers, no. 93 (2008). 
258 McGuire and Olson, "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use 
of Force." 





In this chapter I focus on the arena of parliamentary institutions (Level I) and develop 
evidence for the hypothesis that institutions shape the representative behavior of members (Link 
I) (See Figure IV. 1.).  The chapter proceeds as follows. 
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The First Game of Institutional Design: How Regime Type Shapes Parliamentary Institutions 
 
In the first section I focus on the first nested game of institutional design, suggesting how 
incumbent preferences, which vary by regime type, correspond to differences in formal rules 
governing parliamentary debate and deputy roles (Level I).  I show how incumbent preferences 
for level of debate and capacity correspond to differences in the levels of participation in debate 
in committee and caseload (Link I). 
 
 The Second Game in Multiple Arenas: How Legislative Institutions Shape Representative 
Behavior 
 
Existing literature applying new institutionalism to authoritarian politics focuses almost 
exclusively on the nested games of institutional design: how elite-level bargaining simultaneously 
shapes both electoral institutions as well as the substantive outcome of elections.  Institutional 
design is only one type of nested game conceptualized by George Tsebelis, however.260  The 
second type, missed in much of the authoritarian politics literature, is the nested game of multiple 
arenas.  Actors must choose strategies by simultaneously considering payoffs in more than one 
arena.   
 In the second part of the analysis, I investigate the relationship between policy and 
constituency responsiveness by developing a theory of representation as bargaining in multiple 
arenas.  I argue that mass political support constitutes a politically-relevant contextual factor in 
the process of cooptation of members.  In choosing representative behavior to mobilize popular 
support, members of parliament must seek an optimal balance between acquiescence in the 
parliament in order to gain the resources for constituency responsiveness (i.e. casework and 
district projects) and policy responsiveness (i.e. contestation/debate) in the legislature.  I argue 
that if members go too far beyond the tacit boundaries of “constructive opposition”, these 
members encounter difficulties in acquiring resources to provide constituency responsiveness in 
the current round (i.e. mandate), or even losing their ability to be placed in the party list in future 
rounds of elections.  However, if they acquiesce too significantly in policy responsiveness, their 
party risks losing popular support, not because they do not or cannot provide constituency 
responsiveness, but because they are viewed as coopted or makhzenized.  Thus, members of 
                                                     
260 George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990). 
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parliament must strategically “represent” by considering how the context (i.e. mass political 




I develop an argument about cooptation in which I suggest that the selection of an 
optimal “basket” of representative activities is a mechanism by which cooptation occurs.  I argue 
that cooptation occurs as members make strategic choices among two goods—policy 
responsiveness and constituency responsiveness—in order to maximize the probability of 
reelection.  Members must consider payoffs in two simultaneous games or multiple arenas: 
regime power-holders who exert influence over the structuring and thus substantive outcome of 
elections and access to patronage, and constituents whose support the member must mobilize in 
order to enhance the probability of being elected.  I argue that given preferences of regime power-
holders for a weak legislature, members must acquiesce on policy responsiveness to acquire 
resources to provide constituency responsiveness--the primary support-generating preference of 
constituencies.  This acquiescence constitutes the mechanism of cooptation, but I suggest that it 
cannot occur, or at least persist, without the component of mass-level political preferences.  I 
argue that policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness are substitute goods; I test this 
using a multivariate model of time devoted casework.  
 
Why do Parliaments Exist in Authoritarian Political Settings? 
 
The existence of the legislative assembly in a plethora of institutional arrangements and 
in all or nearly all types of political systems has been noted by scholars for decades.  In 1973, J. 
Blondel found that only five states in the world, all of which were part of the Middle East, had 
never had a legislature or assembly.  He describes the parliament as a resilient institution.  In his 
words:  
 
Legislatures are . . . spread very broadly across the world . . . The absence of a legislature 
seems in almost all cases to be a temporary occurrence, either deliberately so (as when a 
legislature is abolished because of instability or the need to reform the institution . . .) or 
because the leaders seem unable to maintain themselves in office for long without the 
legitimizing influence of a legislature . . . .Some sort of natural law seems to force leaders 
of modern politics sooner or later to create legislatures or to be overthrown and replaced 
by men who will, in turn, create an assembly.261   
                                                     
261 J. Blondel, Comparative Legislatures (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973).: 9. 
 
 112 
Why do parliaments exist in authoritarian regimes?  If these institutions do not primarily 
legislate, what role do they play?  Numerous explanations have been offered in political science 
literatures.  These explanations may be grouped into three general classes: (1) Older conventional 
wisdom which has generally been abandoned in mainstream work; (2) Functionalist explanations; 
and, (3) Newer theories focusing on institutions as the outcome of elite-level bargaining.   
 
Older Conventional Wisdom: Authoritarian Legislatures as Window-Dressing 
 
The first group of theories relates to the conventional wisdom, which is generally no 
longer accepted in mainstream political science thought, that authoritarian legislatures do not 
have any particular political functions or consequences.  The first of these views is that 
parliaments in nondemocratic countries are “window dressing” for authoritarian regimes and thus 
play a “cosmetic” rather than a substantive role.  This type of argument also appeared in the 
world politics literature when a debate concerning whether international institutions are window-
dressing held prominence in the literature.  Students of international institutions recognized that 
rational actors who bear the costs of institutions do so because the benefits of institutions to those 
actors outweigh their costs.262  As noted, recent work makes it clear that authoritarian legislatures 
have important political consequences.263   
 A second conventional view is that legislatures are remnants of colonialism.  Abdo 
Baaklini has argued persuasively against this perspective, citing instances from the Middle East in 
which colonial powers worked to dismantle indigenous legislative institutions because they 
threatened the power of the colonial rule.264  Indeed, the Ottoman Empire’s first council emerged 
during the period of Selim III (1789-1807); and Egypt, Iraq, and Syria all had well-functioning 
legislatures in the interwar years.265  Although modern parliaments originated in western 
European countries and spread via institutional diffusion to other parts of the world, councils and 
assemblies existed in the indigenous culture of other societies as well, and modern legislatures 
have precedence in precolonial and colonial African, Asian, and Middle Eastern societies.266  
                                                     
262 Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World.": 734. 
263 Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." 
264 Baaklini and Heaphey, Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Lebanon.: Chapter 8. 
265 Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of 
Democratic Institutions.: Chapter 1. 
266 Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National 
Assembly.": 371.  Gerhard Loewenberg argues that the form of the parliament is generally present in 
polities from local civil society associations to nations to international bodies.  See Gerhard Loewenberg, 
Modern Parliaments: Change or Decline? (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971). 
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Further, Morocco did not even have a parliament during colonial times; Algeria had a parliament 




 A number of other roles fit within the broader paradigm of functionalism.  Functionalism 
is an approach originating in sociology which explains the existence of social institutions by the 
function they serve; for functionalists, institutions are created to fulfill a role or function.268  A 
large body of literature in the 1960s and 1970s focused on the functions of legislatures in 
developing countries; virtually all scholars writing on the subject at the time approached their 
work with a functionalism paradigm.  A functionalist approach to Arab legislatures appeared even 
in the late 1990s.  Functionalist arguments are limited in that they offer an explanation for what 
parliaments do, but not necessarily for how they connect to broader outcomes such as regime 
survival or breakdown. 
 First, Baaklini et al. suggest that Arab parliaments have grown in importance in recent 
years because incumbents desire to increase visibility of parliaments to increase domestic and 
international legitimacy and to project a liberal visage to the world and to the World Bank.  In 
truth, this is probably one function of both the Moroccan and Algerian parliaments.  The 
administration of both the Moroccan and Algerian Parliaments devotes resources to improving 
the public image of these institutions even while fundamental changes to the structure of political 
power are not made.269  Evidence of the success of such a strategy is manifested in statements that 
Morocco is “the model of Middle East reform” or that Algeria is “one of the most democratic 
countries” in the Arab Middle East.270  Uninformed individuals, and perhaps even relatively 
informed observers, may be fooled by a democratic façade.   
A second function of parliaments in comparative work on legislatures through the 1980s, 
but also which have been noted recently by Denoeux and Desfosses, is political integration.  
Weinbaum argued that members of parliament in Afghanistan were unparalleled in their ability to 
                                                     
267 Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of 
Democratic Institutions.  See also Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Classification and Change in Legislative 
Systems: With Particular Application to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan," in Legislative Systems in 
Developing Countries, ed. and Chong Lim Kim G. R. Boynton (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1975).: 33. 
268 J. Holmwood, "Functionalism and Its Critics," in Modern Social Theory: An Introduction, ed. A. 
Harrington (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
269 Guilain P. Denoeux and Helen R. Desfosses, "Rethinking the Moroccan Parliament: The Kingdom's 
Legislative Development Imperative," Journal of North African Studies 12, no. 1 (2007). 
270 Cite Hamid and Koogler who disagree with this CW.  For Algeria, find citation. 
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integrate the periphery with the core. 271  Interview evidence from Morocco suggests that rural 
populations may encourage a local notable to run for parliament, believing that he will be an 
effective advocate for them at the level of the national government.  The role of political 
integration may also refer to bringing together parties representing different policy preferences.272  
The weakness of the representative link and the political process (including the exclusion of some 
parties which would gain support in the population) limits the effectiveness of these roles in 
Morocco and Algeria.  Nevertheless, this may be one role that parliaments play in these countries, 
but the mechanism and its effects are understudied.   
 A third function of parliaments in authoritarian political settings is that they allow the 
regime to more effectively achieve its political goals, including managing political and economic 
reform and mobilizing public support for policies prescribing austerity and repression of Islamic 
militants.  On the one hand, the low level of confidence that the Moroccan and Algerian publics 
place in the parliament and their limited knowledge of the legislative work of the parliament, as 
indicated by data from the constituent survey, casts doubt on the extent to which the parliament 
creates support for unpopular reforms or lessens discontent about the difficult economic situation.  
When in the opposition prior to 1997, the Moroccan USFP virulently criticized economic policies 
it considered to blame for high inflation.  Once the period of alternance began, inflation 
worsened, yet the USFP stopped mentioning this problem.  This process did not create support in 
the population, but rather deepening lack of confidence in the political elite, and possibly greater 
support for other groups such as the Islamist Party of Justice and Development or the outlawed 
movement Justice and Charity.   
 A fourth function of legislatures and assemblies in authoritarian regimes is to respond to 
demands for expansion of political participation.  Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Jamal have 
suggested that “[p]olitical liberalization serves as a pressure valve against mounting opposition 
during economic crises.”273  Liberalization of the parliament, even if it actually represents a small 
expansion of access to resources, certainly plays this role in both the Moroccan and Algerian 
cases. 
                                                     
271 Similarly, Gandhi and Vreeland show that parliamentary authoritarian regimes are less likely to 
experience civil war.  See Ellen  Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from 
Jordan." 
272 For example cooperation between socialist and Islamist parties in Morocco.  See Zerhouni, "Elite Et 
Transition Democratique Au Maroc: Les Parliamentaires De La Legislature 1997-2002". 




 Fifth, parliaments provide a mechanism by which to scrutinize the bureaucracy.  There is 
some interview evidence to suggest that indeed both parliaments play the former role.274  
Interviews turned up very limited evidence of a potential oversight role of the legislature over the 
bureaucracy.275  Thus, while this role may exist to a limited extent, it cannot, like other 
functionalist arguments, explain why regimes choose or accept a multiparty parliamentary 
institution rather than having a single-party caucus or an independent oversight branch of the 
government oversee the bureaucracy.  Thus, functionalist theories fail to explain the mechanisms 




Following mainstream thinking, a new set of theories begin with the assumption that the 
creation and persistence of legislatures with particular institutional structures are the outcome of 
elite-level bargaining in the nested game of institutional design.  The creation of a parliament is 
not an accident of colonialism, but rather is an explicit political bargain within the winset of 
incumbent and opposition groups at independence.  The shape of the parliament, including the 
party system, its capacity, and prerogatives vis-à-vis the executive, are shaped at independence, 
and in subsequent time periods, by on-going rounds of elite-level bargaining.276   
It is important to clarify that the second and third types of explanations respond to two 
slightly different questions and are based in two literatures which make explicit different 
assumptions.  The second group seeks to identify roles or functions of parliaments and assumes 
that through these roles legislatures contribute (or may contribute) to a process of political 
development (e.g. institutionalization or democratization).  It addresses a “what” question; 
namely, what role do parliaments play?   
                                                     
274 See, for example, discussions of bargaining between left and Islamist deputies in Morocco.  Zerhouni, 
"Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between Islamists and Leftists in Morocco." 
275 Denoeux and Desfosses, "Rethinking the Moroccan Parliament: The Kingdom's Legislative 
Development Imperative." 
276 The outcome of this bargaining is also shaped by contextual factors, which include uncertainty, the 
historical antecedents in the institutional context, synergistic issue linage, international threats, offers, and 
side payments, and potential reverberation in the domestic sphere, among other factors.  In the Moroccan 
and Algerian cases, the length of time after independence before the parliament was established reflects 
greater uncertainty on the part of the Moroccan monarch as compared to the Algerian president and 
military regime.  The multiparty character of the Moroccan parliament in contrasts with the one-party 
regime in Algeria and reflects differences in the preferences of incumbents.  Luong Jones, Pauline, 
Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988).  See also 
Remington and Smith. 
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The third class of explanations to which this project seeks to contribute asks not only 
what parliaments do, but also why they exist.  It asks a “why” question; namely, why do 
authoritarian legislatures contribute to regime survival?  It also sees authoritarian institutions as 
consequential, but acknowledges that they may not promote democratic transition.  Thus, the 
third body of literature offers early, though more promising clues for explaining why 
authoritarian parliaments contribute to the longevity of regimes.   
 
Cooptation through Patronage and Cooptation through Policy Concessions 
 
 Although there is increasing acceptance that authoritarian institutions have important 
political consequences, the mainstream view is that regime power-holders coopt members of the 
political elite to gain “loyal parliaments”.277  Most work on liberalization in the Arab world 
characterizes parliaments as filled with regime “place-men” whose independent influence on 
policymaking and oversight of the government is limited.278  If these individuals play a role in 
making laws, it is by the legitimacy they confer to policies by limiting debate and providing the 
“rubber stamp” upon which their personal privileges depend.  In this view, members are either 
disinterested in challenging the policy preferences of incumbents or are willing to acquiescence 
vis-à-vis their own policy preferences when faced with the opportunities and constraints of the 
legislature.  Although cooptation through spoils and cooptation through policy concessions as 
incumbent strategies are distinct, as Gandhi and Przeworski argue, they are intricately linked for 




For O’Donnell, cooptation is to “encapsulate” opposition or “domesticate” the 
opposition.279  I define cooptation as a bargaining process which entices opposition members to 
participate in the formal political process.  It entails the exchange of patronage (e.g. material 
goods, prestige, access to networks, etc.) and/or policy concessions on the part of incumbents for 
political behavior on the part of the opposition, which is closer to the ideal point of regime power 
brokers.  Used for elites willing to accept the institutional framework and participate in the formal 
political process, cooptation is achieved by coercion, though softer in form than force or 
                                                     
277 Posusney, "Multiparty Elections in the Arab World: Elections Rules and Opposition Responses." 
278 Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria, 1988-2002: Studies in a Broken Polity.: 264. 
279 See Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.": 1281 and 1283.  
See also Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South 
American Politics (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1973). 
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repression.  Opposition mitigates or moderates its position, entering into “constructive” 
opposition in exchange for the ability to participate in legislative politics and the formal political 
process.  The pressures exerted by incumbent are expressed this way by an Algerian Islamist 
deputy: “[t]he government exerts a bad influence on the deputy.  He cannot play a free role.”280  
According to an opposition party member in Morocco: “[t]he rules of the game require a 
government and opposition.  We play the part of the opposition in this comedy.  We are really 
collaborators.  How can we react against the regime when we are a part of it?  All parties are 
vulnerable.  They cannot resist.”281   
 
Linking Mechanism of Cooptation to the Representation and Patron-Client Paradigms 
 
In this chapter I refer to policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness (See 
Table IV. 1.).  I operationalize policy responsiveness as participation in debate in committee.  
Participation in debate may entail contestation, moderation, or acquiescence on the part of the 
opposition and may result in policy concessions on the part of incumbents.  By constituency 
responsiveness I mean casework and district projects, which correspond to distribution of spoils 
in the patron-client paradigm.  
Although I use the terms representation and representative activities in this and following 
chapters, I do so cautiously and without implying that participation in debate or casework 
necessarily constitutes representation of constituents.  Chapter 7 addresses the appropriateness of 
the representation and patron-client paradigms for the cases.   
                                                     
280 Algeria, Member #13, May 2006. 
281 Morocco, Member #19, July 2006. 
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TABLE IV. 1.  The Representation and Patron-Client Paradigms 
 



























































Distribution of Patronage 
 
A vast literature exists on political patronage in several world regions.  Ellen Lust-Okar 
demonstrates the importance of wasta in legislative politics in Jordan.  Her fieldwork suggests 
that parliament in Jordan is a basis for those who contest and win elections to demand jobs and 
patronage for friends and relatives, and presumably for constituents, from government ministries 
and bureaucracies.  In this way, wasta broadens the base of support for the regime because 
members serve as patrons, distributing particularlized benefits to friends and supporters.  The 
popular support generated by the distribution of wasta translates into regime stability and 
legitimacy.  If parliaments play this role, then they contribute to regime persistence because 
beneficiaries do not want to risk loss of privileges, or constituents are enticed to participate in the 
hope of electing a family or tribal representative who can improve their lives, if elected.   
An Algerian observer described liberalization as a “narrow expansion of the yield” to 
perhaps a 1000 or more people.282  This implies that the regime allows a relatively small number 
of individuals, who were at the margins, to contest and win seats in local, regional, and national 
councils.  “All of the deputy’s personal problems are solved,” said an Algerian observer.283  And, 
a Moroccan journalist described the privileges of deputies by saying, “Well, it’s worth their 
while.”284       
                                                     
282 Algeria, Observer #2, October 2005. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Morocco, Observer #1, June 2007. 
 
 119 
Incumbent Policy Concessions and Opposition Moderation 
 
Work on policy concessions of incumbents finds its analog in literature on opposition 
issue moderation. 
 
Incumbents and Policy Concessions 
 
Gandhi and Przeworski argue that: “if these institutions do matter for [regime] survival in 
power, they must entail policy compromises and thus have consequences for other outcomes.”  
Policy concessions are an outcome of elite-level bargaining and are used by Gandhi and 
Przeworski to refer to concessions made by incumbent elites.  Incumbents make compromises 
when the cost of doing so is less than the potential threat to their power or when the cost of doing 
so is less than using another strategy; namely distribution of resources.  Within the framework of 
negotiation, opposition elites also make policy concessions; these are referred to in a separate 
literature as “moderation” because this literature generally deals with Islamist parties which are 
seen to take on less “extreme” policy positions as a consequence of participating in the political 
process.285  Opposition members, whether Islamist, socialist, or members of other parties, are 
those which express some level of criticism with the program of the government and engage in 
varying levels of policy contestation (See Figure IV. 2.).  Members of parliament who do not 
contest acquiesce to the will of the government may be considered incumbent elites because 
theirs is complete “acquiescence”—simple “rubber-stamping” or “hand-raising” in parliament 
without debate or expression of alternative policy choices.  These individuals may have genuine 
support for the government and its programs; they main disagree personally with policies, but still 
display fully acquiescent political behavior; or, they may be acting opportunistically and have 
little interest in policies.   
Figure IV. 2. shows political negotiation between incumbent and opposition elites, 
cooptation also requires movement on the part of regime power-holders from their ideal policy 
positions or “concessions”.   
 
                                                     
285 These terms have the unfortunate and unintended effect of suggesting that Islamist parties hold extreme 
positions whereas pro-government parties, for example, do not. 
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FIGURE IV. 2.   Continuum of Policy Acquiescence-Contestation: Incumbent and 
Opposition Preferences and the Effect of Concessions and Moderation 
 
“Acquiescence”                                                                                              “Contestation”  
   Incumbent Ideal Point                                                              Opposition Ideal Point  
|_______________________________________________________________________| 
              “Concessions” →                                                                ← “Moderation”  
 
Opposition and Issue Moderation 
 
When opposition members “moderate”, they accept policy proposals which are closer to 
the preferences of incumbents than to their ideal point.  Moderation is a change in strategy which 
results from and creates new political space.  In summarizing the deradicalization of the left in 
Western Europe and Latin America, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham suggests that leaders moderated 
their agendas in order to take advantage of new opportunities for participation provided by 
democratization.  Most recently, scholars are interested in understanding whether and why 
Islamists will pursue alternative (i.e. more moderate) positions as a consequence of participation 
in the formal political process; namely, parliamentary elections.  The dominant wisdom is that 
moderation occurs as a result of iterated political interaction resulting in political learning of two 
types: a change in strategy or ideology.  Wickham shows, with reference to Egypt, that 
moderation can occur under conditions of liberalization since institutional openings provide 
avenues for participation.  This provides “strategic incentives for moderation and . . . 
opportunities for political learning” which she defines as “experience-driven change in individual 
leaders’ core values and beliefs”.286   
Similarly, with respect to Jordan and Yemen, Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler 
suggest that Islamist parties may increase women’s participation in politics as a shift in strategy 
(i.e. to appear more moderate) or as a shift in ideology (i.e. as a result of the success of moderates 
within their ranks).287  Unsurprisingly they find that it is both the structure of disagreement 
between moderates and hardliners that creates political opportunities for women to take a greater 
role in the politics of Islamist parties.  According to R. Quinn Mecham, Islamists moderate 
(“reframe their message”) as a strategic response to the incentives and constraints they 
                                                     
286 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's 
Wasat Party," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004).: 205. 
287 Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler, "Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist 
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perceive.288  This strategy is clear from interview evidence.  In Algeria, the Islamist MSP joined 
governing coalition with regime parties FLN and RND.  A deputy from the MSP stated that: 
“[w]e see what they are doing.  We turn and look the other way for now.  It is alright for now, but 
soon it won’t be.”  And for another member of the MSP: “[w]e will have a PRESIDENT in 
2012.”  These statements indicate that policy moderation in the short-run is part of a medium or 
long-run strategy to govern which, of course, implies influence over both policies and resources.   
 
Cooptation in Morocco and Algeria 
 
Much has been written on cooptation of political elites in Morocco, where the process has 
been referred to by multiple writers as makhzenization.  Once elites are coopted into the system, 
according to Albrecht and Wegner, they engage in a “tamed type of protest articulation”.289  The 
Algerian process of cooptation of elites has not been discussed sufficiently in the literature; the 
cooptation of elites within the multiparty context is a relatively recent development. 
Let me begin by discussing the relationship of cooptation to party creation and the 
production of a political class.  The creation of the first “multiparty” legislature in Morocco took 
place in 1963 prior to liberalization, while the first multiparty legislature was not created in 
Algeria until 1997, via the process of liberalization.  In both cases, regime incumbents sought 
loyal members from which they created a pro-government bloc in parliament.  In Morocco, the 
first elections gave a majority to independent candidates, which functioned as a pro-palace 
bloc.290   In Algeria, the pro-government RND created shortly before the 1997 elections won 156 
of the 389 seats in the lower house of parliament (about 40 percent) and ensured an easy majority 
by which to pass the president’s program. 
In Algeria, the creation of the RND was part of a distinguishable pattern in which regime 
power-holders manufactured a political class along the lines of the political map drawn by the 
                                                     
288 See also Zerhouni, "Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between Islamists and 
Leftists in Morocco."  Wegner, "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and 
Morocco."  A number of very good articles document the ways in which the Party of Justice and 
Development “moderated” its positions on prominent policies since it began to participate in parliamentary 
politics in 1997.  According to Zerhouni, the PJD shifted from being against a bill to not proposing 
amendment because according to, Abdallah Baha, because the PJD is unified against terrorist and unified 
with the king.  She writes: “PJD appeared to have been moderating over the past few years—particularly 
during 2006—quieting or sidelining the dissidents within the party that had been promoting a line critical 
of the monarchy and its polices” (p. 40), including Mustapha Ramid who had been calling for constitutional 
amendment.  Lise Strom, "Testing Morocco: The Parliamentary Elections of September 2007," Journal of 
North African Studies 13, no. 1 (2008). 
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annulled 1991 elections.  The first round of elections in 1991, although generally neutral 
administration, generated a certain level of support for three “Fronts”: The FLN, the FFS, and the 
FIS.  From the Berber FFS, the regime encouraged the creation of a second Berber party, the 
RCD, thus dividing this possible source of opposition to the government.  Both participated in the 
1997 elections, then boycotted in 2002, in response to the squashing of debate in the legislature.  
Finally, the FIS was banned, but several Islamist parties were created in their place; among them 
Hamas (later named MSP), En-Nahda, and El-Islah.  The less popular MSP joined a governing 
coalition with the FLN and RND during the 2002-2007 mandate.  En-Nahda and El-Islah, the 
more popular movements, have been manipulated and crushed whenever a charismatic leader 
comes to their helms.  Through these strategies, the regime controls opposition parties, removing 
dedicated and charismatic members from positions if they can lead their party to a majority in the 
parliament or pose a serious challenge to the regime. 
 Since Morocco gained independence, “the monarchy has manipulated the party 
configurations by including some parties in the management of the affairs of state, excluding 
others, repressing some, and even promoting the birth of a pro-monarchy bloc which would 
dominate parliamentary life, when there was one.”291  The creation of political parties continued 
in Morocco until the 2000s as the regime fomented division between the country’s approximately 
26 political parties.  Individuals are enticed to begin new parties by the promise of getting 
rewards sooner, leading to a discrediting of the party system.292  In the words of Maghraoui,  
 
Through this mechanism [elections], the monarchy selects not only its political allies but 
its opponents.  The absence of a single and simple electoral code gives the administration 
leeway to include or exclude candidates and to manipulate the electoral process and 
results at will.  Other devices to control the electoral process include the proliferation of 
political parties created and endorsed by the administration and headed by men close to 
the king, which have tended to dominate electoral districts to dilute the relatively 
independent urban vote; setting the elections to the upper house after those to the lower 
house, which allows the administration to “correct” unforeseen political balances and 
redress “undeserved” rewards or punishments in the lower house; an informal quota 
system to keep parties on a leash; and, of course, the widespread buying and selling of 
votes.293 
                                                     
291 Layachi, State, Society & Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life.: 76. 
292 Zerhouni, "Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between Islamists and Leftists 
in Morocco." 
293 “The king has relied on divide and rule tactics to selectively reward or punish different factions, leading 
to a competition among established interest for the favors of the palace.  Using a mixture of co-optation and 
intimidation, the modern Moroccan monarchs have relied on both carrots and sticks to orchestrate the 
political fortunes of their subjects.  The result of the careful management of competing interest done by the 
Moroccan rulers has led to one of the most stable and legitimate states in the region.” Payne, "Democracy 
and Governance: Assessment of Morocco.": III. 
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  Maghroui has called this process in Morocco depolitization of the political elite, a 
reduction to clientalistic politics, and “sparse and ambivalent” among elites.294  This creates a 
“constructive opposition” and “soft opposition”; a parliament dominated by pro-regime forces 
generally unwilling to challenge the status quo.295  All parties are supportive of the monarchical 
regime; “they perform a function of opposition that is less confrontational than that observed in 
truly open and competitive polities.”296  “The ultimate goal is to eliminate any potential 
opposition to regime, state, and king.  The consequence of such policies has been a 
‘makhzenization’ of society, i.e. an almost total control of society by the state through various 
administrative, cultural, political, and police means.”297  This has led to dependence on the state 
through clientelism.   
Laayachi’s statements suggest that the mechanisms of policy concession and patronage 
are linked, if not meaningfully understood, as a single mechanism.  I argue that they are linked 
through the mechanism of representation as members seek to bargain in multiple arenas.  In order 
to test observable implications of this argument, I investigate the relationship between these two 
mechanisms of cooptation: distribution of patronage and policy concessions/moderation.  Why is 
this linkage missed?  I argue this is because work thus far focuses on institutional design and 
misses how bargaining over parliamentary representation occurs in multiple arenas. 
 
The First Nested Game of Institutional Design:  
Incumbent Preferences and the Shape of Electoral Laws and Party Systems 
 
 Most work applying new institutionalism to authoritarian political contexts investigates 
the role of strategic bargaining between incumbent and opposition elites in shaping political 
institutions.  This work suggests that elites negotiate in two nested games; one over the 
substantive outcome of elections and the other over the rules of the game.  Andreas Schedler, 
borrowing from George Tsbelis, has called this the nested game of institutional design.  One part 
of this literature focuses on explaining the distribution of domestic political power in institutional 
choices of parliamentarian or presidential systems.  Findings from this literature have been 
applied to assessing the role of institutions in influencing the direction and pace of political 
transition. 
                                                     
294 Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, "Democratization in the Arab World? Depoliticization in Morocco," Journal 
of Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002). 
295 Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization.: 31. 
296 Layachi, State, Society & Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life.: 75. 
297 Ibid.: 42. 
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A second area focuses on individual institutions—in this case how preferences for party 
structure vary across institutional settings and affect choice of electoral rules.  This work links 
with legislative politics because it shows in concrete terms why particular party systems emerge.  
Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Jamal theorize definitively concerning the role of regime type in 
shaping electoral and party systems in the Arab world.  Here I summarize their argument in order 
to extend it to two characteristics of legislative institutions: centrality and capacity.  At the outset, 
let me note that my conclusions are based on only two cases.  While I compare dynamics in 
Morocco and Algeria, the hypotheses I generate about monarchies and presidential regimes 
cannot be tested without addition of other cases. 
 
Assumptions about Preferences of Actors 
 
Lust-Okar and Jamal assume that incumbent preferences vary by regime type.   
 
Assumption A1: “ Incumbent preferences over the distribution of domestic political power 




 In my analysis, I refer to regime power-holders and incumbent elites interchangeably.  I 
use this analysis as a means by which to generate and begin to evaluate between-country 
hypotheses.  The hypotheses I generate need to be tested in other cases; therefore, I am cautious 
about using monarchical and presidential regimes. 
 I define incumbents in Morocco as the monarchy and as the part of the makhzen closely 
connected to the palace.  In Algeria, I define regime power-holders as the ruling clique of military 
generals whose accent is critical to major policy decisions.   
 The opposition differs across time and space, particularly in Morocco.  For the mandate 
of interest (2002-2007), the opposition comprises parties and actors who are outside the system 
and seek to change it, rather than simply to gain resources through it.  In the words of Jean-
Jacques Levenue, the opposition is not “those linked to existing power structure [but] . . . those 
opposed to it.299     
                                                     
298 Ellen and Amaney Ahmed Jamal Lust-Okar, "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime 
Type on Electoral Law Formation," Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 3 (2002).  338. 
299 Jean-Jacques Levenue suggests two stylized types of actors: those linked to existing power structure and 
those opposed to it.  See also Willis. 
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 In both Algeria and Morocco, there are movements and parties which are illegal300, which 
the regime has been unable to coopt into the system, or which have boycotted elections,301 
apparently because the tacit bargain over the outcome of those elections does not fall within the 
winset of both incumbent and opposition.  In this sense, these movements and parties are the true 
opposition.  Since I focus on deputies elected to parliament, I also include elites who have been 
coopted into the regime but, nevertheless, engage in meaningful contestation (i.e. cause 
incumbents to make policy concessions).   
 Among those parties which participated in the 2002 elections and which gained 
representation, Islamist parties constitute the “true” opposition for this study.302  The opposition 
in Morocco during the mandate of interest (2002-2007) is the PJD, although the Koutla 
(democratic block) comprised of the USFP, Istiqlal, PPS, and the GSU formed a “soft” or 
“moderate” opposition after periods of parliamentary history during which they constituted the 
opposition.  The PJD has pursued a stance of “critical endorsement”, supporting the government 
on most bills, provided that the policy does not impinge upon an interpretation of Islam embraced 
by its members.  The PJD, thus, tends to vote for the majority of the laws, but cited some 
criticisms.303  In Algeria, the opposition is likewise the Islamist parties, el-Islah and MSP, 
notwithstanding the fact that the MSP entered for strategic reasons into a governing coalition with 
government parties, FLN and RND in the 2002-2007 mandate. 
Following Lust-Okar and Jamal and statements made elsewhere in this chapter, I assume 
that institutions are the outcome of elite-level bargaining.  I expand their work on electoral 
institutions to look at other legislative institutions, including rules related to the internal 
functioning and relationship vis-à-vis areas of the government external to the parliament.   
 
Assumption A2:  Incumbent and opposition elites bargain over the shape of parliamentary 
institutions in the periods of consolidation of power and liberalization. 
 
Regime Preferences and Institutional Design 
 
Lust-Okar and Jamal assume that while opposition preferences for small-party 
representation do not vary, regime power brokers in the two types of states differ in terms of the 
                                                     
300 See Zerhouni, "Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between Islamists and 
Leftists in Morocco." 
301 Parties of the extreme left.  PADS, which still claims repression, called for a boycott of the 1997 
legislative elections in Morocco. 
302 Wegner, "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and Morocco." 




party system and, thus, electoral rules which best suit their interests.  “Monarchs prefer electoral 
rules that divide political power across competing political parties and promote society’s 
dependence on the monarchs for arbitration and stability.”304  “Presidents in one-party states 
prefer electoral laws that promote the majority party and serve to weaken and fragment 
opposition parties.”305  I adopt these assumptions also.   
  
Assumption A3:  “In both monarchies and one-party states, opposition elites prefer rules 
that favor small-party representation.”
306
   
 
Assumption A4:  “Monarchs prefer electoral rules that divide political power across 






Given differences in preferences, “Electoral rules in monarchies promote the division of 
political power among contending forces.  Electoral rules in former one-party states promote a 
single large party and act against representation of small political parties.”308   
 
Assumption A5:  “Presidents in one-party states prefer electoral laws that promote the 





Based upon evidence from 1977-1996, they demonstrate that monarchies Morocco, 
Jordan, and Kuwait do not have electoral rules which promote majority parties, whereas former 
one-party regimes Egypt, Algeria, Palestine, and Tunisia have such rules which include party 
lists, rules moving remaining votes to large parties, and thresholds.  Further, the electoral code in 
Algeria uses the Hare formula which tends to produce over-representation of larger parties.  
Under this formula, a party could receive as few as thirty percent of the votes but get two-thirds 
of the seats.  In Morocco, no such provisions enhancing a single dominant party were used at the 
time that their study was conducted.310 
 
                                                     
304 Lust-Okar, "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation.": 
354. 
305 Ibid.: 355. 
306 Ibid.: 353. 
307 Ibid.: 354. 
308 Ibid.: 356. 
309 Ibid.: 355. 
310 Ibid.: 358.  Morocco adopted a closed-list PR system in multi-member districts before the 2002 elections 
and now uses counting rules similar to the Hare formula. 
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The Party System in Morocco and Algeria 
 
Following from these assumptions, Lust-Okar and Jamal hypothesize that: “In 
legislatures in monarchies, opposition parties should be well-represented.  In legislatures of 
former one-party states, they should not.”311   
 
Hypothesis A1: “Electoral rules in monarchies promote the division of political power 
among contending forces.  Electoral rules in former one-party states promote a single 
large party and act against representation of small political parties.”
312
   
 
The outcome of elections for the mandate of interest in Morocco and Algeria reflects the 
preferences of monarchs and presidents for the distribution of political power across parties, as 
mediated by electoral rules.  In Morocco in 2002, 22 parties were elected to parliament with 
representation ranging from six seats (2.8 percent) to fifty seats (9.6 percent).  Clearly, no one 
party is capable of effectuating a policy change independent of a coalition.  Until 2002 when a 
new electoral code was promulgated, Morocco had a plurality system with 325 seats in 1996 and 
no threshold to reduce representation of small parties.  In Algeria in 2002, nine parties were 
elected with representation ranging from one seat (.3 percent) to 199 seats (51.2 percent).  In the 
parliamentary election which led to the 1991 victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in 1991, a 
plurality system in multimember districts was also in use.  The new electoral code promulgated 
following the FIS victory in the first round of elections in 1991, created the present system which 
uses, as in Morocco at the present time, a closed-list proportional representation system in 
multimember districts and a 5 percent threshold.   
 
The First Nested Game of Institutional Design: 
The Effect of Regime Type on Centrality and Capacity of the Legislature 
 
Nearly all work on variation in parliamentary institutions in the Arab Middle East focuses 
on development level; for example, the level of centrality and capacity of legislatures, as in the 
work of Baaklini et al.313  
                                                     
311 Ibid.: 360. 
312 Ibid.: 356.  




Centrality: The Power of the Parliament to Influence Policies 
 
Centrality is the degree to which legislatures function as powerful, representative, and 
independent policymaking institutions.  In short, it is their power to affect political outcomes and 
to resist pressure emanating from the executive.  Baaklini et al. suggest three levels of centrality.  
States in category one have: “. . . succeeded in negotiating and establishing most of the 
institutional arrangement required for enshrining the legislature as the principal area of political 
competition”.314  Those in category two have: “. . . demonstrated substantial successes in 
negotiating new political rules and that have begun to revitalize the legislature on that basis”.315  
In category three legislatures, “. . . political incumbents and the main opposition forces agree on 
the basic rules of the political game, including the constitutional framework, the electoral law, 
and the law regulating the formation and operation of political parties and voluntary 
associations”.316  For Baaklini et al., category three legislatures embody a high level of centrality: 
 
1. It is constitutionally and politically permitted to operate as an autonomous and influential 
institution; 
2. It is capable of resisting actions emanating from the executive; and, 
3. It is able to formulate its own policy proposals and can affect the decision-making 
process in significant ways.317 
 
 
I have adopted parliaments with “limited centrality”, or weak parliaments, in Chapter 1 to 
describe a feature of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism political systems additional to 
noncompetitive and manipulated elections.  I argue that the Moroccan and Algerian parliaments, 
while they do not differ significantly in terms of actual centrality as defined by those prerogatives 
given them in the constitution (See Chapter 1), nevertheless differ in terms of level of debate 
between political parties in the legislature over particular policies.   
 
                                                     
314 Ibid.: 66. 
315 Ibid.: 67-8. 
316 I suggest that centrality concerns primarily influence on policy; however, it also consists of the ability to 
provide oversight of other branches of government.  Abdo; Denoeux Baaklini, Guilain; Springborg, Robert, 
Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1999).: 66. 
317 Ibid.: 63. 
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Level of Debate in the Legislatures: Assumptions and Expectations 
 
 How do regime preferences for parliamentary politics affect level of debate?  I have 
already established that regime power-holders in hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes prefer 
parliaments with low centrality.  We find the parliament has few prerogatives independent of the 
parliament, and that opposition groups in both countries contest for constitutional changes (See 
Chapter 1).  Opposition elites, I assume, prefer parliaments with high centrality.   
 
Assumption B1:  Incumbent elites in authoritarian political systems prefer parliaments 
with low centrality. 
 
Assumption B2:  Opposition elites prefer parliaments with high overall centrality. 
 
Hypothesis B1: The parliaments in Morocco and Algeria will have limited constitutional 
powers independent of the executive. 
 
Hypothesis B2: Opposition elites will contest for greater constitutional powers for the 
Parliament. 
 
 Level of debate is affected by internal norms and procedures, electoral laws, and the 
number of parties elected and the distribution of power between them.  The Algerian constitution 
prescribes for the parliament a role in “general debate” of the programme of the executive 
(Article 80).  By contrast, the Moroccan constitution mentions that draft bills are examined by 
committees, continuing between sessions (Article 54).  Article 58 provides extensive details of 
the procedure for debate, including the number of readings, procedures for a joint committee in 
cases of disagreements within committees or between the houses, and resubmission of the 
amended bills to houses.  Further, the Moroccan constitution offers two modes of oversight to the 
parliament, including weekly question periods attended by ministers before parliament and the 
ability to set up fact-finding committees.  While the opposition finds fault with these mechanisms, 
in practice, they may map onto informal institutions which shape the level of the debate in the 
legislatures of different political regimes. 
 Further, the electoral code in Algeria uses the “Hare” formula which tends to produce 
over-representation of larger parties.  Under this formula, a party could receive as few as thirty 
percent of the votes, but get two-thirds of the seats.  In Morocco, no such provisions enhancing a 
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single dominant party were used.318  These rules shape the party system and also level of debate 
in the legislature. 
The effect of the distribution of parties on the level of debate is evident when comparing 
the 1997-2002 and 2002-2007 mandates in parliament.  One deputy described the debate in the 
2002-2007 mandate as “flat”, arguing that the boycott of the 2002 elections by the RCD and the 
FFS, as well as the reduction in the number of former ministers elected in 2002, diminished the 
level of debate compared to the 1997-2002 session during which no party held more than 32 
percent of the seats (RND).319  
In Morocco, by contrast, where the king continues to manage consensus and coalitions in 
the parliamentary system, debate and the questioning of ministers is lively.  Because of 
Morocco’s long history of multiparty politics as a forum for interaction between and among 
government and opposition elites, its parliament is well-positioned to contribute to reform and has 
a relatively greater influence on public policies than that of Algeria.     
Level of debate is affected by internal norms and procedures and by the number of parties 
and coalitions in parliament.  The Algerian constitution describes the role of the government to 
engage in “general debate” as well as committee work on the programme of the government 
(Article 80).  The Moroccan constitution establishes a more elaborate system, providing details 
for how draft bills are examined by committees which continue between sessions (Article 54).  
Article 58 provides extensive details of the procedure for debate, including the number of 
readings, procedures for a joint committee in cases of disagreements within committees or 
between the houses, and resubmission of the amended bills to houses.  Further, in addition to the 
legislative function prescribed by both constitutions, the Moroccan constitution offers two modes 
of oversight to the parliament; the weekly questioning of ministers before parliament and the 
ability to set up fact-finding committees.  While the opposition finds fault with these mechanisms, 
they influence the level of the debate within the sessions.  These constitutional provisions suggest 
that debate should be of particular importance in the Moroccan system vis-à-vis the Algerian 
system, where the role of the parliament to vote on laws is not elaborated by many of the same 
details provided by the Moroccan constitution.   
 Level of debate may also be affected from mandate to mandate by the number of parties 
represented, the power relationship between them (e.g. coalitions), and the range of policy 
preferences expressed by them, inter alia.  The effect of the distribution of parties on the level of 
debate is evident when comparing the 1997-2002 and 2002-2007 mandates in parliament.  One 
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deputy described the debate in the 2002-2007 mandate as “flat”, arguing that the boycott of the 
2002 elections by the RCD and the FFS, as well as the reduction of former ministered elected in 
2002 led to a vast reduction in the level of debate compared to the 1997-2002, session during 
which no party held more than 32 percent of the seats (RND).  
 
Assumption B3:  Monarchs prefer moderate or high levels of debate in parliament over a 
set of issues defined by them.  Presidents prefer limited parliamentary debate.  
Hypothesis B3:  The overall level of parliamentary debate will be higher in Morocco than 
in Algeria. 
 
 Given these hypotheses, we should observe higher levels of involvement in lawmaking 
activities in Morocco than in Algeria. 
 
Hypothesis B4:  Members in Morocco will be more likely to participate in lawmaking 
activities than will members in Algeria. 
 
Participation in Lawmaking Activities: Empirical Evidence  
 
Are some deputies more or less likely to have engaged in policymaking activities?  
Moroccan members are more likely than Algerian members to participate in policymaking even 
though the role of the parliament in independently shaping laws is very limited (See Table IV. 2.).  
Thirteen percent of Algerian members compared with none of the Moroccan members during the 
present mandate (2002-2007) performed lawmaking tasks.  Of particular interest is speaking in 
the plenary session.  Only 4 (4.6 percent) of Moroccan respondents have never done so compared 
with 44 (51.8 percent) of Algerian respondents.  These survey statistics are consistent with the 
effect of fostering a large number of political parties which compete among themselves, as in 
Morocco, rather than a single dominant party, as in Algeria.  
Moroccan members of parliament are more active than Algerian members of parliament 
in lawmaking activities.  It is not possible to determine whether this difference is a consequence 
of the longer number of years of multiparty parliamentary experience in Morocco through which 
the parliament has developed a more central role in policymaking, or whether it reflects regime 
strategy for greater debate in Morocco.  I argue that both are implications of regime strategy and 
suggest that the level of debate over policies and the participation of members in lawmaking 
activities should be higher in monarchies than in former one-party states within the class of 




TABLE IV. 2.     Lawmaking Actions among Moroccan and Algerian Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
Number of Actions:   
     Zero 0 (0.0%) 13 (13.4%) 
     One 4 (4.6%) 7 (7.2%) 
     Two 7 (8.0%) 10 (10.3%) 
     Three 19 (21.6%) 20 (20.6%) 
     Four 16 (18.2%) 21 (21.7%) 
     Five 16 (18.2%)  20 (20.6%) 
     Six 26 (29.6%) 6 (6.2%) 
Total/Mean 88 (4.3) 97 (3.2)b 
   
Propose a Project/Proposition of Law:   
     No 23 (26.1%) 37 (43.5%) 
     Yes 65 (73.9%) 48 (56.5%) 
Total/Mean 88 (.7) 85 (.6)c 
   
Speak in Plenary Session:   
     No 4 (4.6%) 44 (51.8%) 
     Yes 84 (95.5%) 41 (48.2%) 
Total/Mean 88 (1.0) 85 (.5)d 
   
Look for Support for a Law Outside Parliament:   
     No 47 (53.4%) 42 (49.4%) 
     Yes 41 (46.6%) 43 (50.6%) 
Total/Mean 88 (.5) 85 (.5)e 
   
Debate a Law in Committee:   
     No 9 (10.2%) 18 (21.2%) 
     Yes 79 (89.8%) 67 (78.8%) 
Total/Mean 88 (.9)a 85 (.8) 
   
Propose an Amendment:   
     No 18 (20.5%) 23 (27.1%) 
     Yes 70 (79.6%) 62 (72.9%) 
Total/Mean 88 (.8) 85 (.7) 
   
Convince a Colleague in Private to Vote for a Law:   
     No 52 (59.1%) 39 (45.9%) 
     Yes 36 (40.9%) 46 (54.1%) 
Total/Mean 88 (.4) 85 (.5) 
a Kutla deputies are less likely to have debated a law in committee (P Chi2 < .043).    
b Islamist deputies in Algeria have performed more of these activities, but the difference is not 
substantively significant (P Chi2 < .035).   
c Islamist deputies in Algeria are less likely to have proposed a law (P Chi2 < .026).  Government (HMS, 
RND, FLN) deputies in Algeria are less likely to have proposed a law (P Chi2 < .049).  Government (RND, 
FLN) deputies in Algeria are less likely to have proposed a law (P Chi2 < .040). 
d Islamist deputies in Algeria are less likely to have spoken in a plenary session (P Chi2 < .015). 
e Government (HMS, RND, RND) deputies in Algeria are less likely to have looked for support for a law 
outside parliament (P Chi2 < .048).  Majority party (FLN) deputies in Algeria are less likely to have looked 
for support for a law outside parliament (P Chi2 < .005).  Government (RND, FLN) deputies in Algeria are 
less likely to have looked for support for a law outside parliament (P Chi2 < .007). 
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Capacity: The Resources to Represent 
 
Capacity is “a parliament’s possession of the resources and expertise that will allow it to 
perform the functions to which it theoretically is entitled”.320  Members need material and human 
resources in order to provide “policy” responsiveness, as well as “constituency” responsiveness.  
Here I focus on the latter.  
I can find no interview evidence that monarchs endow parliaments with greater material or 
human resources than do presidents, meaning that the amount of staff and resources in parliament 
and the level of indemnities members receive does not appear to be substantially different.  
However, the elite status of members in Morocco and their dual role in the bureaucracy allows them 
to have greater access to resources and networks, as discussed in Chapter 2, through which they can 
provide district projects and solve casework requests.  Most deputies believe that the material and 
logistical resources available to them with which to fulfill their mandates are vastly insufficient to 
fulfill their role as defined by the constitution.321  Although the difference is not statistically 
significant, Moroccan members are somewhat more likely than Algerian members to agree that the 
resources provided to them by the parliament, government, and parties is sufficient (or too much); 
22 (25.6 percent) or Moroccan deputies and 14 (17.6 percent) of Algerian deputies agreed with that 
statement (See Table IV. 3.). 
 
TABLE IV. 3.     Perceptions of Resources among Moroccan and Algerian Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
Resource Level:   
     Not Enough (1) 64 (74.4%) 66 (82.5%) 
     Enough 22 (25.6%) 13 (16.3%) 
     Too Much (3) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.3%) 
Total/Mean 86 (1.3) 80 (1.2) 
Questions: Do you think the resources deputies receive from the Parliament, the government, and their 
parties are: too much, enough, or not enough? 
 
Level of Capacity for Constituency Responsiveness: Assumptions and Expectations 
 
 I begin by assuming that members prefer to have a high level of access to resources 
through which they may provide “constituency” responsiveness.  I assume that incumbents have 
preferences for capacity which differ by regime type.  Monarchs prefer a level of capacity for the 
parliament that, although it may be less than other parts of the bureaucracy, is greater than that of 
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321 There are no statistically significant differences in perceived resource levels between parties and blocks 
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a parliament in a presidential system.  In Morocco, the parliament is one part of a larger 
makhzenian political system based upon patron-client relationships.  The role of the King as 
arbitrator over the whole system is not contested.  In Algeria, incumbents prefer lower capacity of 
the legislature because it should not compete with the hegemony of the president and the 
executive by making alternative, viable policy proposals.  There is no arbitrator over the system 
that can assure regime continuity other than the army working through a strong, hegemonic 
president. 
 
Assumption B4:  Members prefer to have access to resources for service and allocation 
responsiveness. 
 
Assumption B5:  Regime power-holders in monarchies prefer parliaments which provide 
high overall levels of constituency responsiveness.  Regime power-holders in presidential 
systems prefer lower levels of constituency responsiveness. 
 
Hypothesis B5:  Morocco will have institutional rules which foster a higher level of 
capacity for “constituency” responsiveness among members of parliament than will 
Algeria. 
 
Hypothesis B6: Members in Morocco will be more likely to believe that they can access 
ministers and members high in the government than will members in Algeria. 
 
How do regime preferences affect access to resources to provide constituency 
responsiveness, including casework, district projects, and communication?  Because of the higher 
capacity afforded to members in monarchical systems by this institutional structure, I hypothesize 
that members will have higher caseloads and be more likely to have access to district projects 
than will members in presidential systems.     
 
Hypothesis B7:  Moroccan members will have higher caseloads and be more likely to 
influence funds for district projects than will Algerian members.  
 
 
Empirical Evidence: Capacity for Constituency Responsiveness 
 
Two institutional mechanisms mediate the effect of regime preferences on capacity level.  
In Morocco, members of parliament may serve simultaneously as ministers in the government or as 
officials elected to positions in local government, either as majors or as members of councils.  All 
of these positions bring with them resources to provide casework and district projects.  Many 
members of parliament are also elected to municipal or provincial assemblies, or are elected as 
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mayors or heads of provincial councils.  Survey data suggests that as many as 40 (40.9 percent) of 
the sample also hold a second public function.   
Second, monarchs choose constitutional arrangements which allow members to hold 
second functions in the private sector, whereas presidents do not allow such functions.  In Morocco, 
most members maintain their former job, their function being listed prominently on public lists of 
parliamentarians.  In Algeria, with some exceptions (e.g. certain business endeavors, notaries, etc.), 
members cannot hold such functions.  We make the following empirical observations which affect 
the capacity of members of parliament to provide “constituency” responsiveness. 
 
Hypothesis B8: Morocco will have constitutional arrangements which amalgamate the 
legislative branch with the bureaucracy and encourage members to have a second public 
function.  In Algeria, a second public function will not be allowed. 
 
Hypothesis B9:  Morocco will have constitutional arrangements which allow members to 
have second functions in business or the public sector.  In Algeria, second functions will 
be limited. 
 
Finally, as noted in Chapter 2, members of parliament are drawn from an elite political 
class, the makhzen, whereas many Algerian members are new elites with little or no prior 
experience in politics.  Here, too, we find evidence to support the hypothesis that members 
perceive greater access to ministers and other individuals within networks which can provide help 
with solving casework requests.  Many Algerian deputies, including some from majority parties, 
suggest that their role and access is very limited.  According to an Islamist deputy in Algeria: 
“[t]he government has the power and the deputy can only accomplish something by asking the 
ministry who may or may not respond . . . People think the deputy has influence to realize a lot.  
In reality this in not true.  The system always limits the deputy’s power.  We write letters and 
recommendations [to ministries].  There is almost always no response.  You must have a personal 
relationship with someone in the government.  I cannot accomplish anything.  There are too many 
obstacles.”322  Another member from a majority party concurred: “[w]e do much more personally 
over coffee . . . We work indirectly.  We fix problems as a team.  . . . If we have problems with 
the wally, we can’t work it out.  We will request an exchange of interest.  I am simple and 
correct.”323   
Despite these generalities, some Algerian deputies and most Moroccan deputies clearly 
have access to important members of the regime.  During an interview, an Islamist deputy in 
                                                     
322 Algeria, Member #17, July 2006. 
323 Algeria, Member #15, July 2006.  
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Algeria, in this case the MSP, which was in a ruling coalition with the government parties FLN 
and RND, received a call from the wally of his state.324  In Morocco, deputies are much more 
likely to say that they have access to government ministers, though some say that they have been 
blocked from challenging officials publicly on politically sensitive issues.  One Islamist deputy in 
Morocco explained that he does not receive requests any longer because he cannot do anything to 
help: “The doors are closed to me.”325  “If you play the game,” according to one Algerian 
observer, “you will win.”  Deputies who do not play according to the rules cannot be reelected, 
successful in solving citizens’ problems, and risk losing personal privileges.  A Moroccan 
political consultant said: “I won’t run.  I’m the president of an association—I prefer to be private.  
I won’t sell myself to be elected. This is still a rentier state.”326     
Table 4 shows that Moroccan members are more likely than Algerian members to have 
higher caseloads; 98 requests per month on average in Morocco and 44 requests per month in 
Algeria.  The data confirm that Moroccan members are more likely than Algerian members to 
rank district projects as their most time-consuming function; 28.6 percent compared with 17.3 
percent.  The mean percentage of members’ work week devoted to casework is, however, similar.  
The mean is 2.3 in Morocco and 2.1 in Algeria on a scale of 1 to 4 where the mean is close to 2, 
or 25 to 50 percent of the work week.327 
 
                                                     
324 Algeria, Member #7, December 2005. 
325 Morocco, Member #20, May 2007. 
326 Morocco, Observer #4, July 2006. 
327 Rankings of casework relative to other functions suggest, contrary to expectations, that Algerian 
members are actually more likely than Moroccan members to prioritize casework.  23 (25.3 percent) of 
Moroccan members and 30 (37.0 percent) of Algerian members rank casework as their most time 
consuming function, with a mean of 2.1 in Algeria compared with 2.4 in Morocco suggesting that Algerian 
members spend more time with casework than to Moroccans relative to other tasks.  These data cast doubt 
on the quality of the ranking measures relative to more concrete measures such as lawmaking activities 
actually performed and cases actually taken in an average month.  Given that Moroccan members are 




TABLE IV. 4.     Activities among Moroccan and Algerian Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
Most Time-Consuming Task:   
     Projects for the District 26 (28.6%) 14 (17.3%) 
     Debating and Writing Laws/Policies 32 (35.2%) 35 (43.2%) 
     Providing Help with Individual Requests 23 (25.3%) 30 (37.0%) 
     Communicating with Constituents 4 (4.4%) 1 (1.2%) 
     Meeting with Members of Party 6 (6.6%) 1 (1.2%) 
Total 91 81 
   
Mean Rank (1=Most time to 5=Least time):   
     Projects for the District 2.9 (1.6)a 2.8 (1.3) 
     Debating and Writing Laws/Policies 2.5 (1.4) 2.3 (1.5) 
     Providing Help with Individual Requests 2.4 (1.1) 2.1 (1.1)b 
     Communicating with Constituents 3.4 (1.1) 3.6 (1.0) 
     Meeting with Members of Party 3.7 (1.3) 4.0 (1.1) 
Total 92 84 
   
Percentage of Week Devoted to Casework:   
     25 Percent or Less 24 (26.7%) 28 (32.9%) 
     26-50 Percent 31 (34.4%) 32 (37.7%) 
     51-75 Percent 22 (24.4%) 13 (15.3%) 
     76 Percent or More 13 (14.4%) 12 (14.1%) 
Total/Mean 90 (2.3) 85 (2.1) 
   
Number of Requests per Month (Range) 0 to 1600 0 to 210 
   
Mean Number of Requests per Month 97.8 (215.1) 44.3 (41.1) 
Total 85 70 
a Ranked higher PJD (p < .001). (ie do much less) 
b FLN ranks casework lower (p < .037). 
 
 
Representation as Cooptation: 
The Relationship between Policy Contestation and Service Provision 
 
 Members of parliament in monarchical regimes are more likely than those in presidential 
regimes to engaging in lawmaking activities and to have higher caseloads.  But what is the 
relationship between engage in lawmaking activities (i.e. policy contestation) and casework (i.e. 
service responsiveness or patronage)?  In other words, does cooptation, which requires policy 
cooperation for privileges, lead to a trade-off between participation in debate (“policy” 
responsiveness) and resources for provision of casework (“service” responsiveness)?  Do the 
preferences of monarchs and presidents for level of debate lead to a different relationship between 
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provisions of these two types of representative goods?  I construct an argument about cooptation 
through representation, beginning with assumptions and hypotheses used to test it. 
 
Assumptions and Hypotheses 
 
Party, Candidate, and Member Preferences 
 
Following from the assumptions of rational choice, I assume that all actors have 
preferences and act to maximize utility.  Members seek to maximize the chance of reelection and 
attainment of higher political office.328  Survey data show that 89.7 percent of Moroccan deputies 
and 88.5 percent of Algerian members were seeking reelection and desired a more important 
political career, or both.  Parties seek to maximize representation over the long-run; thus, I 
assume that they also wish to see their members maximize the change of reelection or attainment 
of higher political office.  I argue that the optimal strategy of both actors is equivalent.  Interview 
evidence suggests that parties seek candidates that provide constituency service.  An Islamist 
deputy in Algeria suggested that: “[t]he first thing the party looks for is someone who serves the 
citizen, is close, and is almost in a parental role over the citizens.  They want someone who will 
take on the demands of citizens.”     
 
Assumption C1:  Members seek to maximize the chance of reelection or attainment of 
higher political office in the short-run. 
 
Assumption C2:  Parties seek to maximize representation in the government over the 
long-run.   
 
Assumption C3: The choice of representative goods which maximizes members’ popular 
support is also optimal for the party. 
 
 
Regime Power-Holder Preferences 
 
 I assume that both monarchs and presidents set conservative limits within which 
parliamentary debate can take place: “The monarchy as the ultimate Moroccan power center 
cannot be contested by parliamentary government; in turn, for those actors who accept the rules 
of the game, there is a sphere for articulation and political contest, namely parliament and 
                                                     
328 Scholars assume that members seek reelection.  See Carey and Shuggart 418, Rae 1971; Mayhew 1974; 
Epstein 1967; Taagepera and Shugart 1989. 
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elections”.329  Within these limits monarchs prefer a higher level of debate in parliament than do 
presidents.  For one party leader in Algeria, “The state wants parties and deputies which will vote 
without asking too many questions.”330   
 
Assumption C4:  Regime power-holders prefer members who acquiesce on policy and 
oversight outside of prescribed limits.  Incumbents punish members who do not acquiesce 
within the institutional limits by removing access to networks of patronage. 
 
Assumption C5:  Monarchs prefer moderate levels of parliamentary debate within 
clearly-prescribed issue boundaries.  Presidents prefer low levels of parliamentary 
debate but do not state clear issue boundaries. 
 
 
 The mechanism of cooptation suggests that members who contest beyond these limits 
encounter difficulty attaining patronage and access to patronage networks which facilitate the 
resolution of casework requests and the provision of district projects.  Two Moroccan members 
interviewed made this point.  One Moroccan deputy from a socialist party claimed that he had 
opposed the regime and that, “all doors are closed to me.”331  In this case, the deputy was a 
wealthy businessman with extensive contacts in civil society.  Through these networks, the 
deputy was still able to solve problems.  The second deputy was in the opposition.  He claimed 
that he once took casework requests but that, because he was in the opposition and really wanted 
reform, he had no contacts with which he could solve any problems.  So, he turned people 





I assume that citizens prefer high levels of service and allocation responsiveness.  
Further, they are adverse to behavior by members which suggests that they are in parliament to 
serve their own interests (i.e. they are coopted).  Interview evidence suggests that Moroccan and 
Algerian constituents expect members to be present in their districts, to help them solve personal 
problems with jobs and the administration, and to attract development funds and resources to the 
district.  Citizens expect to know deputies before voting for them.  In Algeria, one reason people 
vote for large parties is that they do not know or trust new parties.  “You could never be reelected 
                                                     
329 Layachi, State, Society & Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life.: 129. 
330 Algeria, Observer #3, April 2007. 
331 Morocco, Deputy #18, July 2006. 
332 Morocco, Deputy #21, May 2007. 
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if you weren’t there and you are not known by the people of the district”, said a majority party 
member in Algeria.333   
  Moroccans and Algerians rank from most to least important: obtaining funds for 
development projects, taking care of citizens’ requests, writing and debating laws, informing 
citizens, and organizing meetings with party members (See Table IV. 5.).  They also believe that 
deputies prioritize these tasks in nearly the reverse order.  Even among those who believe 
elections are no longer flawed, there is an expectation that deputies will contribute to real social 
and economic change: “There won’t be any fraud this time.  But people still won’t have 
confidence until they see something concrete.”334   
 
TABLE IV. 5.     Expectations and Perceptions Moroccan and Algerian Constituents 















Obtaining Funds 1 5 1 3 
Writing and Debating Laws 3 2 3 2 
Taking Care of Citizens’ Requests 2 4 2 1 
Informing Citizens 4 3 4 4 
Organizing Meetings with Party 5 1 5 5 
Questions: Please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the 
following statements: (1) Only people with a connection to a deputy can ask for help with a personal 
problem (2) People around here do not trust the outcome of elections. 
 
 
Assumption C6:  Citizens prefer high levels of casework and district projects. 
 
Assumption C7:  Citizens prefer members who do not seek personal gain or are puppets 
of the regime (acquiescent on policy). 
 
 
Representation as Bargaining in Multiple Arenas 
 
I construct a visual representation of bargaining in multiple arenas which adds detail to 
our understanding of why cooptation or makhzenization works once members are elected to 
parliament.  Members of parliament seek to maximize their chances of reelection by making 
strategic choices about representative activities while simultaneously considering payoffs in 
multiple arenas.  Members of parliament are not merely engaged in negotiation with incumbent 
                                                     
333 Algeria, Member #2, March 2007. 
334 Algeria, Observer #8, April 2007. 
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elites who prefer a measure of policy acquiescence and who control the outcome of elections 
through election structuring.  Semi-competitive elections give both regime incumbents and also, 
to some extent, citizens agency in the outcome.  Citizens influence the outcome of elections via 
political support.  I argue that incumbents control the levers of patronage, requiring support-
maximizing members to limit policy responsiveness (i.e. contestation) in order to provide 
“service” responsiveness (i.e. solving requests of citizens).   
Thus, I extend Gandhi and Przeworski’s assertion that: “[c]o-opting by distributing spoils 
and coopting by making policy concessions entail different institutional mechanisms.”335  I argue 
that, within legislative politics, the two mechanisms, although analytically distinct, are 
interconnected via the primary mechanism of representation.  In other words, one mechanism by 
which cooptation occurs is the strategic choices members make between representative activities.  
I test whether policy responsiveness and service responsiveness are substitute goods requiring 
members to make a conscious choice between them, under conditions of electoral uncertainty, as 
they seek to maximize the chance of reelection.  
Members of parliament must choose baskets of two types of representative activities--
policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness--which I define as casework, district 
projects, and communication.  I use a model of revealed preferences in two arenas to illustrate 
this mechanism (See Figure IV. 3.). 
 
Assumption C8:  Members seek to maximize popular support by choosing an optimal 
combination of legislative and constituency responsiveness given the preferences of 
regime power-holders and citizens. 
 
 
The budget lines la and lm signify all combinations of representative activities which may 
be selected by members of parliament, given the constraints and opportunities of parliamentary 
institutions, where the subscripts identify the country.  The budget line reflects the power, 
preferences, and coalitions of actors at all levels; institutions, formal and informal; and elite-level 
strategies.   
The preference-maximizing market basket is Qm and Qa on indifference curve Um and Ua.  
Members trade off between forms of representation—(“policy” responsiveness and 
“constituency” responsiveness)—balancing acquiescence in policy matters for resources and 
networks with which to solve constituent problems.  In maximizing the change of reelection, 
actors must consider payoffs in multiple arenas.   
                                                     
335 Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.": 1282. 
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FIGURE IV. 3.  Dynamics of Cooptation and Optimization of Popular Support in the 
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 The slope and placement of the line is determined by parliamentary institutions, 
negotiated by incumbent and opposition elites in the first nested game of bargaining over 
institutional design.  This line reflects the preferences of incumbents for levels of debate and 
constituency responsiveness, inter alia.  In both countries, P reflects the level of contestation 
which may result in the withdrawal of resources and networks by which to provide services.  
Because regime power-holders in Algeria prefer minimal debate in parliament, Pa is lower than 
Pm.  Q reflects the maximum level of casework and district projects, ceterus paribus, which a 
lm 
la 









fully acquiesce member can provide.  Because regime power-holders in Morocco prefer higher 
constituency responsiveness, and since parliamentary institutions facilitate greater capacity in this 
area, Pa is lower than Pm.   
 In strategically determining representative behavior to maximize the chances of 
reelection or attainment of higher office, members of parliament must seek an optimal balance 
between acquiescence in the parliament in order to gain the resources for constituency 
responsiveness (e.g. casework and district projects) and “policy” responsiveness (i.e. 
contestation) in the legislature.  I argue that if members go too far beyond the tacit boundaries of 
“constructive opposition”, these members encounter difficulties in acquiring resources to provide 
“constituency” responsiveness in the current round (mandate) or even losing their ability to be 
placed in the party list in future rounds of elections.  However, if they acquiescence too 
significantly in “policy” responsiveness, their party risks losing popular support, not because they 
do not or cannot provide constituency responsiveness (e.g. casework), but because they are 
viewed as coopted (“makhzenized”).  For example, the old opposition in Morocco, led ostensively 
by the USFP and Istiqlal has been seen as drawn into the government; they take the blame for 
certain failed social policies for which they contested while in the opposition and cannot take 
credit for improvements, which might be seen as the result of the government, and of the 
opposition.336  Thus, members of parliament must strategically “represent” by considering how 
the context (i.e. mass political attitudes) affects payoffs in the principle game: reelection.   
    
Testing the Implications of the Preference Model 
 
The preference model suggests observable implications which can be tested with member 
data.  Here I focus on predicting variation in time devoted to casework, paying special attention to 
the nature of the relationship between access to casework on the one hand, and participation in 
parliamentary debate on the other. 
 




The dependent variable is time devoted to casework as a percentage of one’s work week 
as a deputy (See Table IV. 6).  In Algeria, this should generally be an individual’s entire work 
                                                     
336 Tozy, "Morocco's Elections: Islamists, Technocrats, and the Palace.": 38. 
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week since members are not allowed, with a few exceptions (e.g. notary public), to exercise a 
second function.  In Morocco, a deputy may have a second position in the private sector, or even 
be elected or appointed to a second public function.  In either case, and particularly in the latter, 
the member’s second function may be linked with casework.  A deputy who is a businessman, for 
example, will generally use business contacts to get jobs for constituents if he or she provides 
casework; members who are simultaneously majors will handle casework operations with state 
budgets and resources and thus casework operations under the two functions will not be separate 
in general.   
 The dependent variable has four ordered categories.  Table IV. 6. presents the distribution 
of time devoted to casework in the two countries.  Moroccan members tend to devote slightly 
more time on average than do Algerian deputies, but the difference is not statistically significant.  
The modal category in both Morocco and Algeria is 25 to 50 percent.  
 
TABLE IV. 6.     Percentage of Work Week Devoted to Casework Moroccan and Algerian 
Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
   
Percentage of Week Devoted to Casework:   
     25 Percent or Less 24 (26.7%) 28 (32.9%) 
     26-50 Percent 31 (34.4%) 32 (37.7%) 
     51-75 Percent 22 (24.4%) 13 (15.3%) 
     76 Percent or More 13 (14.4%) 12 (14.1%) 
Total/Mean 90 (2.3) 85 (2.1) 





Trading off baskets of representative goods.  The primary independent variable of interest is 
participation in parliamentary debate (See Table IV. 7.).  As a proxy for this variable, I use an 
indicator of whether the deputy has ever, during the mandate (2002-2007), debated a law in 
committee.  In both Algeria and Morocco, all deputies are members of a committee and, thus, 
have multiple opportunities to do so.  Nearly all members have debated a law in committee at 
least once: 89.8 percent of Moroccan members and 78.8 percent of Algerian members.  Already, 
the higher proportion of Moroccan members who have debated a law suggests that debate, albeit 
within the guidelines of “constructive opposition”, is more acceptable in the Moroccan case than 




TABLE IV. 7.     Lawmaking Actions among Moroccan and Algerian Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
Debate a Law in Committee:   
     No 9 (10.2%) 18 (21.2%) 
     Yes 79 (89.8%) 67 (78.8%) 
Total/Mean 88 (.9)a 85 (.8) 
  
 
 Hypothesis 1 states that in order to mobilize popular support and maximize changes of 
reelection, members in both Algeria and Morocco face a trade-off between legislative 
responsiveness and constituency responsiveness.  The same trade-off exists in both countries, but 
because the preferences of regime power-holders for level of debate in the parliament varies 
across regime type, the budget line is less steep, meaning that Moroccan members may 
simultaneously choose a higher level of both legislative and constituency responsiveness than can 
Algerian members (i.e. Indifference curve UM is higher than U 2).  Interview evidence suggests 
strongly that Moroccan members are more likely to have the stature to question and approach 
ministers than are Algerian members.  Evidence also suggests that Algerian members feel a 
higher level of pressure to conform to norm of executive control over the policymaking realm. 
 
Hypothesis C1:  Members face a trade-off between policy responsiveness and gaining 
resources for constituency responsiveness.  Because monarchs prefer a level of debate, 
Moroccan members are less likely to face this trade-off than are Algerian members 
where presidents prefer a very limited level of debate.   
 
Party membership: Opposition and the structure of non-opposition.  First, what is the 
relationship between being in the opposition and access to resources to provide casework?  I 
hypothesize that, contrary to expectations about Islamist parties in much of the literature, 
members of the Islamist opposition will devote less time to casework for three reasons.  First, 
because of their position in the opposition, Islamist deputies have less access to resources and 
networks to solve casework requests.  Second, because they are in the opposition, Islamist 
deputies will devote greater resources and time to developing a party program than will members 
of other parties.  Third, because Islamist parties more closely resemble a party in the western 
sense (i.e. Islamist parties are to a lesser extent “façade” parties), they will behave in ways which 
conform most closely to expectations of the effect of electoral system on political behavior.  
Closed-list proportional representation systems should lead to low caseloads—probably lower 
than what we observe in the Moroccan and Algerian cases—thus we would expect the political 
behavior of parties which are most democratic in their internal functioning to conform more 
closely to this pattern than those which are least democratic in their internal functioning. 
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Hypothesis C2:  Members of the opposition will devote less time, on average, to 
casework. 
 
 What about non-opposition parties: majority parties, “moderate” opposition parties, 
smaller parties and independents, and regime-created parties?  How will these parties differ from 
the opposition and from one another in the time devoted to casework?   
If monarchs prefer a multiplicity of smaller parties which compete with one another and 
have similar abilities to mobilize popular support, institutions in the political system should 
provide similar levels of opportunity for resources for casework and district projects for all non-
opposition parties.  Thus, non-opposition parties should devote more time to casework than 
opposition parties, but non-opposition parties should not differ from one another in this provision.   
 
Hypothesis C3:  Members of majority and other non-opposition parties in Morocco will 
devote more time, on average, to casework than will the opposition party.  Members of 
non-opposition parties in Morocco will not differ from one another in the time they 
devote to casework.   
 
Hypothesis C4:  Members of the majority party in Algeria will devote more time, on 
average, to casework than will the opposition party and other non-opposition parties 
(small parties and independents notwithstanding). Members of non-opposition parties in 
Algeria will differ from one another in the time they devote to casework.   
 
If presidents prefer a single dominant party, they should provide greater opportunity to 
the majority party to mobilize support through constituency service than to other opposition and 
non-opposition parties.   
A special case in Morocco and Algeria may be small parties with less than eight percent 
of the seats and independents.  These deputies should have a greater incentive to cultivate a 
personal vote and, thus, be more likely to devote more time to casework.   
 
Hypothesis C5:  Members of small parties and independent deputies will devote more 
time, on average, to casework. 
 
Hypothesis C6:  Non-opposition elites will have equal access to service responsiveness in 
Morocco but unequal access to service responsiveness in Algeria. 
 
In the next sections, I test these hypotheses in multivariate models and develop and test a 
final hypothesis concerning the relationship between legislative responsiveness and constituency 
responsiveness in the two countries.  I argue that members in both countries need to trade off 
between policy responsiveness and gaining the resources to provide constituency responsiveness.  
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However, because monarchs prefer a higher level of debate than do presidents, members in 
Morocco are much less likely to face this trade-off than are their Algerian counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis C7:  Members face a trade-off between policy responsiveness and gaining 
resources for constituency responsiveness.  Because monarchs prefer a level of debate, 
Moroccan members are less likely to face this trade-off than are Algerian members.   
 
Representative role.  Following from the basic political logic of Friedrich’s “rule of anticipated 
reactions”, legislators who believe constituency service is more important for maintaining 
electoral support will receive more casework.337  Interview data revealed differences among 
deputies in the ways they conceive of their role as representatives.  These differences are 
discussed at greater length in Chapter 4.  Here, I control for extent the to which members believe 
serving citizens is central to their role as a deputy.  Members’ responses to the following 
statement are measured as a likert scale: “Serving citizens is the most important thing I do as a 
deputy.”  I hypothesize that those who agree more strongly with this statement will devote more 
time to casework. 
 
Hypothesis C8:  Members who have a service orientation will devote more time, on 
average, to casework than those who focus on other aspects of representation. 
 
Political ambition.  Members who have greater political ambition should devote more time to 
casework because of the role casework plays in developing standing in the party, as well as the 
district.  Political ambition is measured by a question asking whether the member will not, may, 
or certainly will pursue a more important political position in the future.   
 
Hypothesis C9:  Members who have greater political ambition will devote more time, on 
average, to casework. 
 
Previous mandates.  Members who have served a previous mandate should also have more 
established networks for casework provision and, therefore, may be more likely to devote more 
time to it. 
 
Hypothesis C10:  Members who have served a previous mandate will devote more time, on 
average, to casework. 
 
                                                     
337 1946, 589-91. 
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Developmental level of district.  Developmental level of the district is an important control and 
may also explain variation in time devoted to casework.  In Algeria, developmental level is 
measured as a proportion of households with toilets linked to a sewage system, and is measured 
in Morocco as the number of hospital beds per capita in the region in which the electoral district 
is located.  Rural and less developed districts will lack infrastructure and, thus, members in these 
districts should devote more time to casework. 
 
Hypothesis C11:  Members whose districts are better developed will devote less time, on 
average, to casework. 
 
Institutional variation: District magnitude.  District magnitude is also an important control 
because of its relationship to incentives to cultivate a personal vote.  Members in small districts 
will have a greater need to develop standing with citizens in order to be placed first on the party 
list in the next elections where such a list position is most critical to being reelected. 
 
Hypothesis C12:  Members in larger districts (higher district magnitude) will devote less 
time, on average, to casework. 
 
Openness of casework operations.  I control for the openness of casework operations, which is 
proxied by the proportion of casework requests that come from women.  Members with more 
open casework practices will be more likely to devote more time to casework.   
 
Hypothesis C13:  Members with more open casework operations will devote more time, on 
average, to casework. 
 
Political competition within districts.  Finally, I control for the average time devoted to 
casework among members in the same district.  Members may work together on casework and 
may also work together with other branches of government on casework in that district.  More 
responsive members may also create a more competitive environment which encourages other 
members in that district to improve constituency responsiveness in order to build or maintain 
popular support.  Thus, I hypothesize that mean time devoted to casework among members of 
one’s district will predict the amount of time an individual respondent devotes to casework. 
 
Hypothesis C14:  Members in districts with higher average time devoted to casework 




 Further, I control for the proportion of the seats in the district held by members of one’s 
party.  Members who are the only member of their party from their district may devote more time 
to casework in order to mobilize popular support and retain a position as head of the list.  This 
effect may be mitigated by the gains in efficiency attained by members who are elected with other 
members of their party and, thus, can work together on the resolution of casework. 
 
Hypothesis C15:  Members in districts with a larger proportion of members from their 




Bi-variate distributions suggest that Moroccan members who have spoken in committee 
are also more likely to devote a higher proportion of their week to casework than those who have 
not spoken in debate (See Table IV. 8.).  In Algeria, the relationship is opposite: those who have 
spoken in committee are more likely to devote a lower proportion of their week to casework.  
These differences are not statistically significant in two-tailed Chi-squared test for independence.  
However, they suggest that the hypothesized trade-off between legislative and constituency 
responsive is present in Algeria, but may be different or less strong in Morocco.  
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TABLE IV. 8.     Percentage of Work Week Devoted to Casework Moroccan and Algerian 
Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
   
Percentage of Week Devoted to Casework:   
     25 Percent or Less 24 (26.7%) 28 (32.9%) 
     26-50 Percent 31 (34.4%) 32 (37.7%) 
     51-75 Percent 22 (24.4%) 13 (15.3%) 
     76 Percent or More 13 (14.4%) 12 (14.1%) 
Total/Mean 90 (2.3) 85 (2.1) 
   
Mean Percentage of Week Devoted to Casework by Legislative 
Responsiveness: 
  
     Has Spoken in Committee 2.3 (1.0) 2.1 (1.0) 
     Has Not Spoken in Committee 1.9 (.9) 2.3 (1.2) 
Total 87 84 
   
Mean Percentage of Week Devoted to Casework by Party:   
     “Moderate” Opposition Parties (Koutla Bloc) 2.2 (.9) - 
     Regime-Created Parties (Makhzen Parties and RND) 2.4 (1.0)† 2.3 (1.2) 
     Majority Parties (MP and FLN) 2.6 (1.2) 2.2 (1.1) 
     Islamist Party/Parties (“True Opposition”) 1.9 (1.0) 1.8 (.9) 
     Small Groups/Parties (21 or fewer seats) 2.6 (1.0) † 2.4 (1.0) 
Total 89 81 
Question: What percentage of your work week as a deputy do you devote to solving citizens’ personal 
requests? 
† p<.10 * p<.05  ** p<.01 *** p<.001 two-tailed test Chi2 test. 
 
  
Bivariate distributions also suggest that Islamist deputies devote least time to casework 
than all other parties in both countries.  In itself, this is important evidence given conventional 
wisdom that Islamist parties gain popularity through service provision.  Although the Chi-squared 
tests of independence do not compare levels of time devoted to casework between non-opposition 
parties, the levels of time devoted to casework is closer among non-opposition arties in Algeria, 
even though I hypothesized that values on the dependent variable would be closer among non-
opposition parties in Morocco.  Multivariate modeling will provide more convincing evidence of 




 Ordered logit is used to test the effect of the independent variables on time devoted to 
casework.  All variables are standardized with values from 0 to 1 (See Tables IV. 9. and IV. 10.).     
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 The results suggest that, as hypothesized, Moroccan members who have debated a law in 
committee are more likely to devote a higher proportion of their week to casework.338  Algerian 
members who have debated a law, however, are less likely to devote time to casework.  In 
Algeria, when all other variables are held at their means, members who have debated a law in 
committee are 19 percent more likely than those who have not to be in the second casework 
category (25-50 percent of their week devoted to casework); members who have debated a law in 
committee are 25 percent less likely than those who have not to be in the third category (51-75 
percent); and members who have debated a law in committee are 15 percent less likely than those 
who have not to be in the third casework category (76-100 percent).  In Morocco, the relationship 
is reversed.  Members who have debated a law in committee are 9 percent less likely than are 
those who have never debated a law to be in the second casework category (25-50 percent); 
members who have debated a law in committee are 25 percent than are those who have never 
debated a law to be in the third casework category (51-75 percent); members who have debated a 
law in committee are 9 percent more likely than those who have not to be in the third casework 
category (76-100 percent).  These results suggest that members who are more active in 
parliamentary debate will be less likely to provide casework in Algeria, but more likely to provide 
casework in Morocco.   
What other factors are important for explaining why some members devote little time to 
casework while others devote considerable time?  Within-country effects tend to be similar in the 
two countries although not all of the same variables are statistically significant.  Having a service 
role orientation is associated with more time devoted to casework in both countries, although the 
effect in Algeria is significant only at the p < .10 level.  The same is true of more open casework 
operations which also predict greater time devoted to casework, but fails to meet the p < .05 level 
in Algeria.  Finally, higher average time devoted to casework among members in one’s district 
also predicts greater time devoted to casework at the individual level in both countries.   
A few other differences in within-country effects also emerge.  In Algeria, greater 
political ambition and the higher mean level of time devoted to casework in one’s district 
significantly predicts greater time devoted to casework.  This effect is not significant in Morocco.  
One might argue that provision of casework—or the establishment of patron-client 
relationships—is particularly important as a political strategy in Algeria.   
All of the hypothesized relationships concerning the effect of party membership on time 
devoted to casework fail to be supported by the data.  In Algeria, neither membership in the 
                                                     
338 In neither case does time devoted to casework predict whether a deputy has spoken in committee; this 
suggests that endogeneity is not biasing the results.   
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opposition or non-opposition, nor the structure of non-opposition have any explanatory power.  In 
Morocco, parliamentary group membership does make some difference, though not as 
hypothesized.  In the full model, members of the largest parliamentary group (MP) are more 
likely to devote more time to casework, but not at less than the p < .05 level.  This seems contrary 
to the expectation that monarchs prefer parties at parity with one another and, therefore, may not 
give advantages to any one party.  However, it may be incorrect to assume that the preferences of 
power-holders can lead to such an exact relationship with political outcome.  Further, the majority 
party may have greater ministerial portfolios and, therefore, be most efficient at solving casework 
requests.  Wald tests reveal that the effect of parliamentary group membership on time devoted to 
casework differs between the majority party (MP) and the opposition (PJD).  This difference is 
also close to statistical significance for the PJD and small parties, as well as for the koutla 
(moderate opposition) and the PJD.  These results suggest that parliamentary group is important 
in Morocco, but that it is the opposition that is different from other parties in terms of time 
devoted to casework; in this case, the PJD spends less time on this representative function than 












(1 <25%; 4 >75%) 
Marginal Effects
1 
(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
  2 3 4  
Islamist party (MSP and Islah) -.19 (.95) -.00 (.02) -.02 (.10) -.01 (.03)  
Majority party (FLN) .58 (1.16) -.01 (.04) .07 (.14) .02 (.05)  
Small party .11 (1.09) -.00 (.01) .01 (.13) .00 (.04)  
Higher developmental level of district -1.12 (3.10) -.00 (.06) -.13 (.35) -.04 (.12)  
Previous term in Parliament -.41 (.91) -.01 (.06) -.04 (.09) -.01 (.03)  
Serving citizen most important 2.21 (1.48)† .01 (.12) .25 (.17)† .08 (.06)  
Political ambition 3.32 (.93)*** .01 (.17) .38 (.13)** .13 (.06)*  
Higher district magnitude -.13 (1.61) -.00 (.01) -.02 (.18) -.01 (.06)  
Higher proportion of same party in district -.21 (2.33) -.00 (.01) -.02 (.26) -.01 (.09)  
More open casework operation 1.60 (1.01)† -.01 (.08) .18 (.12)† .06 (.04)  
Higher casework deputies in district 12.39 (2.60)*** .05 (.65) 1.40 (.48)** .47 (.20)*  
Has debated law in committee -2.02 (.73)** .19 (.14) -.26 (.10)* -.15 (.10)†  
Weight -.64 (.93) -.00 (.03) -.07 (.11) -.02 (.04)  
N 68     
LR Chi2 / Prob. > Chi2 57.55/.0000***     
Pseudo R2 / Log Likelihood .3209/-60.899     
      
Wald Test of Linear Hypotheses      
H0: βIslam – βFLN=0 .48 (.4870)     
H0: βIslam – βSmall=0 .12 (.7301)     
H0: βFLN – βSmall=0 .12 (.7312)     
† p<.10 * p<.05  ** p<.01 *** p<.001 two-tailed test; Standard errors are in parentheses; 1 ∂y/∂x for variable means,  















(1 <25%; 4 >75%) 
Marginal Effects
1 
(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
  2 3 4  
Koutla party .62 (.82) -.07 (.11) .09 (.12) .05 (.07)  
Majority party (MP) 1.68 (.96)† -.26 (.16)† .20 (.07)** .20 (.16)  
Islamist party (PJD) -.83 (1.04) .05 (.04) -.12 (.14) -.05 (.05)  
Small party 1.07 (.91) -.15 (.14) .15 (.12) .10 (.11)  
Higher developmental level of district .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)  
Previous term in Parliament -.20 (.49) .02 (.05) -.03 (.08) -.01 (.04)  
Serving citizen most important 2.84 (1.41)* -.30 (.19)† .44 (.24)† .21 (.11)†  
Political ambition -.35 (.67) .04 (.07) -.05 (.10) -.03 (.05)  
Higher district magnitude -2.14 (2.06) .23 (.24) -.33 (.32) -.16 (.16)  
Higher proportion of same party in district 1.07 (3.00) -.11 (.32) .17 (.46) .08 (.22)  
More open casework operation 3.39 (1.07)** -.36 (.18)* .52 (.20)** .25 (.10)*  
Higher casework deputies in district 8.79 (2.14)*** -.94 (.43)* 1.35 (.42)*** .64 (.23)**  
Has debated law in committee 2.19 (.87)* .09 (.15) .25 (.07)*** .09 (.03)**  
Weight -.58 (2.75) .06 (.30) -.09 (.42) -.04 (.20)  
N 79     
LR Chi2 / Prob. > Chi2 48.78/.0000***     
Pseudo R2 / Log Likelihood .2296/-81.831     
Wald Test of Linear Hypotheses      
H0: βMP – βIslam=0 5.56 (.0175)*     
H0: βMP – βSmall=0 .44 (.5064)     
H0: βIslam – βSmall=0 3.24 (.0717)
†     
H0: βKoutla – βMP=0 2.34 (.1264)     
H0: βKoutla – βSislam=0 2.66 (.1026)
†     
H0: βKoutla – βSmall=0 .32 (.5736)     




Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 These results suggest that the structure of incentives to provide different combinations of 
representative goods differs by regime type according to the preferences of incumbents.  
Members in Algeria, a former one-party state, where a single dominant party is preferred by 
incumbents, face a trade-off between policy responsiveness and obtaining resources to the 
provision of casework.  In Morocco, a case of monarchy, where a large number of factionalized 
parties and a high level of debate is preferred by incumbents, members do not face this trade-off.  
This does not mean, as interview evidence from Morocco shows, that Moroccan members cannot 
face this trade-off (i.e. that the budget line is still sloped downward) at particular points on the 
budget line.  Rather, it means that at least for the range contestation we observe, which is 
generally within the limits set for the parliament, Moroccan members do not face this trade-off.  
Rather, the direction of the relationship between these two activities appears to be opposite, 
suggesting that at least some form of participation in debate is encouraged, or at least not 
discouraged, with the removal of casework opportunities.  Interview evidence from Morocco is 
clear: contestation outside of the established boundaries of politics is punished.  I encountered 
several claims of this in different political parties.  For this reason, we know that there is some 
point Pm at which increasing contestation leads to removal of patronage networks for the 
provision of casework.  Some of the cited members could still provide services through 
associations, while others said they had ceased provision altogether.   
However, as noted, the relationship between participation in debate and provision of 
casework in Morocco is negative, demonstrating that at certain points on the curve, legislative 
and constituency responsiveness are complements, not substitutes.  In other words, unlike in 
Algeria, participation in parliamentary debate (e.g. commissions, plenary sessions, etc.) may be 
rewarded by access to patronage networks for resolving requests.  This result makes sense, given 
what we know about the preferences of monarchs for lively parliamentary debate and the 
concomitant effects of these preferences on electoral rules, the party system, and, as I have 
shown, parliamentary institutions.  Given the results, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
budget line in Algeria, la is sloped downward.  However, the evidence from Morocco suggests 
that the budget link, lm, is kinked; sloped upward for some range of values of Pm and Qm.  Thus, I 




FIGURE IV. 4. Dynamics of Cooptation and Optimization of Popular Support in the 
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Further research might test this model in other cases of monarchies and former one-party 
systems to determine whether the results in Morocco and Algeria generalize to broader classes of 
authoritarian regimes.  Further attention might be turned to adding complexity to the model by 
considering different budget lines for opposition and non-opposition groups. 
lm 
la 


















Following Duverger, Cox, and Riker, Pippa Norris notes that electoral systems have 
“mechanical” effects on institutional arrangements and political outcomes, for example,by 
affecting the structure of party competition or the proportionality of seats to votes, among other 
outcomes.339  Norris also argues that institutions have “psychological effects” on the attitudes and 
behavior of members,and, on the quality of representation and accountability in the political 
system.  In other words, institutions, via the representative link, affect ordinary citizens and likely 




John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart argue that the closed-list proportional 
representation system in one round, such as the electoral system in Morocco and Algeria, 
engenders the weakest incentives among possible seat allocation formulas, ceteris paribus, to 
promote personal reputation.340  The strength of these incentives is expected to decline as district 
magnitude increases.   
Further, Norris suggests that the interaction between centralized party candidate selection 
and party allots, like those existing in Morocco and Algeria, should yield cohesive and disciplined 
parliamentary parties, party voting, and, of particular importance for this chapter, programmatic, 
rather than particularistic benefits.341  Most empirical work examines the United 
                                                     
339 The distinction between mechanical and psychological effects was first identified by Duverger and later 
used by Riker and Cox.  I am grateful to Ken Kollman for identifying this.  Norris, Electoral Engineering 
Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 
340 John M. and Matthew Shugart Carey, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of 
Electoral Formulas," Electoral Studies 14, no. 4 (1995). 
341 Norris, Electoral Engineering Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 
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States, Britain, and Australia, where first-past-the-post plurality rules in single member districts 
are associated with the observed increase in constituency attention over the past fifty years.342  
Caseloads grew dramatically in Britain from nearly nothing in 1950 to approximately 33 hours 
per week (constituency work) in 2001.343  Given the evidence in the comparative literature on 
constituency service (stopped here), we should expect the electoral system in Morocco and 
Algeria “to encourage politicians to offer programmatic benefits, focused on the collective record 
and program of their party, and to strengthen cohesive and disciplined parliamentary parties” 
rather than casework.344 
 
Member Perceptions of Incentives to Cultivate a Personal or Party Reputation 
 
The survey asked members to rank their perception of the importance of building a party 
or personal reputation as a strategy for gaining reelection.  Five response categories were given:  
 
(1) Party only;  
(2) Party and personal image, with emphasis on party;  
(3) Party and personal image equally;  
(4) Personal and party image, with emphasis on personal image  
(5) Personal image only (See Table V. 1.).   
 
Although, admittedly, we lack a baseline for authoritarian settings like Morocco and 
Algeria, these data appear puzzling.  The mean response is about the same in the two countries, or 
about “both party and personal image equally” (“3”).  There is variation among respondents in 
both countries, with at least a few deputies selecting each category.  Given the closed-list PR-
system, we expect very low incentives to cultivate a personal reputation, or for the distribution to 
be heavily skewed toward “party only” (“1”).  Yet the results do not conform to these 
expectations expressed by Carey and Shugart and advanced in the literature.345   
Why do Moroccan and Algerian members tend, on average, to feel that both party and 
personal reputation are important for reelection?  What do we learn about legislative politics from 
the individual-level determinants of these perceptions?  More specially, does variation in district 
magnitude play a role in explaining variation in perceptions? 
                                                     
342 Brian J. Gaines, "The Impersonal Vote? Constituency Service and Incumbency Advantage in British 
Elections, 1950-92," Legislative Studies Quarterly 23, no. 2 (1998), Norris, Electoral Engineering Voting 
Rules and Political Behavior, Donley T. Studlar and Ian McAllister, "Constituency Activity and 
Representational Role among Australian Legislators," Journal of Politics 58, no. 1 (1996). 
343 Norris, Electoral Engineering Voting Rules and Political Behavior.: 235. 
344 Ibid.: 232. 





Second, the member survey asked respondents to estimate the number of casework 
requests they receive in an average month (See Table V. 1.).  Yet caseloads (“service” 
responsiveness) seem high in relation to conventional wisdom.  Moroccan deputies handle 98 
requests per month, on average, while Algerian members handle 44 requests, on average.  
Caseload varies from 0 to 1600 in Morocco and from 0 to 210 in Algeria.346   
Since electoral competition is limited in these settings, one might ask why members go to 
their districts to help constituents with requests at all?  Given the electoral institutions, why do 
members of parliament provide constituency service?  What explains variation in caseload?  Can 
district magnitude or any other institutional features account for this variation?   
 
TABLE V. 1.     Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote and Strategies among Moroccan and 
Algerian Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
Perceived Incentives to Build Personal Reputation:   
     Build a Strong Party Image (1) 9 (10.0%) 10 (11.9%) 
     Build Both, Strong Party Image Emphasis 19 (21.1%) 22 (26.2%) 
     Build both Equally 36 (40.0%) 26 (31.0%) 
     Build Both, Personal Image Emphasis 20 (22.2%) 11 (13.1%) 
     Build a Strong Personal Image (5) 6 (6.7%) 15 (17.9%) 
Total/Mean 90 (2.9) 84 (3.0) 
   
Caseload (“Service Responsiveness”):   
     Number of Requests per Month (Range in Sample) 0 to 1600 0 to 210 
   
     Mean Number of Requests per Month 97.8 (215.1) 44.3 (41.1) 
Total 85 70 
Questions: What is the most effective strategy for reelection?  (1) Build a Strong Party Image, etc. 
 
 
                                                     
346 Members do not have professional staff other than the small number of individuals who work in the 
parliamentary group offices, any staff who may assist them in party offices, or a small number of 
individuals they may employ on a party or full-time basis.  Moroccan members in the sample employ 
between zero and nine part or full-time staff members, or about 1.1, on average.  Algerian members employ 
between zero and seven part of full-time staff members, or about .7, on average.  Yet, deputies may have 






There is a further puzzle.  Conventional wisdom in Middle East politics literature, based 
mainly on Eastern cases with weak state structures (e.g. Palestine, Jordan, etc.), suggests that 
Islamist parties gain popularity through the provision of social services.  By extension, one might 
expect that Islamist deputies provide higher caseloads on average, and, thus, may also perceive a 
higher incentive to cultivate a personal reputation.   
Looking comparatively at candidate-selection procedures in developed democracies, 
Gideon Rahat makes a similar prediction about incentives to cultivate a personal reputation in 
cases of more inclusive party list selectorates.347  The selectorate is a group of individuals whose 
preferences come to bear on the selection and order of the candidates because the political 
system, either formally or informally, gives them power in this decision.  Rahat suggests that 
candidate selection procedures, which often vary both across countries as well as across parties 
within countries, fals on a continuum of inclusivity and exclusivity.  In his formulation, inclusive 
procedures encourage politics of personality and lead to low levels of party cohesion.  The 
selectorate in most parties in Morocco and Algeria is highly exclusive and, thus, should not be 
associated with high levels of incentives to cultivate a personal vote.  Further, according to 
interview evidence, the selectorate in Islamist parties is more inclusive than that of other parties 
because it takes into account votes of party militants at the local and regional levels.  Thus, by 
Rahat’s logic, Islamist deputies should perceive greater incentives to cultivate a personal 
reputation and have higher average caseloads than should members of other parties.  This 
prediction falls along the same lines as conventional wisdom in the literature on Islamist parties, 
as noted. 
Yet we observe the opposite pattern (See Table V. 2.).  Moroccan Islamists are markedly 
more oriented toward party reputation than are members of all other parliamentary group 
categories (p < .001).  The effect is also statistically significant for Algerian Islamist deputies (p < 
.05).  Further, although the difference is not statistically significant, Islamists do not have higher 
caseloads, on average, than members of other parties and groups.  If conventional notions of 
social service provision in the Middle East politics literature, or conventional wisdom about the 
effect a less centralized selectorate do not hold in the Moroccan and Algerian cases, what then 
explains these counter-intuitive results? 
 
                                                     
347 Rahat, "Candidate Selection: The Choice before the Choice." 
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TABLE V. 2.     Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Reputation and Caseloads among 
Moroccan and Algerian Parties and Groups 
 Morocco Algeria 
Mean Incentive:a   
     “Moderate” Opposition Parties (Koutla Bloc) 3.2 (.9) N/a 
     Regime-Created Parties (Makhzen Parties and RND) 3.1 (.8) 3.1 (1.2) 
     Majority Parties (MP and FLN) 3.1 (1.3) 2.8 (1.1) 
     Islamist Party/Parties (“True Opposition”) 1.6 (.8)*** 2.5 (1.0)* 
     Small Groups/Parties (21 or fewer seats) 3.1 (.7) 4.3 (1.3)*** 
   
Mean Caseload:   
     “Moderate” Opposition Parties (Koutla Bloc) 64.0 (122.3) N/a 
     Regime-Created Parties (Makhzen Parties and RND) 293.0 (640.4) 39.8 (36.9) 
     Majority Parties (MP and FLN) 89.3 (83.7) 33.9 (22.8) 
     Islamist Party/Parties (“True Opposition”) 126.0 (256.4) 39.1 (33.6) 
     Small Groups/Parties (21 or fewer seats) 156.1 (371.0) 80.5 (66.4) 
a 1=Party Only; 5=Personal Only. 





Following the literature on issue moderation discussed in Chapter 4, I argue that an 
institutional opening in the Moroccan case explains why Islamist deputies there perceive greater 
incentives to cultivate a party reputation compared with those of other Moroccan members.  This 
effect remains statistically significant in multivariate analysis in Morocco, but not in Algeria.  To 
account for this difference, I argue that liberalization alone may not be sufficient to create 
differences in reelection strategy (e.g. party or personally-oriented strategies).  Rather, the 
combination of liberalization, which I argue is a necessary condition, and the higher level of 
debate encouraged in the Moroccan parliament, which I argue is a sufficient condition, creates a 
distinctive institutional opening which explains why PJD deputies tend to be more party-oriented 
and focused on programmatic benefits than other deputies.  In other words, the opportunity and 
incentives to engage in a higher level of debate in parliament under a monarchical system 
encourage and allow disciplined parties which develop programmatic rather than solely 
particularistic strategies.  For this reason, although PJD deputies do not provide less casework, on 







In this chapter, I examine whether institutions have “mechanical” and “psychological” 
effects on the type, level, and determinants of “service” responsiveness among Moroccan and 
Algerian members (Level II), and whether they establish a representative link at the level of the 
district (Link II).   
 
Level II:  How Institutions Create Incentives and Shape Member Casework Practices 
 
First, in an analysis corresponding to Level II in the conceptual map, I investigate on how 
opportunities and constraints created by institutions affect two related outcome variables: 
members’ perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal reputation, and their provision of 
casework (See Figure V. 1.).  I focus on “service” responsiveness because of its accessibility to 
all or most deputies, regardless of their political party or professional background, wishing to 
build political support.  I test the effects of both institutional and noninstitutional variables on 
perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and caseload. 
 
Link II:  How Member Behavior Shapes the Representative Link  
 
Second, in an analysis corresponding to Link II in the framework, I test whether a 
district-level link between member caseload and level of citizen contact with deputies exists at the 
level of the district.  I examine whether a correlation emerges at the district-level in average 
caseloads (i.e. member data) and the proportion of constituents who recognize the name of a 
deputy and have contacted him or her (i.e. constituent data).  In doing so, I begin to investigate 
whether and how member behavior has implications for the quality of the representative link, 









Electoral System: The Party List Selection Procedure and Selectorate 
 
In closed-list multimember districts, citizens cast a single ballot for a party.  The party 
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(Chapters 4 & 5) 
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General Nature of the Party Selectorate 
 
Interview evidence suggests a highly centralized and generally nontransparent list 
selection procedure for all significant parties holding seats in the 2002-2007 mandates.  Parties 
have a similar organizational structure in both countries; the party selectorate consists of the 
members of the national bureau of the party.  Parties vary to the extent that local party members 
influence the choice of the selectorate.  Under electoral authoritarianism, incumbent elites (e.g. 
Ministry of the Interior) can influence party lists and, thus, are part of the party list selectorate. 
 
Islamist Party Selectorates 
 
A marked trend in improved consideration of party militant preferences in party list 
selection procedures emerged among Islamist parties in both Morocco and Algeria.  In preparing 
for the 2007 elections, both the Moroccan PJD and the Algerian MSP were incorporating a 
procedure of voting among ordinary party adherents in the selection of candidates for electoral 
lists.  Although party militants were set to vote for their candidate choices, it was clear that the 
final selection and classing of candidates remained the choice of the party bureau.  Thus, Islamist 
parties in both countries are making modest gains in “democratizing” party list selection 
procedures, according the right to vote for candidates to party militants.  Further, the PJD is the 
only party in which deputies consistently said that they did not have a choice about whether to 
present their candidacy a second (or third) time; rather, this is up to the party.  We can test 
whether this difference in selection procedure (i.e. a less centralized selectorate), which I want to 
emphasize is modest, impacts perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal vote and caseload 
in the expected direction.   
 
Incumbent Elites and Party List Selection 
 
Under electoral authoritarianism, regime incumbents also wield control over electoral 
structuring, and influence party lists in ways which make them effectively part of the selectorate.  
Claims of this type of interference were made during interviews only in Algeria, but there are 
almost certainly subtle ways in which officials can influence party lists in Morocco as well.  
Opposition members in Algeria claim that Ministry of Interior officials sometimes preclude 
independent lists from elections by returning rejected lists with stipulations (e.g. more signatures 
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needed), and by giving the list members only a few days before the deadline to make changes.348  
Further, an Islamist deputy in Algeria noted that he was moved ten places up the list because the 
candidates who were selected by the party for the first nine seats did not pass the security 
interview undertaken by the Ministry of Interior.349  A small Berber party also claimed that its 
party list had been approved by the Ministry of Interior, but the order of the names switched.350   
These actions are, by definition, difficult to observe and to verify beyond claims of 
interviewees.  Regardless, it is reasonable to expect that incumbent elites outside the party 
selectorate play a role in choosing who candidates will be, even if this role is subtle.  Since most 
list selection takes place behind closed doors, it is impossible to verify that this is not the case.  
The extent to which regime incumbents are included in the selectorate, and the extent to which 
the selectorate is centralized and nontransparent is, of course, very significant “because there are 
‘safe seats’ in virtually every legislature.  In many cases it is the candidate-selection procedure—
and not the general election—which determines who will become a member of parliament.”351  
Even if balloting is correctly done on election day, it is possible for voters to be disenfranchised 
by the “choice before the choice.”352  
 
A Word on Personal and Party Reputation: Competing or Complimentary Pulls? 
  
Authoritarian politics and authoritarian institutions are, according to conventional 
wisdom, “personalized.”353  Citizens in Morocco and Algeria express an interest in particularistic, 
not programmatic goods (See Chapter 4, Citizen Preferences); according to interview evidence, 
constituents seek candidates they “know” and “trust” before voting for a party list.  Thus, we 
expect members in authoritarian settings to be selected for their personal standing in the 
community and to be engaged in representative activities which provide for their personal image 
in the district (e.g. casework).   
But we know noncompetitive elections to be the outcome of bargaining among 
incumbent and opposition elites.  As such, the preferences and strategies of both party 
                                                     
348 Algeria, Member #16, March 2005. 
349 Algeria, Member #17, July 2006. 
350 Algeria, Observer #3, April 2007. 
351 Gideon Rahat, "Candidate Selection: The Choice before the Choice," Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 
(2007).: 139. 
352 Quotation taken from title.  Ibid. 




selectorates and incumbents profoundly influence electoral structuring and, thus, also affect 
deputies’ strategies for reelection.   
What does it mean for a Moroccan or Algerian member to cultivate a party reputation as 
a reelection strategy?  What does it mean to cultivate a personal reputation as a reelection 
strategy?  National setting appears to be very important when considering opportunities and 
constraints faced by members.   
 
Why Personal Reputation Matters to Deputies 
 
The preferences of constituents in Morocco and Algeria suggest that deputies seeking 
reelection must promote their personal reputation, perhaps through the provision of district 
projects and casework.  Constituents in both Morocco and Algeria rank district projects and 
casework as the most important and second most-important task of deputies.  Members, for their 
part, complain that citizens do not understand their national lawmaking mandate, and confuse 
their function with that of a local official.  In the words of an Algerian deputy: “It is true that 
many deputies do not bother to do anything during the mandate, but then the citizens won’t shake 
their hands when they come back to campaign a second time.”354  Citizens look for credible work 
in the district when considering whether to reelect a candidate.   
Further, knowing the identity of candidates on party lists is important to constituents.  In 
discussing the May 2007 election, an Algerian constituent stated that he would not vote because 
he did not know any of the candidates on the list.  Algerian women viewing posters of party lists 
in their district pointed out which of the candidates they knew.  During legislative electoral 
campaigns in Morocco, friends and party militants talk to all their family, friends, and neighbors 
to convince them to vote for a particular candidate and party list.   
These statements suggest that the personal vote is important to deputies as they campaign 
for reelection and as they choose representative activities during the mandate.  Cain et al. define 
the personal vote as: “the portion of a candidate’s electoral support which originates in his or her 
personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record.”  The part of the vote that is not personal 
includes support for the candidate based on his or her partisan affiliation; fixed voter 
characteristics such as class, religion, and ethnicity; reactions to national conditions such as the 
state of the economy; and performance evaluations centered on the head of the governing party.355   
                                                     
354 Algeria, Member #2, March 2007. 
355 Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral 
Independence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).: 9.  I suggest that in the Moroccan and 
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Conventional wisdom concerning nondemocratic political settings suggests that voters 
select candidates they know about (e.g. the candidate’s family is known) or are connected to by 
family or other relationships.  Survey data and evidence from qualitative interviews confirm the 
importance of candidates’ personal qualities and performance in voting decisions.   
In Table V. 3., I have starred four factors which fit within the definition of the personal 
vote.  These include that: (1) the voter knows or is connected to the candidate; (2) the candidate 
chooses to live in the district; (3) the candidate works hard; and, (4) the candidate has a strong or 
influential political personality (e.g. in order to get resources for the district).  62.5 percent of 
respondents in Morocco and 58.8 percent of respondents in Algeria chose one of these four 
characteristics as the most important factor in their choice of which party list to vote for.  
Whether the candidate works hard is the most important factor for the largest proportion, or 47.5 
percent of Moroccans and 34.2 percent of Algerians.  No other factor is most important to more 
than 10 percent of the Moroccan sample, although the strength of the political personality is also 
most important for 21.9 percent of the Algerian sample. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Algerian contexts, ethnicity could be part of the personal vote, but more specifically that family and tribe 
linkages are important to the personal vote.   
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TABLE V. 3.     Proportion Selecting Factor as Relevant for Vote Choice among Moroccan 
and Algerian Constituents  
 Morocco Algeria 
Percent Selecting as One Important Factor:   
     From family or tribe 358 (49.3%) 406 (57.7%) 
     Endorsed by tribal leader 181 (25.6%) 235 (33.9%) 
     *Know or connected with 347 (47.5%) 354 (50.1%) 
     *Lives in state/willaya 326 (44.8%) 315 (46.4%) 
     Is religious 360 (53.0%) 315 (46.7%) 
     *Works hard 664 (91.2%) 615 (84.3%) 
     Party program 410 (58.2%) 431 (58.3%) 
     Party questions the government 453 (66.7%) 398 (57.3%) 
     Party close to the government 213 (31.3%) 220 (32.8%) 
     *Strong influence or personality 343 (50.0%) 565 (80.0%) 
Total 705 700 
   
Percent Selecting as Most Important Factor:   
     From family or tribe 63 (9.3%) 101 (15.6%) 
     Endorsed by tribal leader 11 (1.6%) 10 (1.5%) 
     *Know or connected with 37 (5.4%) 14 (2.2%) 
     *Lives in state/willaya 14 (2.1%) 3 (.5%) 
     Is religious 40 (5.9%) 40 (6.2%) 
     *Works hard 323 (47.5%) 222 (34.2%) 
     Party program 55 (8.1%) 70 (10.8%) 
     Party questions the government 62 (9.1%) 37 (5.7%) 
     Party close to the government 7 (1.0%) 6 (.9%) 
     *Strong influence or personality 51 (7.5%) 142 (21.9%) 
Total 680 649 
Questions:  (1) Please tell me if each of the following are a factor in your decision of which party list to 
vote for.  (a) The candidate is from your family or tribe, etc.  (2) Please tell me which of the factors is the 
most important in your decision of which party list to vote for.   
 
 
Why Party Reputation Matters to Deputies 
 
The preferences of party selectorates in Morocco and Algeria suggest that deputies 
seeking reelection must also promote their party’s reputation.  However, there is evidence that 
provision of district projects and casework, because they matter to citizens, are also important 
from the perspective of the party.   
Parties seek a range of qualities among potential candidates.  Parties seek candidates who 
work hard and are well-known, according to interview evidence.  For an Islamist deputy in 
Algeria, the criteria for selection include: “intellectual level, political or management experience, 
and popularity in the district.”356   
                                                     
356 Algeria, Member #19, March 2005. 
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The family or ethnic background of candidates is also important.  In the Mzab region of 
Ghardia, which has four seats, the FLN must find Mzab candidates to fill at least the first two 
names on the list (in 2002 all four FLN list members were Mzab) in order to gain the support of 
tribal leaders.  One FLN member recalled that he had been asked to run because of his ethnicity; 
he reluctantly accepted.  In this community, leaders choose a party and the group votes as a block.  
In a larger district like Bejaia, with twelve seats, the FLN must find a mix of candidates and 
strategically class them according to their ethnicity (e.g. Berber), family, and area of residence in 
order to maximize votes from people in the district who would know or have a family or ethnic 
connection with individuals on the list.  In the words of an FLN Deputy from Batna “My tribe is 
shaoui.  The lists have to have shaoui in order to gain election.”357       
While parties generally select candidates, candidates sometimes select parties.  Some 
members in both Morocco and Algeria said that they had been asked by parties to run on their 
lists, generally because of the personal and family standing of the candidate in a region.  Further, 
candidates might be attracted to a particular party for various reasons; among them, to gain access 
to ministers from that party.  According to a Moroccan member, “I joined this party because they 
have several ministers.  Ministers from our party will help with requests.”358  In the words of an 
Algerian member of the FLN, “it would be better to be a senator; you can do more for your 
party.”359  Others simply agree to be classed in a low position on the list in exchange for the help 
of the candidate who is elected in the unsuccessful candidate’s bid for local election.  Further, 
those who have worked for the party will have a share in the benefits and networks once the party 
does well and will receive benefits such as seats in parliament, senate seats, ministerial posts, etc. 
 Party members in different parts of the government can help solve citizen requests; they 
can manage funds for district projects, they can provide help with personal problems, they can 
provide government resources for campaign, etc.     
Some members claimed that the party looks for individuals who work hard or who belong 
to particular ethnic groups, but it is also clear that the selection is based on personal connections.  
In the words of an FLN deputy: “The problem is that party makes the list. There is often conflict 
between party members.  If you have friends high in the party, you can be first, second, or third 
on the list.  If you have a problem with them, you can’t be on the list.  I was chosen because of 
my studies, personality, and tribe.”360 
                                                     
357 Algeria, Member #18, April 2007. 
358 Morocco, Member #22, May 2007. 
359 Algeria, Member #28, April 2007. 
360 Algeria, Member #18, April 2007. 
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As these comments demonstrate, neither the personal nor the party image can be 
neglected by most deputies seeking reelection.  They further suggest the importance of the 
national setting, not merely of institutions, in understanding why members vary in their 




 Three institutions, which vary at the subsystem level, may affect perceptions of 
incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and caseload.  These include rules allowing a second 
public function in local or regional governance, district magnitude, and the exclusivity of the 
party list selectorate.   
 
Formal External Rule: A Second Public Function 
 
 The first institutional difference relates to rules allowing Moroccan deputies to hold a 
second public function.  Article 105 of the Algerian constitution stipulates that the post of deputy 
may not be held concurrently with any other mandate or function.  No such prohibition is found 
in the Moroccan constitution.   
 In Morocco, an estimated 40 members (44.9 percent) held a second public function, 
where I define a second function as being a minister or being a member or president of a local 
(municipal) or provincial council.  Ministers and the heads of municipalities (mayor) and 
provinces (governors) have contacts and resources, as well as a mandate, to provide resolution of 
casework request.  Individuals in these positions say that there is no formal distinction in their 
casework as a deputy and as a member of another local, regional, or national office. 
 I hypothesize that deputies who have a second public function will provide greater levels 
of casework. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Ceterus paribus, caseload should be higher among Moroccan deputies 
who have a second public function than among those who do not. 
 
 
Formal Electoral Institution: District Magnitude 
 
 A second source of within-country institutional variation is district magnitude.  Districts 
range from two to five in Morocco, with a national district of thirty women.  Districts range from 
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four to thirty-two in Algeria with eight other members representing overseas districts with one or 
two seats each.   
Carey and Shugart hypothesize that as district magnitude increases, the incentives to 
foster a personal reputation decline in a closed-list PR-system in one round.361  Bernhard Wessles 
finds that among national MPs in Europe and members of the European Parliament in the 15 
states, those from districts of smaller magnitude pay greater attention to constituency service.362  
John Curtice and Phil Shively find that citizens in PR systems with multimember districts are less 
likely to be contacted by members or to have knowledge of the members than those living with 
single-member district systems.363   
Thus, I hypothesize that incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and caseload will 
decrease as district magnitude increases. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Ceterus paribus, incentives to cultivate a personal vote and caseload will 




Two additional institutional features suggest competing expectations concerning personal 
reputation-seeking behavior of Islamist deputies.   
 
Informal Electoral Institution: Inclusivity of the Selectorate 
 
On the one hand, their more inclusive party selectorate leads to the expectation that 
Islamist deputies should have higher incentives to cultivate a personal vote.  Further, 
conventional wisdom about Islamist parties suggests that Islamist deputies should have higher 
average caseloads than do members of other parties and groups.  It follows that Islamist deputies 
should have greater incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework than 
should deputies from non-Islamist parties. 
 
                                                     
361 Carey, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." 
362 Bernhard Wessels, "Whom to Represent? The Role Orientations of Legislators in Europe," in Political 
Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
363 John Curtice and Phil Shively, "Who Represents Us Best? One Member or Many?" (paper presented at 
the International Political Science Association World Congress, Quebec, 2000).as cited in Norris, Electoral 
Engineering Voting Rules and Political Behavior.: note 8, page 342. 
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Hypothesis 3a: Ceterus paribus, Islamist deputies should have greater incentives to 





On the other hand, bivariate distributions suggest that Islamist deputies, because of their 
role in the opposition, have significantly higher incentives to cultivate a party reputation than do 
members of other parties.  The issue moderation literature provides an explanation for why 
Islamist deputies should have higher incentives to engage in party reputation-seeking behavior.   
If these expectations are correct, we should observe not only higher incentives to engage 
in party reputation-seeking behavior and higher caseloads among Islamist deputies, but also a 
higher magnitude of the effect in Morocco than in Algeria.  The higher level of debate in the 
Moroccan parliament, resulting from the preferences of monarchs, provides a particularly salient 
institutional opening by which Islamist deputies will be able to critique the program of non-
opposition parties in committee and the House.  Thus, they will have a strong incentive to 
develop its own distinct party platform on a house of issues.  In other words, the Moroccan PJD, 
much more than the Algerian Islamist parties, will have an incentive to provide party 
programmatic benefits to constituents, rather than to rely solely on particularistic benefits like 
casework.  I argue that this is because of their role as opposition parties, rather than because they 
are Islamist parties, per se.   
 
Hypothesis 3b: Ceterus paribus, Islamist deputies should have greater incentives to 
cultivate a party reputation and to provide programmatic benefits rather than casework 
than should deputies from non-Islamist parties. 
 
According to anecdotal evident, this is in fact what we observe.  The Moroccan PJD 
appears to have more detailed literature on their policy positions than do Islamist parties in 
Algeria.  Further, they appear to express positions on television and in the parliament to a greater 
extent than do their Algerian counterparts who face state-run media focused on the president and 
his program.   
Further, Chapter 4 demonstrated that participation in parliamentary debate in Morocco, 
so long as the boundaries drawn by the monarch are respected, is not a substitute, but rather a 
complement, for casework.  In Algeria, it appears that participation in debate comes at the 






Several other factors may predict variation in perceptions of incentives to cultivate a 
personal reputation and caseload.  
 
Political Experience and Ambition 
 
Further, most comparative literature suggests that new members are more likely than 
their more senior colleagues to provide casework.  David M. Wood and Garry Young show, for 
example, that junior members of parliament in Britain and Ireland are more active in 
constituencies than those who have previously served terms, and are more likely to cite reelection 
as a motivation for this.364 
  
Hypothesis 4: Members who have not served a previous term will perceive greater 
incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and will have higher caseloads. 
 
It is difficult to hypothesize about the effect of political ambition on personal vote 
strategy.  On the one hand, one would expect those with higher political ambition to work for the 
party image, since the party selectorate largely influences whether they will be a candidate in the 
next election.  On the other hand, if parties look for candidates with higher standing in their 
districts, greater political ambition should be expected to have a higher incentive to cultivate a 
personal vote.   
I hypothesized that casework is the only representative activity which is accessible to all 
members wishing to enhance their popular support in the district.  Therefore, I expect that higher 
political ambition should be related to higher caseloads in both countries. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Members with higher ambition to pursue a more important political 




                                                     
364 Garry Young and David M.  Wood, "Comparing Constituency Activity by Junior Legislators in Great 
Britain and Ireland," Legislative Studies Quarterly 22, no. 2 (1997).: 217. 
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Independent and Small Party Deputies 
 
 Independent deputies may run in both countries.  Independents and those from small 
parties with fewer than eight percent of the seats in parliament should perceive higher incentives 
to cultivate a personal reputation and have higher caseloads. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Ceterus paribus, independent deputies and those from parties with few 
seats should have greater incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide 





 Two role types, the citizen-orientation and the legislative-orientation, emerge in the 
interview evidence.  As a proxy for these orientations I use a question common in comparative 
studies of representation, “Serving citizens is the most important thing that I do as a deputy.”   
Donley Studlar and Ian McAllister find that the three role types among Australian 
legislators predict the degree of focus on constituency affairs.365  Thus, I hypothesize that those 
who agree more strongly with this statement will perceive higher incentives to cultivate a 
personal reputation and to provide casework. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Ceterus paribus, deputies with a citizen-orientation role type will 
perceive greater incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework 
than deputies with a legislative-orientation. 
 
 
Inclusivity of Casework Operations 
 
Members may vary from one another in terms of the inclusivity or exclusivity of their 
casework operations.  Members with parliamentary offices, and others, may seek to provide 
casework assistance to members of their constituency broadly.  Other members may provide help 
on an exclusive basis only within personal networks or in cases of particular need.   
As a proxy for inclusivity of casework operations, I use the proportion of requests that 
come from women.  The percentage of requests that comes from women is not significantly 
                                                     
365 Donley T. Studlar and Ian McAllister, "Constituency Activity and Representational Role among 
Australian Legislators," Journal of Politics 58, no. 1 (1996). 
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related in either country to party, gender of deputy, or rural district, but is significantly related to 
the total number of requests received.   






 We also expect that political competition among members within particular multimember 
districts shapes incentives for personal reputation-seeking and caseload.  First, I include a 
measure of the percentage of seats in the district that are held by members of one’s own party.  
Members from districts, in which they are the only member of their party elected, may perceive 
greater incentives to cultivate a personal vote and to provide casework than those who are one of 
several members of their party list elected in the district. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Ceterus paribus, deputies from districts with lower proportions of 
deputies from their party will perceive higher incentives to cultivate a personal 
reputation and will have higher caseloads. 
 
 Further, I include a measure of the average caseload among all members from the district.  
This factor should be statistically significant since it includes the member’s own case level in the 
calculation of the mean.  It may also control for district-level conditions of both political 
competition among members of a district and the efficiency of service provision of government 
levels and agencies in the district. 
 
Hypothesis 10:  Ceterus paribus, deputies from districts with higher average caseloads 
among all deputies from that district will perceive higher incentives to cultivate a 
personal reputation and will have higher caseloads. 
 
 
Level of District Development 
 
 Finally, I control for the level of development of the district.  Interview evidence suggests 
that demand for casework is higher in rural areas which lack infrastructure relative to urban areas.  
However, administrative bottlenecks should drive demand for casework in both rural and urban 
areas.  Further, members in rural areas may be more likely to be supported for personal 
characteristics, such as their being from prominent local families.  One Moroccan member stated 
that the people of his town urged him to run because other members of his family had previously 
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been members of parliament and he was trusted to “represent the interests of the town’s people to 
the central government.”366 
 
Hypothesis 11:  Ceterus paribus, deputies from districts rural areas will perceive higher 




 Here I list bivariate distributions of the outcome and institutional variables.    
 
Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Reputation 
 
Bivariate distributions and ANOVA test of independence suggest that the institutional 
opening hypothesis, rather than expectation based on the exclusivity of the selectorate, explains 
perceived incentives among Islamist deputies relative to those of other parties.  District magnitude 
is not related to this outcome (See Table V. 4.). 
 
The Islamist Opposition 
 
Bivariate distributions suggest that Islamist deputies are less likely than deputies from other 
parties, on average, to perceive incentives to cultivate a personal reputation.  In Morocco, Party of 
Justice and Development deputies in Morocco are most focused on party reputation (1.6), followed 
by all other parties whose incentives average (3.1-3.2), the center of the distribution.  The same 
bivariate effect applies in Algeria.  Deputies of the Movement for Society and Peace and Islah are 
significantly less likely than those from other parties to perceive an incentive to cultivate a personal 
vote (2.5).  Independents and members of parties with twenty-one or fewer seats (in Algeria only), 
are significantly more likely to perceive an incentive to cultivate a personal vote than those from 




 No statistically significant bivariate relationship exists in either country between district 
magnitude and perceived incentives to cultivate a personal vote. 
                                                     
366 Morocco, Member #22, May 2007. 
 
 177 
TABLE V. 4.     Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Reputation among Moroccan and Algerian 
Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
Mean Strategy by Party:   
     “Moderate” Opposition Parties (Koutla Bloc) 3.2 (.9) N/a 
     Regime-Created Parties (Makhzen Parties and RND) 3.1 (.8) 3.1 (1.2) 
     Majority Parties (MP and FLN) 3.1 (1.3) 2.8 (1.1) 
     Islamist Party/Parties (“True Opposition”) 1.6 (.8)*** 2.5 (1.0)* 
     Small Groups/Parties (21 or fewer seats) 3.1 (.7) 4.3 (1.3)*** 
   
District Magnitude:   
     2 3.2 (1.1) 4 (N/a) 
     3 3.0 (1.2) N/a 
     4 3 (1.0) 3.3 (1.4) 
     5 2.8 (1.0) 2.0 (0.0) 
     6 N/a 3.5 (1.2) 
     7 N/a 3.6 (1.5) 
     8 N/a 2.6 (1.4) 
     9 N/a 2.3 (1.5) 
     10 N/a 3.3 (1.0) 
     11 N/a 3.0 (1.2) 
     12 N/a 2.8 (1.7) 
     16 N/a 2.5 (1.0) 
     30 2.8 (1.2) N/a 
     32 N/a 2.9 (1.4) 





Other than district magnitude in Algeria, institutional variables are not related to caseload 
in bivariate tests of independence (See Table V. 5.). 
 
The Islamist Opposition 
 
Bivariate distributions suggest that there are no statistically significant bivariate 




 A statistically significant bivariate relationship exists between district magnitude and 






On average, deputies with a second public function in Morocco have high caseloads, 
although the bivariate relationship does not yield a statistically significant result.  These 
relationships, however, must be tested in multivariate models to see whether they might be an 




TABLE V. 5.     Caseloads among Moroccan and Algerian Members 
 Morocco Algeria 
Mean Strategy by Party:   
     “Moderate” Opposition Parties (Koutla Bloc) 64.0 (122.3) N/a 
     Regime-Created Parties (Makhzen Parties and RND) 293.0 (640.4) 39.8 (36.9) 
     Majority Parties (MP and FLN) 89.3 (83.7) 33.9 (22.8) 
     Islamist Party/Parties (“True Opposition”) 126.0 (256.4) 39.1 (33.6) 
     Small Groups/Parties (21 or fewer seats) 156.1 (371.0) 80.5 (66.4) 
   
District Magnitude:   
     2 64.0 (83.2) 50 (N/a)** 
     3 136.4 (334.7) N/a 
     4 111.5 (212.1) 42.2 (33.1)** 
     5 50.9 (58.0) 61.7 (37.5)** 
     6 N/a 42.3 (49.6)** 
     7 N/a 30.2 (17.3)** 
     8 N/a 25.0 (13.2)** 
     9 N/a 86.7 (65.1)** 
     10 N/a 50.0 (30.6)** 
     11 N/a 31.6 (17.5)** 
     12 N/a 24.8 (3.7)** 
     14 N/a 30.0 (N/a)** 
     15 N/a 18.3 (2.9)** 
     16 N/a 33.8 (27.0)** 
     30 42.6 (38.9) N/a 
     32 N/a 85.0 (81.4)** 
   
Public Function:   
     No 63.1 (147.0) N/a 
     Yes 145.6 (281.3) N/a 







 Ordered logit and OLS regression are used to estimate the relationship between the 
independent and outcome variables.  All variables are standardized with values from 0 to 1.   
 
Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Reputation 
 
The Islamist Opposition 
 
The results of a regression support the institutional opening hypothesis (See Table V. 6.).  
In Morocco, Islamist deputies are significantly more likely than deputies of other parties and 
groups to perceive incentives to cultivate a party reputation.  This effect suggests that differences 
in party list selection procedures (e.g. a marginally more inclusive selectorate among Islamist 
parties) are much less important than the institutional opening of higher debate level in 
structuring the opportunities and constraints faced by opposition members.  This evidence 
suggests that the higher level of debate encouraged by incumbent elites in Morocco allows the 
opposition there to be highly disciplined and to develop party-centered programmatic, rather than 
personal reputation-seeking, particularistic benefits.  When all other variables are held at their 
means, members of the PJD are 29 percent more likely than non-Islamists to be in the second-- 
mostly party image--response category; 45 percent less likely to be in the third category; 24 
percent less likely to be in fourth category 4; and six percent less likely than members of other 
groups to be in the fifth--personal image only--category.   
The institutional opening explanation is also supported by the lack of effect of being in 
the Islamist opposition in Algeria on perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal or party 
image.  Parliamentary debate over the program of the government is discouraged in Algeria; thus, 
the same institutional opening for alternative programmatic benefits does not, I argue, exist.  In 
Algeria, incumbent preferences for a single, dominant program of the president and minimal 
parliamentary debate over its projets de loi do not create the same institutional opening (i.e. 
opportunities) for the opposition to strategically develop a distinct party platform and to debate 
other parties on their proposals (See Table V. 7.).   





 There is no evidence that district magnitude operates on perceived incentives to cultivate a 




In neither country are parties of the moderate opposition, regime-created parties, or 
majority parties more or less likely to perceive different levels of incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote.  The effect in the regression is insignificant and the parties are not different from 
one another in Wald tests.   
In Algeria, but not in Morocco, deputies from parties with fewer than eight percent of the 
seats in the house and independents perceive greater, on average, incentives to cultivate a 
personal reputation.  Why this difference in the two countries?  One reason may be that 57 
percent of the Algerian deputies classed as “small” in the regression are independents.  In 
Morocco, none of the two or three independents participated in the study; thus, this category in 
Morocco is populated by deputies from the CD, Alliance, FFD, and GSU groups, rather than by 
many independents, as in Algeria.  Some of these parties are indeed regime-created.   
 In both countries, the control for the average strategy in the electoral district is 
statistically significant, as expected.  No other factors are important in Algeria.  That political 
ambition is insignificant in both countries suggests that members may feel the pull of multiple 


















(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
  2 3 4 5 
Islamist party (MSP and Islah) .93 (.85) -.12 (.10) -.06 (.09) .10 (.09) .10 (.11) 
Majority party (FLN) -.07 (1.11) .01 (.15) .00 (.03) -.01 (.11) -.01 (.10) 
Small party 2.21 (1.12)* -.20 (.07)** -.26 (.19) .16 (.07)* .34 (.25) 
Higher developmental level of district .21 (2.51) -.03 (.35) -.01 (.08) .02 (.26) .02 (.23) 
Previous term in Parliament .65 (.67) -.08 (.07) -.05 (.08) .07 (.07) .07 (.09) 
Serving citizen most important 1.52 (1.24) -.21 (.18) -.05 (.09) .16 (.14) .14 (.12) 
Political ambition -.76 (.78) .11 (.11) .02 (.05) -.08 (.08) -.07 (.07) 
Higher district magnitude .35 (1.69) -.05 (.23) -.01 (.06) .04 (.18) .03 (.15) 
Higher proportion of same party in district -.99 (2.36) .14 (.33) .03 (.09) -.10 (.25) -.09 (.21) 
Strategy of deputies in district 12.24 (2.60)*** -1.69 (.50)*** -.40 (.63) 1.27 (.46)** 1.10 (.38)** 
Weight .90 (.89) -.12 (.12) -.03 (.06) .09 (.10) .08 (.08) 
N 71     
LR Chi2 / Prob. > Chi2 54.66/.0000***     
Pseudo R2 / Log Likelihood .2565/-79.2122     
      
Wald Test of Linear Hypotheses      
H0: βIslam – βFLN=0 .96 (.33)     
H0: βIslam – βSmall=0 1.31 (.25)     
H0: βFLN – βSmall=0 2.34 (.13)     





















(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
  2 3 4 5 
Koutla (“Moderate Opposition”) -.35 (.71) .05 (.11) -.01 (.04) -.04 (.08) -.01 (.02) 
Majority party (MP) -1.07 (.91) .18 (.16) -.10 (.14) -.11 (.07) -.03 (.02) 
Islamist party (PJD) -3.90 (1.08)*** .29 (.14)* -.45 (.10)*** -.24 (.06)*** -.06 (.03)* 
Small party .11 (.82) -.02 (.12) .00 (.02) .01 (.10)  .00 (.03) 
Higher developmental level of district .00 (.00)* -.00 (.00)* .00 (.00) .00 (.00)* .00 (.00)† 
Previous term in Parliament -.26 (.46) .04 (.07) -.01 (.02) -.03 (.06) -.01 (.01) 
Serving citizen most important -.26 (1.25) .04 (.19) -.01 (.04) -.03 (.15) -.01 (.04) 
Political ambition -.22 (.59) .03 (.09) -.01 (.02) -.03 (.07) -.01 (.02) 
Higher district magnitude 1.68 (1.83) -.26 (.28) .05 (.09) .21 (.23) .05 (.06) 
Higher proportion of same party in district -1.43 (2.83) .22 (.43) -.04 (.11) -.17 (.35) -.04 (.09) 
Strategy of deputies in district 5.27 (2.28)* -.80 (.37)* .16 (.24) .65 (.30)* .17 (.10)† 
Weight 4.02 (2.65) -.61 (.42) .12 (.20) .49 (.33) .13 (.10) 
N 83     
LR Chi2 / Prob. > Chi2 51.18 / .0000***     
Pseudo R2 / Log Likelihood .2148 / -93.5642     
      
Wald Test of Linear Hypotheses      
H0: βMP – βIslam=0 7.31 (.01)**     
H0: βMP – βSmall=0 1.63 (.20)     
H0: βIslam – βSmall=0 13.44 (.00)***     
H0: βKoutla – βMP=0 1.05 (.30)     
H0: βKoutla – βSislam=0 14.42 (.00)***     
H0: βKoutla – βSmall=0 .39 (.53)     






 Do similar effects operate on caseload?  Theory suggests that the two should be closely 
related. 
 
The Islamist Opposition 
 
 Although deputies of the PJD are more likely to perceive incentives to cultivate a party 
reputation, they are not more likely to provide lower caseloads.  Party or parliamentary group 
fails to explain any variation in Morocco (See Table V. 8.). 
 This is not highly unsurprising.  While members of the PJD are not less likely, on 
average, to provide casework, they are also not more likely.  52.0 percent of PJD members 
compared with 32.3 percent of deputies from other parties rank lawmaking as their most time-
consuming task (p < .10).  This relationship is not statistically significant in Algeria.  In fact, the 
relationship is opposite: 38.7 percent of Islamist deputies in Algeria rank lawmaking as their most 
time-consuming task compared with 46.0 percent of deputies from other parties. 
 In Algeria, independents and members of small party have significantly higher caseloads 
than those deputies from other parties.  Not only do these individuals have a greater incentive to 








 The lack of distinction between the parliament and other levels and branches of 
government in Morocco is tremendously important with respect to the provision of casework.  
Deputies who serve simultaneously as a minister or as a member or the head of a local or regional 






 Political ambition appears to have a significant positive effect on caseloads in Algeria.  
Those deputies who hope to have a more important political career in the future receive about 32 
more requests per month. 
 In Morocco, variation in caseload is explained by more open case operations.  Deputies 
who receive more than 70 percent of requests from women receive, on average, 61 more requests 
per month than those who receive less than 10 percent of their requests from women. 
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Koutla (“Moderate Opposition”) -2.36 (22.97) - 
Islamist party (PJD)/(MSP and Islah) 37.23 (29.86) 9.00 (16.19) 
Majority party (MP)/(FLN) 29.54 (25.03) 12.84 (21.38) 
Small party 36.91 (24.61) 46.15 (19.48)* 
Higher developmental level of district .01 (.01) -.81 (48.40) 
Previous term in Parliament 2.64 (13.76) 5.76 (14.55) 
Serving citizen most important 9.90 (37.15) -34.67 (22.37) 
Political ambition 1.82 (20.67) 31.96 (15.19)* 
Higher district magnitude -20.95 (59.16) 10.52 (29.38) 
Higher proportion of same party in district 49.41 (89.61) -51.10 (42.94) 
More open casework operations 61.47 (29.78)* 29.78 (19.03) 
Second public function 33.37 (16.62)* - 
Average caseload in district 91.85 (31.10)**  .75 (.23)** 
Weight 35.32 (76.98) 7.00 (20.19) 
N 75 59 
F  / Prob. > F 2.18 / .0192* 4.35 / .0001*** 
R2  .3371 .5314 
   
Wald Test of Linear Hypotheses   
H0: βIslam – βFLN=0 - .03 (.86) 
H0: βIslam – βSmall=0 - 5.62 (.02)* 
H0: βFLN – βSmall=0 -         1.42 (.24)   
      
H0: βMP – βIslam=0 .07 (.7862)               -    
H0: βMP – βSmall=0 .08 (.7819)               -    
H0: βIslam – βSmall=0 .00 (.9919)               -    
H0: βKoutla – βMP=0 2.60 (.1121)
†               -    
H0: βKoutla – βSislam=0 2.59 (.1127)
†               -    
H0: βKoutla – βSmall=0 2.69 (.1061)
 †               -    







Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter opened with several puzzles.  First, given expectations concerning closed-
list PR systems, why do Moroccan and Algerian members tend, on average, to feel that both party 
and personal reputation are important for reelection?  Second, given the electoral system and the 
fact that elections are not perfectly competitive, why do members go to their districts and provide 
constituency service?  Finally, why do opposition deputies, in this case Islamists, whose party 
selectorates are more inclusive than those of other parties, appear to be more party-oriented than 
deputies from other parties? 
I have argued that both national settings as well as institutions are important determinants 
of the incentives deputies perceive and the personal and party reputation-seeking behavior they 
pursue.  Although party selectorates—along with incumbents who are effectively also members 
of selectorates under electoral authoritarianism—powerfully shape the outcome of elections, they 
have preferences for members who are active in their districts, helping to understand why 
deputies tend to place an emphasis on the provision of particularistic goods.  The second arena—
that of constituents—also requires the reelection-seeking deputy to be present in the district and 
to provide help with individual and community problems.  Thus, we should be unsurprised that 
casework is important in Morocco and Algeria, even though the ballot structure is not generally 
associated with high levels of personal-reputation seeking behavior. 
The most significant findings, however, are those which relate to the comparison of 
expectations concerning inclusivity of the selectorate with those competing predictions related to 
the effects of institutional openings for the Islamist opposition.  These results suggest that 
parliaments in monarchical regimes, to the extent that monarchs prefer higher levels of debate 
between a fractionalized and fragile party system which they can arbitrate, may structure 
incentives of the Islamist opposition in ways that are different from parliaments in former one-
party regimes.  In the latter, Islamist deputies are no more likely than members of any other party 
to engage in debate, to perceive incentives to promote a party image, or to have higher caseloads.  
In Morocco, where institutions structure opportunities and constraints in a different way, Islamist 
deputies adopt different strategies.  They are more likely than members of other parties, according 
to bivariate results, to rank policymaking as their most time-consuming activity.367  Further, they 
are significantly more likely than members of all other parties to promote party over personal 
image.  Future research might test whether these results from Morocco and Algeria generalize to 
broader classes of monarchical and former one-party regimes.  A further avenue for research is to 
                                                     
367 This difference was not significant in multivariate tests. 
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explore the extent to which casework behavior is driven by electoral incentives or by availability 
of resources to solve problems. 
 
“Psychological” Effects of Institutions: The Representative Link 
 
What these results mean for the progress of democratic transition and strengthening of 
the parliamentary institutions is unclear.  However, the results provide evidence that 
parliamentary institutions within regimes with a similar, low level of electoral competition (e.g. 
hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes) vary from one another in meaningful ways that are 
probably significant for political development.   
One way of getting at this question, given that we have only two country cases in one 
time period, is to examine the effects of institutions on the attitudes and orientations of citizens 
via the representative link.  I find some evidence that some type of link exists, based on simple 
correlations in the member and constituent data at the district level (See Table V. 9.).   
Among citizens who know the name of at least one deputy from his or her district, 
average monthly caseloads of members from their districts are only slightly higher, and only in 
Algeria.  However, caseloads and constituent evaluations that the job members are doing are 
positively correlated in both countries.  For Moroccans, among constituents who believe deputies 
in their district are doing a poor job, the average caseload in their district is 97.2 requests per 
month.  This figure increases steadily, reaching 160.0 casework requests for constituents who 
believe their members are doing an excellent job.  The same effect holds in Algeria, increasing 
from 46.7 casework requests in districts in which constituents evaluate the job of deputies are 
poor, to 61.4 requests in districts in which citizens evaluate the job as good. 
 But other bivariate results raise questions about the effects of the link on constituent 
attitudes.  Citizens who have had a satisfying case request resolved tend to live in districts with 
lower that average caseloads.   
 These data appear to reflect a representative link, but they raise questions about whether 
that link promotes representation and accountability along the lines of the representation 
paradigm or challenges fairness along the lines of the patron-client paradigm.  It is to this 









TABLE V. 9.     Mean Monthly Caseload of All Members in Constituent’s Electoral District  
 Morocco Algeria 
 
Constituent Knows Name of at Least One  
Member from District: 
     No 95.4 (78.1)*** 44.5 (26.2)*** 
     Yes 95.2 (81.5)*** 54.3 (25.4)*** 
   
Constituent Evaluation the Job of Deputies from 
District: 
  
     Poor 97.2 (78.7)*** 46.7 (25.7)*** 
     Fair 97.3 (67.4)*** 50.4 (25.3) *** 
     Good 106.9 (85.5)*** 61.4 (25.8) *** 
     Excellent 160.0 (152.0)*** 24.8 (.)a*** 
   
Constituent Has Had a Satisfying Casework  
Experience: 
  
 96.5 (77.2)*** 50.8 (26.5)* 
 83.3 (92.9)*** 46.3 (25.7)* 
a Only one observation. 





Casework and Diffuse Support for the Parliament 
 
 
“How can representative government function if those who are elected to represent the people in 
the [Thai] National Assembly forget the interest of the country as a whole and pursue only their 
selfish gain?”  
 
-Thanad Khoman, Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, as cited Darling 1960, p. 356 
 
 
Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski argue that partisan institutions lengthen the tenure 
of authoritarian rulers because they reduce internal threats to rule by coopting opposition and 
bringing it into the regime.  Their explanation, while convincing, presents a puzzle; namely, why 
do citizens in political systems with weak and coopted institutions fail to contest for stronger 
parliaments? 
In Chapter 4 I argued representation is a mechanism of cooptation occurring as members 
bargain in multiple arenas for reelection.  The particular baskets of representative goods that 
members of “loyal” parliaments choose shapes the representative link that members establish (or 
do not establish) in their constituencies.  Through this link, whether high or low quality, 
characterized by absence or presence, the behaviors of members shape the attitudes of ordinary 
citizens.   
In this chapter I turn to an examination of the role of legislators as link between 
institutions and constituents.  I extend Gandhi and Przeworski’s elite-level explanation by 
exploring the relationship between elite and mass dynamics.  I argue that citizens have an 
overwhelmingly negative view of the parliament and its members and that service responsiveness 
(i.e. casework) by members does not improve support for having a strong parliament.  I suggest 
that public opinion serves as a contextual factor affecting the outcome of future rounds of 
bargaining over the prerogatives of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive (See Figure VI. 1.).  
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Although the constitutional prerogatives of the parliaments are weak, most ordinary 
citizens in Morocco and Algeria believe that their parliaments have weight in the policymaking 
process.  A relatively high proportion, 56.0 percent of Moroccans and 34.0 percent of Algerians, 















Link I: Parliamentary 
Institutions Create 
Incentives which 
Shape Caseload and 
Participation in Debate 
(Chapters 4 & 5) 
 
Link II: 
Provision of Programmatic 
and Particularistic Benefits 
Shape Representative Link 
(Chapter 5 & 6) 
 
Link III: Popular Public 
Opinion Affects Size of 
Winset and Outcome of 







Moroccans and Algerians believe that the parliament has a “somewhat effective” role in making 
laws on social and political issues, or about “3” on a scale of 1-4.  Yet satisfaction with the job 
the parliament is doing is very low.  On this indicator, the modal Moroccan believes that the 
parliament is doing a poor job, while the modal Algerian believes the parliament is doing a fair 
job.  When taken as a proxy for contestation for a stronger parliament, only 60 percent of 
Moroccans and 80 percent of Algerians wish to have a parliament with the power to make laws.  
Why is popular support for a strong parliament relatively low compared to the prerogatives 
citizens believe it actually has?  Do casework and other forms of interaction between the citizen 
and member constitute a form of representation which enhances satisfaction with the legislature 




In Chapter 3 I discussed two paradigms—the representation and patron-client 
paradigms—which serve as competing ways of viewing casework in authoritarian political 
settings.  In this chapter, I begin to evaluate the effects of casework on public opinion in order to 
shed light on which of the two paradigms is most appropriate as a means by which to 
conceptualize “representation” in Morocco and Algeria.   
First, I focus in this chapter on the assumptions and expectations of the 
institutionalization literature (See Table VI. 1.).  This work emerged from studies of legislative 
institutions in developing societies of newly independent countries in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, and 
made important strides in hypothesizing about the ways in which legislators establish a 
representative link with constituents.  This work corresponds with the “representation” paradigm; 
it suggests that the representative link necessarily enhances prospects of democracy by positively 
presupposing citizens to the value of strong democratic institutions.   
A competing paradigm, the authoritarian politics literature leaves open the possibility that 
the link entrenches or fails to reverse the political logic of clientelism and, thus, does not improve 
popular support for a strong legislature.  It is consistent with that I call the “patron-client” 
paradigm.  In this paradigm, the representative link might not enhance support for having a strong 




TABLE VI. 1.  Linking Literatures with the Representation and Patron-Client Paradigms 




















fails to reverse 













































 In this final empirical chapter, I sketch Level III and Link III of the conceptual 
framework, connecting mass-level dynamics with elite-level bargaining in Level I. 
 
Level III: How the Representative Link Shapes Public Opinion 
 
First, I examine the determinants of individual orientations toward the parliament, 
assessing how experiences with members of parliament shape these attitudes.  I explore how the 
relationship between member behavior and individual attitudes, which I call the representative 
link, can inform our understanding of why authoritarian institutions contribute to authoritarian 
survival.  I test whether casework and several other types of deputy-citizen interaction enhance 




Link III: How Mass Opinion Affects Future Rounds of Elite-Level Bargaining over Institutional 
Design 
 
Second, although I cannot test it in the present project, I theorize about how mass-level 
opinion serves as a contextual factor for elite-level bargaining over institutional design.  
Institutions—and their prerogatives—are shaped by successive rounds of bargaining between 
opposition and incumbent elites.  The preferences of ordinary citizens about institutions serve as a 
contextual factor influencing the size of the winset between incumbent and opposition elites as 
they bargain over institutional design and, thus, shape the future role of the legislature in the 
policymaking process.  The determinants of support for a strong parliament—in particular, 
whether casework improves support—will help shed light on how the dynamics of public opinion 
relate to elite-level dynamics.   
 
The Legislative Institutionalization Literature and the Representation Paradigm 
 
The legislative institutionalization literature has it roots in a series of individual country 
studies which sought to understand the political systems of newly-independent states of Africa 
and Asia by analyzing the structure and function of their legislatures.368  In Table 1 I suggested 
that this literature is consistent with the expectations of the representation paradigm.  
Unsurprisingly, these studies revealed that parliaments in developing countries tended to play a 
weak role in lawmaking—what Robert A. Packenham labeled the “decisional function” of 
legislatures.369  Guided by functionalism, the literature suggested that legislatures in Africa and 
Asia played other important roles in the political system; among them, fostering integration of the 
core and the periphery and legitimating the regime.370   
                                                     
368 See, for example, Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World."  Charles Hornsby, "The 
Social Structure of the National Assembly in Kenya, 1963-83," The Journal of Modern African Studies 27, 
no. 2 (1989).  Abdo I. Baaklini, "Legislatures in the Gulf Area: The Experience of Kuwait, 1961-1976," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 14 (1982), Saif, A Legislature in Transition: The Yemeni 
Parliament, Weinbaum, "Classification and Change in Legislative Systems: With Particular Application to 
Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan." 
369 Robert A. Packenham, "Legislatures and Political Development," in Legislatures in Developmental 
Perspective, ed. Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1970).: 522. 
370 For examples of work on the role of members in integrating people in the periphery with the central 
government, see Albert F. Eldridge, Legislatures in Plural Societies: The Search for Cohesion in National 
Development (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977).  Abdo I. Baaklini and James J. Heaphey, 




This literature also demonstrated that members in developing country settings who were 
attentive to their districts provided a high level of constituency service, especially the provision of 
help with individual requests or casework.371  Scholars argued that establishing a “legislative 
link” was a unique and consequential role of the Member of Parliament because it built support 
for a new, “modern” institution: the legislature. This literature broke away from other studies of 
developing country contexts by viewing constituency service as representation, not clientelism.372  
Instead, it drew upon new developments in American politics research which suggested that: 
“Nearly everything [a legislator] does to win and hold support—allocating, reaching, presenting, 
responding, communicating, explaining, assuring—involves representation.373      
The study of support for having a strong legislature drew on work from the US and 
western countries and became central to theorizing about legislative representation and 
development in comparative contexts.374  In several essays in Comparative Legislative Reforms 
and Innovations, Baaklini and Heaphey, as well as other authors, argued that members of 
parliament play a role in promoting legislative viability by improving public satisfaction with and 
support for the legislature.375  Although “a transformed legislature follows one of several events--
an abrupt expansion or contraction in executive powers, a radical modification in the 
                                                     
371 See for example, Malcom E. Jewell, "Legislators and Constituents in the Representative Process," in 
Handbook of Legislative Research, ed. Samuel C. Patterson Gerhard Loewenberg, Malcolm E. Jewell 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), Michael Ong, "The Member of Parliament and His 
Constituency: The Malaysian Case," Legislative Studies Quarterly 1, no. 3 (1976).  Shriram Maheshwari, 
"Constituency Linkage of National Legislators in India," Legislative Studies Quarterly 1, no. 3 (1976), 
Manindra Kumar Mohapatra, "The Ombudsmanic Role of Legislators in an Indian State," Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 1, no. 2 (1976).   
372 Michael L. Mezey, "Constituency Demands and Legislative Support: An Experiment," Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1976).: 107.  Hopkins equates constituency service with clientelism.  See 
Raymond Hopkins, "The Kenyan Legislature: Political Functions and Citizen Perceptions," in Legislative 
Systems in Developing Countries, ed. G. R. Boynton and Chong Lim Kim (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1975).: 217.   
373 Richard F. Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston: Little Brown, 1978).: 240.    
Pitkin argues that representation includes four areas: lawmaking, allocation, service, and symbolic 
responsiveness.  Pitkin, The Concept of Representation.  See also Karps, "The Puzzle of Representation: 
Specifying Components of Responsiveness."  Allocation responsiveness refers to the provision of projects 
for the district.  Symbolic responsivenss entails communication with citizens which contributes to the 
building of trust.  Service responsiveness, or casework, is the focus of this chapter and includes any 
“intervention for individuals, groups, or organizations (including businesses) that have requests of, 
grievances against, or a need for access to federal (and occasionally state or local) government departments 
or agencies.”  Johannes, To Serve the People: Congress and Constituency Service.: 18. 
374 See, for example,Roger H. Davidson and Glenn R. Parker, "Positive Support for Political Institutions: 
The Case of Congress," The Western Political Quarterly 25, no. 4 (1972).  W.  Samuel Patterson G. R. 
Boynton, and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions," Midwest 
Journal of Political Science XII, no. 2 (1968), John C. Wahlke Samuel C. Patterson, and G. Robert 
Boynton, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems," in Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, ed. 
Allan Kornberg (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973). 
375 Abdo I. and James J. Heaphey Baaklini, Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and 
Lebanon (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976). 
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configuration of parliamentary parties, a revision in formal constitutional procedures, or a change 
in society norms regarding the legislature”--according to Michael L. Mezey--“a change in the 
level of support accorded to the legislature by attentive publics”, can also have an important 
effect on the persistence or development of a legislature.376  In this view, legislatures can, by 
virtue of the behavior or their members, contribute to their institutionalization as representative 




Recognition of the limitations of parliaments in developing and nondemocratic nations 
also led scholars to theorize about why legislatures remain weak.378  A first body of literature 
argued that legislatures are weak because their structure is incompatible with many political 
settings in which they have been “transplanted” by colonial powers.  Richard Sisson and Leo M. 
Snowiss argue that legislatures are incongruent with indigenous political structure in some 
countries and are hindered by their association with leaders with a colonial past.379  In this view, 
“[w]here legislatures exist as institutional borrowings from alien political cultures, their fragile 
condition is hardly surprising.”380  In Pierre Rondot’s words, “eastern public opinion holds 
western intrigues primarily responsible for the failure of parliamentarian in the East.  However, 
the real causes . . . evolve from the very character of oriental societies,” namely divisions in 
clienteles, clans, etc.381  Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg suggest that 
legislatures are erroneously viewed by many contemporary scholars as western institutions 
transplanted into incompatible or hostile political environments.382  Abdo Baaklini has argued 
persuasively against this view, citing instances from the Middle East in which colonial powers 
                                                     
376 Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World.": 260.  See also Sisson, "Comparative 
Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation.", Weinbaum, "Classification and Change in 
Legislative Systems: With Particular Application to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan."  Chong Lim Kim, Joel 
D. Barkan, Ilter Turan, and Malcolm E. Jewell, The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation 
in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984).: 159. 
377 Baaklini, Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Lebanon.  Also Jain. 
378 These three reasons are outlined in Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing 
Countries: The Case of Turkey," Legislative Studies Quarterly V, no. 1 (1980). 
379 Richard Sisson and Leo M. Snowiss, "Legislative Viability and Political Development," in Legislatures 
in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States, ed. Joel Smith and Lloyd D. Musolf 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979).: 64. 
380 Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National 
Assembly.": 384. 
381 Pierre Rondot, "Parliamentary Regime in the Middle East," Middle East Affairs IV, no. 8-9 (1953).: 257. 
382 Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of 
Democratic Institutions.See also Weinbaum, "Classification and Change in Legislative Systems: With 
Particular Application to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan.": 33. 
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worked to dismantle indigenous legislative institutions because they threatened the power of the 
colonial rule.383  Indeed, the Ottoman Empire’s first council emerged during the period of Selim 
III (1789-1807); and, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria all had well functioning legislatures in the interwar 
years.384  Although modern parliaments originated in western European countries and spread via 
institutional diffusion to other parts of the world, councils and assemblies existed in the 
indigenous culture of other societies as well, and modern legislatures have precedence in 
precolonial and colonial African, Asian, and Middle Eastern societies.385    
A second theory suggests that parliaments remain weak because of the attitudes and 
values of citizens, including the absence of the necessary widespread approval and support for 
democratic institutions or of a “civic culture”.386  Snowiss and Sisson argue that a host of 
requisite “societal conditions” are lacking in new nations with weak legislatures; further, the 
belief that these institutions are “invalid and ineffective” is widespread.387  In Richard Sisson’s 
view, the structure of the parliament must be compatible with the culture of the nation.  Where it 
is not, these bodies will be weak.388  Chan Woo Park argues that in previous decades in Korea, 
public expectations of the legislature mixed traditional and modern views such as old notions of 
authority which contradicted with new ideas of accountability.389  Thus, without “supportive 
ideologies” within the population, Sisson and Snowiss argue, legislatures in new nations will only 
survive if they satisfy the needs of dominant classes.390   
Ersin Kalaycioglu argued instead that legislatures remain weak because they “undermine 
their own existence” by failing to meet the expectations of citizens and, thus, to promote diffuse 
support for the legislature.391  This view is important because it begins to distance itself from 
cultural modernization theory by emphasizing member and citizen agency.  Drawing on work by 
                                                     
383 Baaklini, Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Lebanon.: Chapter 8. 
384 Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of 
Democratic Institutions.: Chapter 1. 
385 Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National 
Assembly.": 371.  Gerhard Loewenberg argues that the form of the parliament is generally present in 
polities from local civil society associations to nations to international bodies.  See Loewenberg, Modern 
Parliaments: Change or Decline? 
386 Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba Almond, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations, an Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), Seymour Martin Lipset, The Political Man (New 
York: Doubleday, 1960). 
387 Richard Sisson and Leo M. Snowiss, "Legislative Viability and Political Development," in Legislatures 
in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States, ed. Joel Smith and Lloyd D. Musolf 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979).: 44.  The authors describe the functions of these legislatures 
which cause them to be viewed this way. 
388 Sisson, "Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation." 
389 Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National 
Assembly." 
390 Snowiss, "Legislative Viability and Political Development.": 59. 
391 Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey.": 124. 
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V. O. Key, it highlights the link between the government system and the political attitudes of 
ordinary citizens and suggests that constituents’ choices and attitudes are rational, not simply the 
result of psychological stimuli or enduring political culture.392  In this view, political attitudes do 
not arise from time invariant and deterministic political culture, but rather are shaped by beliefs 
about whether institutions deliver economic, political, or social benefits.  It is also important 
because it problematizes the assumption that members of parliament necessarily improve support 
for a strong parliament.  It suggests the need to test this proposition vis-à-vis the possibility that 
parliaments with little interest in the problems of ordinary citizens do little to convince the 
population that a strong parliament is in its best interests.   
 
Extending the Legislative Institutionalization Literature 
 
Chong Lim Kim, Joel D. Barkan, Ilter Turan, and Malcom E. Jewell made one of the 
final contributions to the legislative institutionalization literature with a book-length project 
demonstrating the role of modernity in shaping public support for the legislature.393  Although 
these studies have rarely been cited since the 1980s, they make up an important body of 
scholarship which cannot be ignored in future research on legislative politics in nondemocratic 
political settings.  This chapter critiques and extends the legislative institutionalization literature 
in several ways; first, by seeking to recall and integrate its insights into contemporty scholarly 
debates.  The insights it offered are useful and relevant to important questions in authoritarian 
politics, political development, political attitudes, and legislative strengthening. 394   
Second, much of this literature argued that elites outside the parliament, including in the 
executive, disapproved of the nonrepresenative nature of the legislature’s membership.  Samuel 
P. Huntington argues that legislative institutions in developing countries are dominated by 
traditional elites who are opposed to needed reforms and, thus, are not well supported by pro-
modernization governments.395  Similarly, Sisson and Snowiss argue that members elected to 
legislatures are traditional and anti-modern; thus, the more pro-reform executive is unlikely to 
grant the parliament a greater say in policymaking.396  This chapter extends the literature by 
                                                     
392 V. O. Key, Jr. and with the assistance of Milton C. Cummings, The Responsible Electorate: Rationality 
in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966).See 
also V. O. Key, "Public Opinion and American Democracy,"  (1961). 
393 Kim, The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey.  For 
more recent work on legislatures, see, for example, Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., Legislative 
Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
394 Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World.": 765. 
395 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.: 387.   
396 Snowiss, "Legislative Viability and Political Development." 
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recognizing that the executive may have an interest in failing to promote parliamentary 
development, or even in manipulating it, to establish “loyal” parliaments not only because they do 
not challenge its grip on power, but also because they have particular effects on public opinion.397  
Weak legislatures may not induce widespread support for a strong parliament vis-à-vis a strong 
personalized president or monarch and, thus, may be itself a strategy of authoritarian regimes.   
Third, the literature on citizens’ support for the parliament tends to rely on self-report 
evaluations of members in order to test whether deputies shaped the attitudes of citizens.  But 
because, as the literature suggested, support of the parliament is related to support for other 
institutions and the regime as a whole, these measures may constitute a single syndrome of 
political attitudes.  Additional and more compelling evidence of a link would be provided by 
direct measures of interaction between members and citizens and experiences asking for help 
with personal problems.  This chapter includes new measures of contact between members and 
citizens, including whether individuals have ever asked for help with a personal or community 
problem.   
Fourth, the legislative institutionalization literature relied heavily on cultural 
modernization theory and did not test whether it, or another approach such as rational choice 
institutionalism, best explains variation in individuals’ support for the legislature.  Although 
Kalaycioglu argued that V. O. Key’s approach to public opinion was appropriate for 
understanding the formation of support, the model he proposed partially contradicted this claim 
by suggesting that socialization and the development of particular political culture orientations—
especially modernity—was also a key mechanism.  This chapter tests both paradigms for 
understanding variation in satisfaction with, and support for, the legislature under 
authoritarianism.  It includes a third hypothesis which falls under the rubric of a rational choice 
paradigm: support for the parliament is related to one’s position within the political structure.  
Those who enjoy personal connections with members are more likely to extract particularized 
benefits and, thus, more likely to be supportive of a strong parliament.  If those who receive 
particularized benefits from deputies with whom they have a direct or indirect connection are 
more likely to support a strong legislature, this evidence would suggest that constituency 
service—even it is at best particularistic and at worst clientalistic—contributes to popular support 
for a strong legislature.  However, constituency service may lead to lower levels of support for a 
strong parliament.  In this case, it might be more meaningfully understood as a continuation of the 
                                                     
397 Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist, eds., Authoritarianism in the Middle East: 
Regimes and Resistance (Boudler, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). 
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patronage system which existed before liberalization, and might serve as a barrier to, rather than a 
catalyst of, widespread support for a strong and influential legislature.   
Finally, while the legislative institutionalization literature could show that members 
influence political attitudes, it had insufficient data and cases to demonstrate that greater support 
for the legislature promotes its development.  While these conjectures seem sensible and offer 
motivation for studying variation in individuals’ attitudes toward the legislature, failure to test the 
literature’s core hypothesis ultimately contributed to its disappearance from the political science 
canon.  This chapter seeks to address how legislatures influence public opinion with the goal of 
contributing to future research which might later test the effect of support on the development of 
the parliament and on democratic political development.  It explicitly recognizes growing 
evidence from a number of regions that widespread support for democracy—and by extension for 
democratic institutions—is a condition for the survival of a nascent democratic transition.398  In 
other words, individuals’ attitudes about the importance of having a strong parliament may be 
consequential for understanding how authoritarian politics operates and why it persists.399 
 
Satisfaction with and Support for the Parliament 
 
What are the implications of an extremely weak legislature and manipulated legislative 
elections for the formation of public opinion toward democracy’s most critical institution?  If 
“[p]opular support is critically important to the persistence and the efficient functioning of a 
legislative body”, how is this support formed?400  How does the parliament take “hold in the 
public mind” as “a valued and popular institution”?401  What is the role of individual legislators in 
shaping support for a strong parliament?   
 
                                                     
398 See, for example, Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation.  
399 For evidence of the importance of strong legislative institutions in democratization see Fish, "Creative 
Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the Electoral Arena?" 
400 Kim, The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey.: 159. 
401 Gerhard Loewenberg and Chong Lim  Kim, "Comparing the Representativeness of Parliaments," 
Legislative Studies Quarterly III, no. 1 (1978).: 372.  Michael L. Mezey, Comparative Legislatures 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979).: 27. 
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Defining Specific and Diffuse Support 
 
By support, this chapter refers to the generally-accepted definition of diffuse support 
developed by David Easton in the context of a political system in which diffuse support and 
specific support for political institutions is one of two types of responses (input) of members.  
Diffuse support is a set of attitudes which place value on an institution as an indispensable, taken-
for-granted part of the political system.  “A system may seek to instill in its members a high level 
of diffuse support in order that, regardless of what happens, the members will continue to be 
bound to it by strong ties of loyalty and affection.  This is a type of support that continues 
independently of the specific rewards which the member may feel he obtains from belonging to 
the system.”402   
Diffuse support contrasts with specific support, or “generalized attachment to political 
objects . . . not conditioned upon specific returns at any moment.”403  “This is an input to a system 
that occurs as a return for the specific membership.  It represents or reflects the satisfaction a 
member feels when he perceives his demands as having been met.”404  Policy support, for 
example, is specific support which comes about through satisfaction with laws and voting in the 
legislature.405  Specific support is generally viewed by theorists as contributing over time to 
diffuse support.  Satisfaction refers to specific support in this chapter. 
John C. Wahlke has suggested that, in the developing country context, support of the 
legislature is constituted by resistance to attempts to abolish or severely limit the power of the 
legislature.406  During the time of the study, newspapers in Algeria reported government plans to 
propose a constitutional amendment formally increasing the power of the president vis-à-vis the 
legislature.  Although no draft text appeared, reports suggested that the aim of the amendments 
were to establish the office of the vice-president, eliminate the term limit of the president, and 
reduce the power of the parliament.  Elites who support this amendment suggested that it would 
create a presidential system, rather than a hybrid system more like the United States. 
 An Algerian woman expressed a high level of diffuse support for a strong parliament.  
When asked what she thought of these proposed constitutional changes: “I like President 
Boutiflika.  If it [removal of the term limit] was only for him, I would agree.  But what about in 
the future?  I don’t think it is a good idea to limit the power of the parliament, because we don’t 
                                                     
402 David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965).: 124-5. 
403 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965).: 272-3. 
404 Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis.: 125.  
405 See John C. Whalke, "Policy Demands and System Support: The Role of the Represented," British 




know who will lead Algeria in the future and if they will be a good president.”  Another woman 
expressed a low level of support for a strong parliament: “I’m not sure we need a parliament.  I 
think a monarchy like in Morocco would be the best way to govern Algeria.  But, unfortunately 
we don’t have such a possibility in Algeria.”407  
 In Morocco, there are no proposals to abolish the parliament; instead, there are demands 
from the opposition to amend the constitution to give it an independent role in policymaking.  
There is a sense that the King views such a constitutional amendment as being possible, but that 
parties should democratize internally before such a change is made.  Expressing diffuse support 
for the parliament, an ordinary citizen stated: “I am ready to change my low view of the 
parliament.  I am ready to see the parliament play a more democratic and strong role.”408  
 
Expectations for Levels of Satisfaction and Support under Authoritarianism 
 
 Owing to the inability of their parliaments under conditions of electoral manipulation and 
patronage (as well as lack of resources) to deliver its promises to citizens, Moroccans and 
Algerians should have low overall levels of satisfaction (i.e. specific support) with the parliament.  
However, due to the relatively long history of legislative politics, these settings will be 
characterized by conditions of moderate levels of support for a parliament with the power to 
make laws, or diffuse support.  Further, these settings should be characterized by declining levels 
of specific and diffuse support since liberalization.   
 
Satisfaction with the Parliament and its Members  
 
 As hypothesized, Moroccans and Algerians view the parliament and its members in very 
critical terms.  Only 9.4 percent of Moroccans and 10.1 percent of Algerians think the parliament 
is doing a good or excellent job.  Slightly more—16.9 percent in Morocco and 15.0 percent in 
Algeria—think that members from their district are doing well (See Table VI. 2.).  
 Satisfaction is lower in Morocco which has had a liberalized parliament for a longer 
period of time than in Algeria.  And, they are lower in the country in which the parliament plays a 
slightly greater role in policymaking and oversight, but in which this role is viewed by many as 
being for the service of an elite class and in which the membership is viewed as particularly 
corrupt and unresponsiveness.  In Algeria, individuals have a low opinion of members, but these 
                                                     
407 Algeria.  Interview.  2007.  
408 Morocco.  Interview.  2007.  
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members are at worst generally viewed as self-enriching and unwilling to stand up for the public 
interest in the parliament. 
  Among the functions of the parliament, Moroccans believe their parliament is most 
effective at debating national issues (1.6) and worst at communicating with citizens and solving 
their personal problems (1.3).  Algerians view the parliament as best at debate and solving 






TABLE VI. 2.     Specific Support for the Parliament and its Members among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents 
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Questions: (1) Overall, how would you evaluate the job the House of Representatives is doing? Etc. 
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 As hypothesized, Algerians are slightly less critical than Moroccans of the job of the 
current parliament.  However, approval has declined very slightly in Algeria (1.72 to 1.81) and 
improved very slightly in Morocco since the last mandate (1.49 to 1.53).  73.0 percent of 
Moroccans and 66.0 percent of Algerians have the same evaluation of the former and current 
parliament while 27.0 and 34 percent, respectively, have an improved or deteriorated image (See 
Table VI. 3.). 
 
TABLE VI. 3.     Change in Satisfaction with the Present Compared with the Former 
Mandate of Parliament among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents 
 Morocco Algeria 
Evaluate Present House of Representatives:   







































Confidence in the parliament, as a form of specific support, is low in both Morocco and 
Algeria.  55.4 percent of Moroccans do not have much confidence, while 36.6 percent have some, 
and 8.0 percent have a lot.  In Algeria, 25.0 percent do not have much confidence, 51.6 percent 
have some, and 15.2 percent have a lot.  Moroccans have the most confidence in civil society and 
religious leaders and least confidence in political parties.  Algerians have most confidence in 
religious leaders and least confidence in parties.  As hypothesized, the gap between confidence in 
the president and the parliament in Algeria is much larger in Algeria than in Morocco.  Because 
Algeria lacks a legitimate arbitrator, it must engage strategies which promote the image of the 
president and deemphasize the programs of the parliament and parties (See Table VI. 4.). 
 Moroccans and Algerians trust the parliament less than do respondents in many African 
countries.  According to African Democracy Barometer data using the same questions, the 
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proportion of the sample who have some confidence or a lot of confidence in the Parliament is 70 
in Ghana (1999), 58 in Nigeria (2000), 55 in Mali (2001), 92 in Tanzania (2001), and 57.9 on the 
continent as a whole.  In every country studied, except South Africa, approval of the parliament 
was not as high as approval of the president.  The data from Morocco and Algeria suggest a 
similar relationship.409 
  
                                                     
409 Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market 
Reform in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).: 108.  Job performance (all Africa): 49% 
approve of leaders in the parliament; 53% approve of elected local leaders; 64% approve of job 
performance of the president.  South Africa is the only country examined in which more people approve of 






TABLE VI. 4.     Confidence in Public Institutions among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents 
 Morocco Algeria 


































 64.7% 31.7% 3.6% 1.4 41.2% 50.9% 8.0% 1.7 
President and the Government 343 302 113 758 145 356 189 690 
 45.3% 39.8% 14.9% 1.7 21.0% 51.6% 27.4% 2.1 
Parliament 414 273 60 747 228 354 104 686 
 55.4% 36.6% 8.0% 1.5 33.2% 51.6% 15.2% 1.8 
Civil Society 164 312 282 758 169 384 122 675 
 21.6% 41.2% 37.2% 2.2 25.0% 56.9% 18.1% 1.9 
Religious Leaders 131 337 300 768 69 327 299 695 
 17.1% 43.9 39.1% 2.2 9.9% 47.1% 43.0% 2.3 
Unions and Associations 231 304 159 694 200 360 109 669 
 33.3% 43.8% 22.9% 1.9 29.9% 53.8% 16.3% 1.9 
















Question: Please tell me whether you have not much confidence, some confidence, or a lot of confidence in the following institutions. 
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Diffuse Support of the Parliament and its Members 
 
Support for the existence of a parliament with the power to make laws is relatively high 
in both Morocco and Algeria, perhaps owing to the fact that these bodies have existed almost 
continuously since the 1960s.  Algerians demonstrate a higher level of diffuse support than do 
Moroccans.  82.5 percent of Algerians and 63.7 percent of Moroccans support having a 
parliament with the power to make laws, while 7.1 percent of Algerians and 23.1 percent of 
Moroccans believe it would be desirable to have no parliament at all.  Comparable percentages—
10.4 in Algeria and 13.2 in Morocco—support having a parliament that only advises the 
government (See Table VI. 5.).410 
 A stronger test of diffuse support for the parliament is derived by combining the two 
measures.  In Algeria, 80.1 percent of respondents support, or strongly support, having a 
parliament and believe that the parliament should have the power to make laws.  In Morocco, this 
proportion is 60.5 percent.  What an individual means by these statements is bounded within 
current regime such that both the Moroccan and Algerian legislatures already have the power, in a 
sense, to make laws.411 
                                                     
410 Studies from the US have focused on compliance and institutional commitment as two components of 
support.  See G. R. Boynton, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions.", Samuel C. 
Patterson, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems."  Mezey found that compliance not a measure of 
diffuse support in a small sample of six Asian countries.  Mezey, "Constituency Demands and Legislative 
Support: An Experiment."  A host of studies provide additional measures of diffuse support which could be 
incorporated into future waves of surveys in the Arab Middle East and elsewhere.  Questions in these 
sources measure commitment to a parliament with strong power to influence policymaking. 
411 Because of differences in methodology, it is difficult to compare levels of support in Morocco and 
Algeria with other countries across time.  Countries in which the legislature appeared to enjoy a high level 
of diffuse support are Trinidad and Tobago (Ghany 1996); Turkey (Kalaycioglu 1980); and, Kenya 
(Hopkins 1975).  Moderate levels of support generally characterized Korea (Park 2002; Kim 1976).  Low 
levels of support characterized the Lebanon, Philippines, Latin America, Thailand, and Uruguay (Crow 
1970; Mezey 1979; Astiz 1973; Darling 1960; Stauffer 1970).  A study of opinion toward the parliament of 
Trinidad and Tobago revealed a high level of diffuse support: Do you believe that Parliament is an 
important institution in our system of governance?  In 2002, 94.6% responded yes; 1.9% no; and, 3.4% 
don’t know.  In 2006, 92.8% yes; 7.0% no; and, 0.2% don’t know (Ghany 2006).  Most work on Turkey 
suggests that the National Assembly was historically viewed with relatively high levels of specific and 
diffuse support.  Kalaycioglu finds on his five-point scale, 66.2% of the sample in Turkey score 5 while 
21.3% score 4.  In Kenya, finds in urban areas that people think the parliament provides valuable services.  
By contrast, Mezey writes that in the Philippines, one of the post powerful parliament in the world at the 
time, there was not public outcry at Marcos’ suspension of the parliament which was viewed as highly 
corrupt by citizens (Mezey 1979, 27; Stauffer 1975).  In Uruguay, the parliament was described as 
obstructionist (Astiz 1973: 3) and Thai parliament frequently suffered coups (Darling 1960: 356).  Latin 
American parliaments represented wealthy class not lower and rural people (Astiz 1973).  Hamid Ghany, 
"Public Perceptions of Parliament in Trinidad and Tobago: Evidence from the Field," in Seventh Workshop 
of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians (Wroxton, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom: 2006), 
Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey."  Hopkins 1975.  
Chong Lim Kim, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislatures: Public Perceptions of the Korean National 
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While many early studies of support misunderstood aspects of legislative politics in 
developing countries, many were correct in suggesting that where legislative tradition is not 
firmly established—and, thus, the “reservoir of good will” shallow—diffuse support will be low.  
However, a long history of legislative politics can produce support for a legislature even where 
constituent satisfaction with the parliament is low.  The data from Algeria suggest that diffuse 
support can be relatively high, even when specific support, or satisfaction, as we will see, is very 
low.  Chan Woo Park also found in Korea, for example, that with the frequent changes in 
legislative regime, diffuse support was high while approval was low.412   
 
 
TABLE VI. 5.     Diffuse Support for the Parliament among Moroccan and Algerian 
Constituents 
 Morocco Algeria 
Desired Form of Parliament:   
     None 86 (23.1%) 23 (7.1%) 
     Only Advises 49 (13.2%) 34 (10.4%) 
     Power to Make Laws 237 (63.7%) 269 (82.5%) 
Total 372 326 
   
Opinion on Existence of Parliament:   
     Strongly Oppose (1) 27 (3.7%) 24 (3.4%) 
     Oppose 76 (10.5%) 50 (7.0%) 
     Support 368 (50.6%) 488 (68.4%) 
     Strongly Support (2) 256 (35.2%) 152 (21.3%) 
Total/Mean 727 (3.2) 714 (3.1) 
   
Level of Diffuse Support:   
     Support on Both Measures 219 (60.5%) 257 (80.1%) 
     Support on Neither or Only One Measure 143 (39.5%) 64 (13.9%) 
Total 362 321 
Questions: (1) Do you believe there should be: No parliament in Algeria/Morocco, a parliament that only 
advises the government, or a parliament with the power to make laws?  (2) Do you strongly support, 
support, oppose, or strongly oppose the existence of a parliament in Algeria/Morocco? 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Assembly," Legislative Studies Quarterly 1, no. 3 (1976).  Carlos Alberto Astiz, "The Decay of Latin 
American Legislatures," in Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, ed. Allan Kornberg (New York: 
David McKay Company, 1973), Frank C. Darling, "Marshal Sarit and Absolutist Rule in Thailand," Pacific 
Affairs 3, no. 4 (1960), Mezey, Comparative Legislatures.  Robert B. Stauffer, "Congress in the Philippine 
Political System," in Legislatures in Developmental Perspective, ed. Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1970).  Hopkins, "The Kenyan Legislature: Political Functions and 
Citizen Perceptions."  Ralph E. Crow, "Parliament in the Lebanese Political System," in Legislatures in 
Developmental Perspective, ed. Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1970). 
412 Chan Wook Park, "Change Is Short but Continuity Is Long: Policy Influence of the National Assembly 
in Newly Democratized Korea," in Legislatures: Comparative Perspectives on Representative Assemblies, 
ed. Peverill Squire Gerhard Loewenberg, and D. Roderick Kiewiet (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 2002).: 332. 
 
 209 
How Much Power do Citizens Believe the Parliament Has? 
 
How much power do citizens believe the parliament has?  Do they believe that it 
currently has the power to make laws?  Overall, Moroccans believe their parliament has more 
power than do Algerians.  56.0 percent of Moroccans, compared with 34.0 percent of Algerians, 
believe the parliament has enough power to hold the government accountable.  This is consistent 
with the actual role played by the parliaments in the two countries which, although extremely 
limited, is greater in several meaningful ways in Morocco.  For example, debate tends to be 
livelier in the Moroccan case and, although there are significant limitations in their 
accountability, ministers are questioned each Wednesday by the upper house (See Table VI. 6.).   
Moroccans do not differ to a significant extent from one another to the degree to which 
they believe their parliaments influence policy.  However, both view foreign policy as the least 
likely to be influenced by the parliament.  All of these figures suggest that Moroccans and 
Algerians are generous with their evaluations of the role their parliaments play in oversight of the 
executive and influence on policymaking.  Thus, although they expect individual deputies will 
not be helpful with their problems and will be unresponsive to those without a personal 
connection, Moroccans and Algerians think that the parliament has a relatively robust role in 




TABLE VI. 6.     Perceived Power of the Parliament among Moroccan and Algerian 
Constituents 
 Morocco Algeria 
Parliament Has Power to Hold the Government Accountable:   
     No  278 (44.0%) 419 (66.0%) 
     Yes 354 (56.0%) 216 (34.0%) 
Total 632 635 
   
Role of the Parliament in Social Issues:   
     Not Effective (1) 72 (9.8%) 88 (11.9%) 
     A Little 151 (20.35%) 84 (11.4%) 
     Somewhat 352 (47.7%) 345 (46.8%) 
     Great Extent (4) 163 (22.1%) 221 (30.0%) 
Total/Mean 738 (2.8) 738 (2.9) 
   
Role of the Parliament in Political Issues:   
     Not Effective 68 (9.8%) 92 (12.6%) 
     A Little 130 (18.8%) 138 (18.9%) 
     Somewhat 314 (45.3%) 329 (45.1%) 
     Great Extent 181 (26.1%) 170 (23.3%) 
Total/Mean 693 (2.9) 729 (2.8) 
   
Role of the Parliament in Economic Issues:   
     Not Effective 91 (12.5%) 112 (15.5%) 
     A Little 161 (22.2%) 172 (23.8%) 
     Somewhat 287 (39.5%) 314 (43.4%) 
     Great Extent 188 (25.9%) 125 (17.3%) 
Total/Mean 727 (2.8) 723 (2.6) 
   
Role of the Parliament in Foreign Policy Issues:   
     Not Effective 99 (14.8%) 241 (34.0%) 
     A Little 153 (22.9%) 200 (28.3%) 
     Somewhat 239 (35.8%) 183 (25.9%) 
     Great Extent 176 (26.4%) 84 (11.9%) 
Total/Mean 667 (2.7) 708 (2.2) 
Questions: (1) Does the parliament have the power to hold the government accountable? (2) In your 
opinion, what is the role of the parliament in social/political/economic/foreign policy issues? 
 
 
How is Diffuse Support Formed? 
 
Cultural modernization theory and rational choice institutionalism offer competing 





Cultural Modernization Theory 
 
Cultural modernization theory suggests that individual modernity, which develops 
through formal education, urbanization, and socialization, fosters support for modern political 
institutions.  Kalaycioglu argues that expectations and perceptions of the legislature develop both 
in early as well as later life.  In early life, interpersonal trust and basic role expectations of 
members of parliament form.  Support for the national legislature develops as a child’s sense of 
interpersonal trust extends to political institutions, and as that individual engages in formal 
education and political activities.  One’s level of modernity and perceptions of the congruency 
between members’ behaviors and expectations are central forces in shaping support for the 
legislature.413 
 A number of studies in newly-independent states in the 1960s and 1970s found evidence 
that modernity was related to a syndrome of personal and political background characteristics 
which build diffuse support for the legislature.  These factors included formal education, urban 
residence, higher income, liberal values, interpersonal trust, knowledge of the parliament, and 
political participation.  For example, Samuel C. Patterson finds correlational evidence in a limited 
sample for a relationship between education and support.414  G. R. Boynton finds a relationship 
between higher income and support, though urban residence was not a factor in his study.415  
Modernity predicts support for the legislature in two of three countries—Korea and Kenya, 
though not in Turkey—examined in an in-depth study conducted by Kim, Barkan, Turan, and 
Jewell.416   
Other studies found that knowledge of the legislature and political participation are 
predictors of diffuse support.  Salience—knowing about the legislature and what it does—is seen 
as a prerequisite of support, according to Kim and Lowenberg, and is strongly related to support 
in several countries.417  Kalaycioglu finds salience is the most important predictor of diffuse 
support for the legislature because it is related to higher activity levels of deputies in their 
districts.418  In two different studies, Samuel C. Patterson and G. R. Boynton find that political 
                                                     
413 Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey.": 125-9. 
414 Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems.": 299.   
415 See G. R. Boynton, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions."  Samuel C. Patterson 
also finds correlational evidence in a limited sample for a relationship between income. 
416 Kim, The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. 
417 Patterson finds correlation between political knowledge and support.  Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions 
of Support in Legislative Systems.": 299.  Loewenberg, "Legislatures and Parliaments." 
418 Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey." 
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participation is correlated with support for the parliament.419  Studies of support tend not to 
include interpersonal trust in models, although cultural modernization theory suggests that it 
should be positively related to diffuse support.  Finally, contrary to expectations, one study, 
which considered the relationship between liberal values to support, found that support for the 
legislature can exist independently of democratic values.420 
Finally, satisfaction with how well the government is functioning and with the policies of 
the government and its institutions predict support for the legislature.421  Kalaycioglu suggested 
that these forms of satisfaction may cause individuals to filter out or to disagree with negative 
statements about the legislature.422  
Cultural modernization theory has been criticized because it suggests that political 
orientations are deterministic, primarily outside the control of the individual, and shaped by 
deeply engrained “habits of the heart,” rather than by rational calculus of the most efficacious 
political behavior.  Elements of the theory see some political cultures as less modern, while others 
are more modern and some more conducive to democracy.  Still others are less conducive to its 
development and have been particularly discredited. 
 Cultural modernization theory suggests the following hypotheses: 
 
HCM1:  Higher education is related to greater support for the legislature 
 
HCM2: Urban residence with be related to greater support for the legislature 
 
HCM3:  Higher economic satisfaction is related to greater support for the legislature 
 
HCM4:  Liberal values are related to greater support for the legislature 
 
HCM5:  Higher interpersonal trust is related to greater support for the legislature 
 
HCM6: Great knowledge of the parliament (salience) is related to greater support for the 
legislature 
 
                                                     
419 Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems.": 299.  G. R. Boynton, "The 
Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions." 
420 Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey." 
421 Mezey, Comparative Legislatures. 
422  In a similar vein, support may be related to evaluations of past regime (Mishler and Rose 1996); the 
capacity in general of the government to deliver goods, especially economic goods (Norton 1997); and the 
performance of the system/leg as a whole (Kalaycioglu 1980).  Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in 
Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey.", William and Richard Rose Mishler, "Trajectories of Fear and 
Hope: Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28, no. 4 (1996). 
Philip Norton, "Introduction," Parliamentary Affairs 50, no. 3 (1997), Richard Rose and William Mishler, 
"Trajectories of Fear and Hope: Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe," Comparative 
Political Studies 28, no. 4 (1996). 
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HCM7:  Higher political participation is related to greater support for the legislature  
 
HCM8:  Higher satisfaction with government functioning is related to greater support for 
the legislature  
 
Years of formal schooling is used as a measure of education.423  Urban residence is 
measured by the percent of the population of the electoral district (Algeria, 1987) or the closest 
approximation of the electoral district, the province, (Morocco, 1998) which lives in an urban 
area.424  Economic satisfaction is a self-report measure of how satisfied one’s household is with 
their current financial situation.425  Support for traditional gender roles is used as a proxy for 
liberal democratic values.426  Level of interpersonal trust is measured by support for the statement 
that others around one can be trusted.427  Knowledge of the legislature is measured by a self-
reported evaluation of how well the individual understands the functions of the parliament (See 
Table VI. 7.).  Political participation is measured by interest in the outcome of elections.428  
Finally, satisfaction is measured as agreement or disagreement with the statement that the 
government in the capital is doing a good job running the country’s affairs.429 
 
Political Attitudes and Behaviors of Rational Actors 
 
Kalaycioglu’s work took a first step toward distancing itself from cultural modernization 
theory by arguing that legislatures themselves undermine their own success.  This contention 
suggested that the behaviors of members have a direct impact on the attitudes (and perhaps also 
behaviors) of citizens.  If attitudes of individual legislators are shaped by members, they are 
context-sensitive, time-invariant, and responsive to changes in reward calculations.  Although 
Kalaycioglu’s work heavily emphasized cultural modernization theory, it also described a process 
in which the formation of attitudes toward the legislature and behaviors involving interactions 
                                                     
423 Ranges from no schooling (0 years) zero grades to doctorate (18 years).  
424 Ranges from 25% to 99% in selected Algerian districts and from 9% to 100% in Moroccan districts. 
425 Algeria: Very dissatisfied (13%), dissatisfied (34%), satisfied (44%), and very satisfied (9%).  Morocco: 
Very dissatisfied (14%), dissatisfied (26%), satisfied (53%), and very satisfied (7%).   
426 Question: Which statement is closest to your opinion: It would be better if men and women adhered to 
traditional gender roles, or, it would be better if women were able to work outside the home and men 
helped with children.  Algeria: 89% traditional and 11% progressive.  Morocco: 66% traditional and 34% 
progressive. 
427 Question: One should worry about being cheated when interacting with people outside one’s family.  
Algeria: Strongly agree (7%), agree (39%), disagree (41%), and strongly disagree (13%).  Morocco: 
Strongly agree (10%), agree (32%), disagree (42%), and strongly disagree (16%). 
428 Interest the outcome of elections is measured on a scale from 1 to 7.  Mean is 3.9 in Algeria and 3.6 in 
Morocco. 
429 Algeria: Very dissatisfied (8%), dissatisfied (22%), satisfied (53%), and very satisfied (17%).  Morocco: 
Very dissatisfied (25%), dissatisfied (35%), satisfied (37%), and very satisfied (4%).   
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with legislators are based on rational calculation.  In this view, participation leads to interest in 
politics, knowledge of the system, and political efficacy.  A more politically-involved individual 
will have a greater number of contacts, and the number and efficiency of these contacts will also 
depend on one’s position within the political structure.  Those with the contacts and knowledge of 
how to advance demands will get more from legislators and are, therefore, likely to be more 
satisfied and supportive of political institutions, including and especially the legislature.430  
The latter process appears to fit anecdotal evidence not only from field research in 
Morocco and Algeria, but also from research on and conversations with members of parliament 
from Africa that a “learning” process occurs in which legislators are central as links through 
which individuals develop new rational calculations which reflect new political norms and 
institutions.  In a personal communication, a legislator from Kenya suggested that constituents 
need to learn about the new role of the member under democracy.  This role, in her words, was 
not to provide help with personal problems, but rather to oversee the government and make laws 
in the interest of the whole nation.  If particularized demands were to be handled, these should be 
in response to problems in the bureaucracy or problems of development involving a large number 
of constituents.   
Citizens may also learn about changes in the efficacious of their vote and their ability to 
ask officials for assistance.  Through alternance, voters in Senegal became aware that they are 
efficacious and that they can vote for someone who is responsive to district needs.431 A socialist 
deputy in Morocco who had an office in a small urban area suggested that he provided office 
hours and services to constituents in order to teach them that their vote could be used to elect 
someone who is responsive to their needs, in contrast to the five other members in the city’s two 
electoral districts, whom he described as absent and living in Rabat.432    
These anecdotes concur with field evidence which suggests that individuals who are well-
connected and who extract personal benefits from relationships from members will be more 
supportive of the parliament.  In Algeria, a young, educated male expressed interest in having a 
member of parliament with a “strong personality” who could get resources for the willaya.  He 
seemed disinterested in other political parties who, from the perspective of an outsider, seem 
                                                     
430 Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey.": 127.  
Kalaycioglu seemed to advance the contention that actors are rational though he simultaneously suggested 
that support could change as a result of modernization or experiences.  He seemed to advance a theory of 
public opinion consistent with both cultural modernization and rational choice institutionalism, but in so 
doing introduced some inconsistencies into his approach. 
431 Brian Levy and Kpundeh Sahr, eds., Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging 
Lessons (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004).: 115. 
432 Morocco, Member #2, April 2006. 
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closer to liberal democratic ideals.  Instead, he was reasonably well-connected, knowing two 
members of parliament from his district and having a good relationship with two political 
parties.433  His approach to politics had more to do with how to rationally extract the most 
benefits for himself, his family, and his region than with voting for the most “democratic” party 
in the most abstract sense.  Thus, one could understand this individual’s political attitudes not as 
lacking in democratic values, but rather as a rational response given the logic of the political 
system in Algeria. 
 
Position in Structure of Political Power 
  
 There are two ways in which one’s position within the structure of political power may 
influence diffuse support for the parliament.  The first is through direct and indirect relationships 
with members of parliament: either having a friend or family member who is a deputy or simply 
knowing the name of a member of parliament from one’s district.  The latter probably measures 
an indirect connection while the former is clearly a direct connection.  Those who enjoy one of 
these two types of relationships with deputies are more likely to extract benefits and also to be 
more supportive of the legislature. 
The second area of position within the power structure is inclusion in groups whose 
interests are not well represented by a parliament dominated by the policies of an authoritarian 
regime and powerful class or clan interests, rather than the policy preferences of ordinary citizens.  
This includes more religious individuals and perhaps also women.   
The parliament may be less representative of religious individuals because the Islamic 
opposition is allowed only to participate in a limited and controlled manner in both countries.  
Cultural theories and conventional wisdom suggests that individuals with stronger religious 
convictions hold a more undemocratic political culture and, thus, are more likely to be opposed to 
the legislature.  More religious individuals may be more likely to desire a stronger parliament 
because they have no other way than through an authoritarian government to advocate for their 
policy preferences.   
Although the Moroccan monarchy is the Commander of the Faithful, and the president of 
Algeria must be a Muslim—and thus neither government is secular—both advance policies were 
viewed inconsistent with Islam by key segments of the population.  One segment of the political 
elite, and those of the political preferences of the population, is not represented by state 
institutions because of repression, manipulation, and cooption of Islamist opposition, including 
                                                     
433 Algeria, Constituent #5, April 2007. 
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the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and the Justice and Charity Party in Morocco.  In 2006, the 
Algerian president reversed a decision of parliament to allow the importation of alcohol, a move 
viewed by some observers as driven by key interests in the military involved in the sale of 
alcohol.434  In Morocco, a man expressed anger to me because western countries: “. . . force us to 
change laws about polygamy.  They force us to sell alcohol.”  In reality it may be the Moroccan 
government, elite, and civil society which are responsible for these laws, but there is not a system 
of representative government by which ordinary people can change these laws in line with their 
values if these policy preferences are contrary to those of the elite and the government.  Thus, 
those whose interests are less well-represented, and in this case more religious people, will be less 
supportive of the legislature.   
 If we accept number for parliamentary seats as a measure of representation, women’s 
interests are less well-represented in both parliaments.  Further, women are less likely than men 
and women to contact deputies in all of the ways measured by the survey.  Thus, on average, 
women should be less supportive of the legislature than are men.  Although women’s interests are 
defined differently by different individuals, many female members of parliament see their 
primary contribution as bringing in new issues and perspectives that would not automatically be 
introduced by their male counterparts.  The Moroccan parliament has also played a role, though 
not the key role, in the passage of the new PSC.  Thus, there is some possibility in Morocco that 
women would be more supportive of the legislature than would men.  
  
HPS1:  Having a deputy who is a friend or family member is related to higher support for 
the legislature 
 
HPS2:  Knowing the name of a deputy is related to higher support for the legislature 
 
HPS3:  Female gender is related to lower support for the legislature  
 
HPS4:  Higher personal religiosity is related to higher support for the legislature  
 
HPS5:  Higher social religiosity is related to higher support for the legislature  
 
 Having a deputy as a friend or family member and knowing a current deputy from one’s 
district are indicator variables (See Table III. 11.).  Two measures of religiosity and one measure 
of support for Islamist parties are included in the regression.  First, personal religiosity is 
measured by the degree to which religious considerations are important for dress choice.435  
                                                     
434 Morocco, Constituent #2, November 2006. 
435 Algeria: Very important (8%), somewhat important (28%), and not at all important (64%).  Morocco: 
Very important (17%), somewhat important (39%), and not at all important (44%). 
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Second, political religiosity is measured on a seven-point scale by the degree to which one 
believes that religion and politics ought not to be separate.436  Third, confidence in Islamist parties 
measures not only approval of conservative values, but also confidence that the conservative 
political parties have the will and ability to deliver on the values and preferences of their 
supporters.437 
 
Legislators as Links 
 
 In a certain sense, having a deputy as a family member or friend, or knowing the name of 
a deputy is a way of testing whether deputies act as links between the outcome of elite-level 
bargaining and the political attitudes of ordinary citizens.  There are other ways as well.  First, 
how well individuals evaluate the performance of members should be related to support for 
having a strong parliament.438  Second, studies from East Asia, in particular, suggest the 
importance of perceptions of institutional functioning for shaping political attitudes.439  Michael 
Herb offers historical evidence from Europe which suggests that where the public viewed 
elections as fairly administered, transition to parliamentarianism occurred.  By contrast, when 
elections were marred by corruption and rigging, weak regime legitimacy hindered transition.440  
A measure of how transparent and open an individual believes elections and access to deputies to 
be is likely to predict support for a strong legislature.  Third, deputies who deal with a large 
number of demands and who are more visible through party meetings and constituency visits are 
likely not only to influence the support of individuals directly, but also to have particular 
“spillover” effects in their districts; for example, by inducing other deputies to also provide 
services to citizens.441  Fourth, responsiveness to individual citizens needs should also increase 
support for the legislature.442  Those who have had a satisfying casework resolution with a 
                                                     
436 Measured on a same from 1 (No influence) to 7 (Complete fusion).  Mean in Algeria is 3.0.  Mean is 
Morocco is 3.5. 
437 Algeria: No confidence (20%), some confidence (54%), and a lot of confidence (26%).  Morocco: No 
confidence (36%), some confidence (67%), and a lot of confidence (27%).   
438 See Mezey, Comparative Legislatures. 
439 See, for example, Doh Chull and Chong-Min Park Shin, "The Democratization of Mass Political 
Orientations in South Korea," International Journal of Public Opinion Research 15 (2003). 
440 Herb, "Princes, Parliaments, and the Prospects for Democracy in the Gulf."  See also Margaret Susan 
Thompson and Joel H. Silbley, "Historical Research on 19th-Century Legislatures," in Handbook of 
Legislative Research, ed. Samuel C. Patterson, Gerhard Lowenberg, and Malcolm E. Jewell (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
441 Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey.", Kim, The 
Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey, Mezey, 
"Constituency Demands and Legislative Support: An Experiment.".   
442 Kim, The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. 
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member of parliament are most likely to support a strong legislature.  Fifth, those who have 
contacted a member in one or more ways in the district, but who do not know the name of a 
deputy and who do not have a deputy as a friend or family member, are a measure of whether 
contact alone builds support.  Finally, a measure is included for the percentage of the deputies in 
the district who are from the large ruling parties.  In these districts, individuals may be more pro-
status quo and they may also have more effective casework operations because deputies are more 
likely to be connected to the local representatives of the executive, such as the wally in Algeria 
and the governor in Morocco.  
 
HLL1:  Evaluating members from one’s district more highly is related to higher support 
for the legislature 
 
HLL2:  Higher perceived institutional openness and transparency is related to higher 
support for the legislature 
 
HLL3:  Individuals who live in districts with a higher proportion with higher average 
casework loads will have higher support for the legislature 
 
HLL4:  Individuals who have had a satisfying casework experience will be more likely to 
support having a strong legislature 
 
HLL5:  Having had contact with a member one does not know or have a connection with is 
related to lower support for the legislature 
 
HLL6:  Individuals who live in districts with a higher proportion of deputies from large 
pro-government parties will have higher levels of support for the legislature 
 
 Evaluation of members from one’s district is measured as a scale of agreement to the 
statement; overall, the deputies from this district are doing an excellent, good, fair, or poor job 
(See Table III. 9.).  Perceived institutional openness and transparency is a scale created by the 
two measures in Table III. 13.  Mean casework load is taken from responses to the deputy survey 
linked to district.443  A satisfying casework is someone who has ever contacted a deputy from his 
or her district and said that this contact was satisfying or very satisfying (see Table III. 12.).  
Having had contact with a member whom one does not know or have a connection with is 
generated as a variable where at least one of the six measure of contact are present, but “know” 
and “friend” are not (See Table III. 9. and III. 11.).  Finally, election results are used to generate 
                                                     
443 Ranges from 13.5 to 85 requests per month in selected districts in Algeria and from 26.8 to 206.4 in 
selected districts in Morocco, where the mean is taken at the level of the province, not the district, due to 
smaller district magnitudes and differences between administrative and electoral boundaries which make 
lower-level measures imprecise in some cases. 
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the proportion of deputies from large pro-government parties in the district, defined as the FLN in 




 Morocco and Algeria differ in terms of their regime type (i.e. institutional setting), 
history of parliament liberalization, parliamentary membership, and level of debate in the 
parliament.  These differences may help account for greater levels of knowledge of the parliament 
in Morocco, higher levels of contact between members and citizens in Algeria, and higher 
satisfaction with, and support for, the parliament in Algeria.  However, both are authoritarian 
regimes which engage electoral manipulation and patronage to maintain ineffective parliaments.  
The quality of the representative link is similar in the two countries.  Within the universe of cases 
of authoritarianism, at least in the Arab Middle East, Morocco and Algeria provide a comparison 
of arguments based on the effect of casework and other deputy-citizen interactions, on the 
formation of support.  If similar individual-level dynamics are found in the two countries, this 
result will suggest that the quality of the representative link under electoral authoritarianism, 
rather than the specific institutional setting, is an important determinant of the attitudes of 
ordinary citizens, as suggested by the conceptual framework.    
Although the preceding hypotheses relate to diffuse support, they will first be applied to 
predicting short-term satisfaction with the parliament.  Next, the same regressors will be used to 
model diffuse support for the parliament.  All independent variables are standardized from 0 to 1. 
 
Satisfaction with the Parliament  
 
The survey provides multiple ways of measuring satisfaction with the parliament.  
Ordered logit is used to model one of them: overall evaluation of the parliament (See Table III. 
9.).  
 
Model I: Cultural Modernization Theory  
 
                                                     
444 Percentage of deputies from the majority party, the FLN, in Algeria ranges from 41% to 75%.  In 
Morocco, large parties are majority parliamentary groups with more than 40 seats: Group of the Movement 
(MP), Group Socialist (USFP), Group Istiqlal (Istiqlal) and Independents Group (RNI).  This excludes the 
Islamist Group, the PJD.  Proportion of seats in district from large groups ranges from 25% to 75% in 




Model I suggests that, when tested alone, some observable implications of cultural 
modernization theory explains variation in satisfaction with the performance of the parliament 
(See Tables VI. 7. and VI. 8.).  While Algerians with higher economic satisfaction, more liberal 
gender values, greater knowledge of the functioning of the parliament, higher interest in politics, 
and greater overall satisfaction with government performance are more likely to believe the 
parliament is doing a good job, those with higher education, who live in urban areas, and who 
have less interpersonal trust are more likely to believe the parliament is performing well.  
Similarly, in Morocco, while greater interest in politics and satisfaction with government 
performance leads to greater satisfaction with the parliament, greater knowledge of the parliament 
predicts lower satisfaction with its functioning.  These results are inconsistent with many of the 
most important predictions of cultural modernization theory. 
 These results, which suggest that more-educated urban dwellers in Algeria are less 
approving of the job the parliament is doing, are consistent with conventional wisdom in MENA 
politics, but are contrary to what earlier studies suggested about modernity and satisfaction.  
Elections in Algeria and Iran suggest that turnout is lower in urban areas because citizens in these 
areas are more aware of “les enjeux” and, thus, likely to participate in elections.  Lower turnout 
and greater numbers of null votes in urban areas, for example, have characterized Moroccan 
elections since 1963.445 
Most of the variables, however, fail to reach statistical significance of the model of 
satisfaction in Morocco, suggesting a different or perhaps more nuanced picture of satisfaction 
there.  Moroccans who are more interested in politics and more approving of the government are 
generally more likely to be satisfied with the parliament.  Further, the difference in the sign on 
knowledge of the parliament (salience) in the two countries suggests that knowledge builds 
satisfaction in Algeria, but weakens it in Morocco.  Adding more variables to be the model may 
help clarify why this difference exists.   
                                                     






TABLE VI. 7.     Determinants of Satisfaction in Morocco (Model I) 





(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
 
  Fair=2 Good=3 Excellent=4 
Higher education .02(.29) .00(.05) .00(.02) .00(.00) 
Urban residence -.16(.28) -.03(.05) -.01(.02) -.00(.00) 
Higher economic satisfaction .20(.46) .03(.08) .01(.03) .00(.00) 
More liberal values .11(.18) .02(.03) .01(.01) .00(.00) 
Higher interpersonal trust .41(.39) .07(.07) .03(.02) .00(.00) 
Higher knowledge of parliament -1.02(.40)** -.17(.07)** -.06(.03)** -.01(.00)* 
Higher interest in politics 1.01(.27)*** .17(.05)*** .06(.02)*** .01(.00)* 
Higher political satisfaction 2.91(.46)*** .50(.09)*** .18(.03)*** .03(.01)** 
N 636     
LR Chi2 88.63     
Prob. > Chi2 .0000***     
Pseudo R2 .0738     
Log Likelihood -556.081     
p<.05  **  p<.01 ***p<.001 two-tailed test.  Cut points omitted.  Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Poor=1 is the reference group.  1 ∂y/∂x for variable 








TABLE VI. 8.     Determinants of Satisfaction in Algeria (Model I) 





(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
  Fair=2 Good=3 Excellent=4 
Higher education -1.07(.44)* -.19(.07)** -.06(.03)* No obs. 
Urban residence -.98(.49)* -.17(.09)* -.05(.03)*  
Higher economic satisfaction 2.35(.59)*** .41(.11)*** .13(.04)***  
More liberal values .93(.35)** .12(.03)*** .07(.03)*  
Higher interpersonal trust -1.11(.57)* -.20(.10) -.06(.03)  
Higher knowledge of parliament 2.40(.72)*** .42(.12)*** .13(.05)**  
Higher interest in politics 1.34(.52)** .24(.10)* .07(.03)**  
Higher political satisfaction 2.72(.74)*** .48(.14)*** .15(.04)***  
N 504    
LR Chi2 63.70    
Prob. > Chi2 .0000***    
Pseudo R2 .1744    
Log Likelihood -389..89    
* p<.05  **  p<.01 ***p<.001 two-tailed test.  Cut points omitted.  Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Poor=1 is the reference group.  1 ∂y/∂x for 
variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1
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Model II: Position in Structure of Political Power   
 
The first model tested the effect of general satisfaction with government functioning on 
satisfaction with the performance of the parliament (See Tables VI. 9. and VI. 10.).  Model II 
adds measures of one’s position within the structure of political power, demonstrating that in 
Algeria, higher education, urban residence, and lower economic satisfaction are still related to 
lower satisfaction with the parliament, but that the effects of the other variables from Model I are 
no longer statistically significant.  Both having a deputy as a family member or friend and 
knowing the name of a deputy predicts higher satisfaction with the parliament.  The size of the 
effect is greater for having a friend who is a deputy than for simply knowing the name of a deputy 
from one’s district.  
In Morocco, the addition of measures of one’s position in the structure of political power 
suggests that knowing the name of a deputy from one’s district is positively related to satisfaction 
with the parliament, although having a friend who is a deputy is not statistically significant.  
Individuals who hold a less secular view of the relationship between religion and politics and who 
have more confidence in Islamist parties are more likely to be satisfied with the performance of 
the parliament in Morocco, suggesting at least in the short-term, more religious individuals are 
relatively more satisfied with the representation of their interests in parliament.  With the addition 
of more variables, the effect of knowledge of the parliament on satisfaction remains positive in 






TABLE VI. 9.     Determinants of Satisfaction in Morocco (Model II) 





(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
  Fair=2 Good=3 Excellent=4 
Higher education -.16(.36) -.03(.06) -.01(.02) -.00(.00) 
Urban residence .05(.35) .01(.06) .00(.02) .00(.00) 
Higher economic satisfaction .74(.54) .13(.10) .04(.03) .00(.00) 
More liberal values .26(.22) .05(.04) .01(.01) .00(.00) 
Higher interpersonal trust .33(.46) .06(.08) .02(.03) .00(.00) 
Higher knowledge of parliament -.91(.49) -.16(.09) -.05(.03) -.00(.00) 
Higher interest in politics .15(.35) .03(.06) .01(.02) .00(.00) 
Higher political satisfaction 3.00(.55)*** .53(.11)*** .17(.04)***  .02(.01)* 
Female  .17(.22) .03(.04) .01(.01) .00(.00) 
Higher social religiosity -.55(.45) -.10(.08) -.03(.03) -.00(.00) 
Higher political religiosity .89(.43)* .16(.08)* .05(.02)* .00(.00) 
Higher confidence in Islamic parties 2.42(.40)*** .43(.08)*** .14(.03)*** .01(.01)* 
Know name of deputy .66(.21)** .11(.04)** .04(.02)** .00(.00) 
Have deputy friend .25(.38) .04(.07) .02(.03) .00(.00) 
N 495    
LR Chi2 132.61    
Prob. > Chi2 .0000***    
Pseudo R2 .1427    
Log Likelihood -398.335    
p<.05  **  p<.01 ***p<.001 two-tailed test.  Cut points omitted.  Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Poor=1 is the reference group.  1 ∂y/∂x for variable means, change 







TABLE VI. 10.     Determinants of Satisfaction in Algeria (Model II) 





(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
  Fair=2 Good=3 Excellent=4 
Higher education -1.18(.51)* -.25(.10)* -.04(.02) No obs. 
Urban residence -1.40(.56)** -.29(.12)* -.05(.02)*  
Higher economic satisfaction 2.16(.63)*** .45(.13)*** .08(.03)**  
More liberal values .49(.42) .10(.07) .02(.02)  
Higher interpersonal trust -.38(.60) -.08(.13) -.01(.02)  
Higher knowledge of parliament 1.15(.80) .24(.16) .04(.03)  
Higher interest in politics .99(.62) .21(.13) .04(.02)  
Higher political satisfaction 2.03(.93)* .43(.20)* .07(.03)*  
Female  -.06(.28) -.01(.06) -.00(.01)  
Higher social religiosity .47(.62) .10(.13) .02(.02)  
Higher political religiosity -.24(.85) -.05(.18) -.01(.03)  
Higher confidence in Islamic parties .27(.59) .06(.12) .01(.02)  
Know name of deputy .51(.26)* .11(.05)* .01(.01)  
Have deputy friend .92(.44)* .16(.06)** .05(.03)  
N 410    
LR Chi2 62.34    
Prob. > Chi2 .0000***    
Pseudo R2 .1458    
Log Likelihood -308.251    
p<.05  **  p<.01 ***p<.001 two-tailed test.  Cut points omitted.  Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Poor=1 is the reference group.  1 ∂y/∂x for variable 




Model III: Legislators as Links   
 
Finally, how do perceptions of, and experiences with, deputies add to an understanding of 
why some individuals view the parliament in a favorable light than do others?  Model III suggests 
that once the full model is considered for Algeria, the only variable from cultural modernization 
theory which predicts variation either way in satisfaction with the parliament is economic 
satisfaction, which is positively related to satisfaction with the parliament (See Tables VI. 11. and 
VI. 12.).  Knowing a member of parliament, having more favorable evaluations of the job 
deputies from one’s district are doing, and having more favorable perceptions of elections and 
casework operations predict higher satisfaction with the parliament.  The latter effect suggests the 
importance of political outputs of institutions—how well democratic reform is reflected in 
elections and the constituency service efforts of deputies—in determining one’s short-term 
satisfaction with the parliament.  However, these results suggest that satisfaction is part of a 
syndrome of more general satisfaction with how one is doing economically and politically under 
the current regime.  
In Morocco, the results for the first seven variables in the full model are similar to those 
for Algeria: satisfaction with overall government functioning predicts satisfaction with the 
parliament.  Position in the structure of power is also important, however.  Knowing the name of 
a member of parliament from one’s district predicts higher satisfaction.  However, higher 
confidence in Islamist parties also predicts satisfaction, suggesting those who prefer religious 
parties are more confident in, and satisfied with, the parliament.  In Morocco, the PJD is regarded 
by many citizens and western observers as being the most internally democratic and hard-
working political party.  As in Algeria, both more favorable evaluations of the job deputies from 
one’s district are doing, and having more favorable as well as perceptions of that elections and 
casework operations, are more transparent and democratic predict higher satisfaction with the 
parliament.  Further, individuals who do not enjoy a direct or indirect personal connection with a 
member but, nevertheless, have had contact with a member in at least one of the six ways are also 






TABLE VI. 11.     Determinants of Satisfaction in Morocco (Model III) 





(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
  Fair=2 Good=3 Excellent=3 
Higher education -.22(.41) -.04(.08) -.01(.02) -.00(.00) 
Urban residence .30(.43) .06(.08) .01(.02) .00(.00) 
Higher economic satisfaction .46(.59) .09(.11) .02(.02) .00(.00) 
More liberal values .31(.25) .06(.05) .01(.01) .00(.00) 
Higher interpersonal trust .23(.51) .04(.10) .01(.02) .00(.00) 
Higher knowledge of parliament -.61(.54) -.12(.11) -.02(.02) -.00(.00) 
Higher interest in politics -.36(.40) -.07(.08) -.01(.02) -.00(.00) 
Higher political satisfaction 2.96(.62)*** .57(.13)*** .12(.03)*** .01(.01)* 
Female  .13(.24) .02(.05) .01(.01) .00(.00) 
Higher social religiosity -.78(.49) -.15(.10) -.03(.02) -.00(.00) 
Higher political religiosity .69(.46) .13(.09) .03(.02) .00(.00) 
Higher confidence in Islamic parties 2.19(.45)*** .42(.09)*** .09(.02)*** .01(.00)* 
Know name of deputy .68(.25)** .13(.05)** .03(.01)* .00(.00) 
Have deputy friend .22(.42) .04(.08) .01(.02) .00(.00) 
Better evaluation members  2.49(.57)*** .48(.12)*** .10(.03)*** .01(.01)* 
Better perception elections 2.78(.57)*** .54(.12)*** .11(.03)*** .01(.01)* 
Higher average caseloads .32(.38) .06(.07) .01(.01) .00(.00) 
Satisfying casework resolution -.03(.50) -.01(.10) -.00(.02) -.00(.00) 
Contact, no connection with deputy 1.05(.36)** .19(.06)*** .06(.03)* .01(.00) 
Percentage large parties in district -1.36(.78) -.26(.15) -.05(.03) -.01(.00) 
N 444    
LR Chi2 170.28    
Prob. > Chi2 .0000***    
Pseudo R2 .2041    
Log Likelihood -332.017    
p<.05  **  p<.01 ***p<.001 two-tailed test.  Cut points omitted.  Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Poor=1 is the reference group.  1 ∂y/∂x for variable 






TABLE VI. 12.     Determinants of Satisfaction in Algeria (Model III) 





(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
  Fair=2 Good=3 Excellent=4 
Higher education -.01(.67) -.00(.15) -.00(.02) No obs. 
Urban residence -.84(.82) -.19(.18) -.02(.02)  
Higher economic satisfaction 1.55(.72)* .35(.16)* .04(.02)  
More liberal values -.22(.45) -.05(.10) -.01(.01)  
Higher interpersonal trust .32(.70) .07(.16) .01(.02)  
Higher knowledge of parliament 1.00(.82) .22(.18) .03(.02)  
Higher interest in politics .25(.64) .06(.14) .01(.02)  
Higher political satisfaction 1.41(1.16) .31(.26) .04(.03)  
Female  -.44(.32) -.10(.07) -.01(.01)  
Higher social religiosity .51(.72) .11(.16) .01(.02)  
Higher political religiosity -.08(.97) -.02(.22) -.00(.02)  
Higher confidence in Islamic parties .45(.63) .10(.14) .01(.02)  
Know name of deputy .57(.32) .13(.07) .02(.01)  
Have deputy friend .38(.46) .08(.09) .01(.02)  
Better evaluation members 3.86(1.24)** .86(.30)** .10(.03)**  
Better perception elections 2.65(.86)** .59(.19)*** .07(.04)  
Higher average caseloads -1.20(.92) -.27(.21) -.03(.02)  
Satisfying casework resolution -.00(.81) -.00(.18) -.00(.02)  
Contact, no connection with deputy .03(.31) .01(.07) .00(.01)  
Percentage large parties in district -.21(1.44) -.05(.32) -.01(.04)  
N 353    
LR Chi2 89.47    
Prob. > Chi2 .0000***    
Pseudo R2 .2153    
Log Likelihood -243.885    
p<.05  **  p<.01 ***p<.001 two-tailed test.  Cut points omitted.  Standard Errors are in parentheses.  Poor=1 is the reference group.  1 ∂y/∂x for variable 
means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1 
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Summary of Models of Satisfaction (Specific Support) 
 
The results of the three sets of models suggest strongly that cultural modernization theory 
in incapable of explaining variation in satisfaction with the parliament.  When considered alone 
(Model I), the results contradict the theory in Algeria and fail to reach statistical significance in 
Morocco.   
 A second finding is that one’s personal position within the structure of political power is 
a predictor of satisfaction with the legislature, but only in Morocco.   
Third, more religious individuals and those who are more supportive of Islamist parties 
are most satisfied with the parliament in Morocco, perhaps owing to the more robust performance 
of Islamist parties when compared with regime “façade” parties. 
 A fourth finding is that satisfaction in both countries is shaped by positive evaluations of 
the job deputies from one’s district are doing, even if measures of average caseloads in the direct 
and having had a satisfying casework request resolution do not predict higher satisfaction in 
either country.  Further, satisfaction also appears to be shaped by perceptions that elections are 
more transparent elections and deputy-citizen relationship less susceptible to clientelism.  This 
effect suggests that members act as links to shape political attitudes of citizens; in this case, 
satisfaction.   
 
Diffuse Support for the Parliament 
 
 More importantly, however, how does position within the political structure and 
experiences with legislators shape diffuse support for having a strong parliament?   
 
Model IV: Cultural Modernization Theory 
 
Unsurprisingly, greater interest in politics increases diffuse support for the parliament in 
Algeria.  Those individuals who hold more liberal gender values are more likely to be satisfied 
with the parliament, but less supportive of having a parliament with the power to make laws.  
This finding suggests that, with only seven regressors considered, democratic values do not 
necessarily lead to confidence that a strong parliament will best serve the nation.  Instead, these 
individuals may have more confidence in the post-conflict Algeria in a strong leader.   
 In Morocco, those in urban areas are more likely to support having a strong parliament as 
are those who have a higher interest in politics.  In general, these findings are not inconsistent 
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with findings from previous studies in the 1970s and 1980s, which suggested that modernity 
predicted support for a strong parliament. 
  
Model V: Position in the Structure of Political Power  
 
The addition of five more regressors suggests that less liberal gender values and greater 
knowledge of the parliament are related in Algeria.  However, here, confidence in Islamist 
political parties also plays a significant role in support for having a strong parliament.   
 Similarly, in Morocco, higher support for having a parliament with the power to make 
laws is more common among individuals living in urban areas, those who are more religious, and 
those who have higher confidence in Islamist parties.  Unlike for satisfaction in the parliament, 
the impact of religiously on diffuse support for the parliament is constant in both countries.  
  
Model VI:  Legislators as Links  
 
In Algeria, the full model reveals that greater interest in politics and higher satisfaction 
with general government functioning are positively related to support.  Higher education and 
more liberal values are negatively related to support, however (See Tables VI. 13. and VI. 14.).  
This result suggests that those who we might think would be most likely to support having a 
strong parliament—a key democratic reform—show less confidence in having a strong 
parliament.   
Those who adhere to a less secular view of the relationship between religion and politics, 
and have greater confidence in Islamist parties, are more likely to support a strong parliament.  It 
is notable that this effect holds not only for Islamist parties, but also for confidence in other 
parties.  Views that elections and the deputy-citizen relationship are more transparent and open 
are related to higher support for the parliament.  This result is consistent with historical evidence 
which creates a link between the belief that elections are free and fair and the development of the 
parliamentary system in Europe.446   
Although this is one way to conceive of legislators as links between the outcome of elite-
level bargaining and popular political ideas, other measures suggest that this link may not 
promote support for a strong, democratic parliament.  Both the average number of requests taken 
in one’s district and the percent of deputies belonging to the majority party in one’s district (FLN) 
are negatively related to individual-level support for the parliament.  Because of the patronage 
                                                     
446 See, for example, Herb, "Princes, Parliaments, and the Prospects for Democracy in the Gulf." 
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system favors pro-regime deputies, these deputies may be more effective at solving problems.  
Individuals in districts where more casework is performed appear to be less likely to support a 
strong parliament.  This result suggests that constituency service, rather than being a new, open 
form of representation, may instead be a continuation of patronage patterns which existed prior to 
liberalization.   
 As in Algeria, those who adhere to a less secular view of the relationship between 
religion and politics, and have greater confidence in Islamist parties, are most likely to support a 
strong parliament.  Views that elections and the deputy-citizen relationship are more transparent 
and open are also related to higher support for the parliament.   
Further, the puzzling, though somewhat intuitive relationship between districts with more 
average casework requests and lower support for the parliament also exists in Morocco.  It may 
be that where members are more effective in solving requests, they may be part of a larger 
government apparatus which is efficient at solving problems of citizens.  Individuals in those 
districts may be more pro-regime and, thus, less supportive of the parliament.  Or, it may be that 
efficient resolution of particularized demands—clientalist or otherwise—depresses support for 
democratic reform in ways which may be key to understanding the operation of authoritarian 
politics.  Individuals from districts with different configurations of political parties, including 
high proportions of deputies from majority parties, are not more or less likely to support a strong 
parliament.  This may be because there are a larger number of political parties elected in smaller 
districts, or because deputies are mainly part of an elite class and less likely to differ from one 
another in their ability to solve casework requests.  There were fewer examples in Morocco than 
in Algeria of deputies who expressed an inability to contact members of the government at the 






TABLE VI. 13.     Determinants of Diffuse Support in Morocco 
Model Estimated Logit Coefficients Marginal Effects
1 
(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
 Model IV Model V Model VI Model IV Model V Model VI 
Higher education -.23(.43) -.06(.51) .01(.58) -.06(.10) -.01(.12) .00(.14) 
Urban residence .89(.40)* 1.09(.48)* .67(.62) .22(.10)* .26(.12)* .16(.15) 
Higher economic satisfaction -.18(.69) .33(.80) .89(.92) -.04(.17) .08(.19) .22(.22) 
More liberal values -.27(.25) -.16(.32) -.19(.35) -.07(.06) -.04(.08) -.05(.09) 
Higher interpersonal trust .23(.52) .06 (.62) .43(.71) .06(.13) .02(.15) .11(.17) 
Higher knowledge of parliament -.81(.59) -1.00(.72) -1.19(.80) -.20(.14) -.24(.17) -.29(.19) 
Higher interest in politics 1.34(.39)*** .88(.47) .76(.52) .32(.09)*** .21(.11) .19(.13) 
Higher political satisfaction -.77(.65) -1.27(.78) -.83(.92) -.19(.16) -.31(.19) -.20(.22) 
Female - -.35(.30) -.64(.33)* - -.09(.07) -.16(.08)* 
Higher social religiosity - .14(.62) .70(.69) - .03(.15) .17(.17) 
Higher political religiosity - 1.94 (.59)*** 1.64(.65)* - .47(.14)*** .40(.16)** 
Higher confidence in Islamic parties - 1.78(.55)*** 1.38(.63)* - .43(.13)*** .34(.15)* 
Know name of deputy - .28(.32) .15(.36) - .07(.08) .04(.09) 
Have deputy friend - -.63(63) .97(.71) - .14(.13) .21(.13) 
Better evaluation members - - 3.15(1.42)* - - .77(.35)* 
Better perception elections - - .46(.74) - - .11(.18) 
Higher average caseloads - - -2.13(.60)*** - - -.52(.15)*** 
Satisfying casework resolution - - -.53(.95) - - -.13(.24) 
Contact, no connection with deputy - - -.88(.55) - - -.22(.13) 
Percentage large parties in district - - .01(1.00) - - .00(.24) 
Constant 08(.80) -1.83 (1.17) -2.35(1.52) - - - 
N 325 268 242    
LR Chi2 18.96 49.29 62.99    
Prob. > Chi2 .0151* .0000*** .0000***    
Pseudo R2 .0430 .1346 .1896    
Log Likelihood -211.115 -158.415     






TABLE VI. 14.     Determinants of Diffuse Support in Algeria 




(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome) 
 Model IV Model V Model VI Model IV Model V Model VI 
Higher education -.30(.66) -.80(.73) -3.92(1.16)*** -.04(.09) -.11(.10) -.31(.09)*** 
Urban residence -.36(.76) .02(.83) -.02(1.03) -.05(.10) .00(.12) -.00(.09) 
Higher economic satisfaction -1.07(.97) -.47(.95) .54(.94) -.15(.14) -.07(.13) .04(.07) 
More liberal values -1.92(.52)*** -2.07(.79)** -2.43(.85)** -.38(.12)*** -.42(.18)* -.39(.21) 
Higher interpersonal trust .27(1.12) -1.00(1.08) -1.67(1.36) .04(.16) -.14(.15) -.13(.11) 
Higher knowledge of parliament 1.77(1.15) 2.99(1.31)* 1.76(1.23) .24(.16) .42(.18)* .14(.10) 
Higher interest in politics 2.34(.82)** 1.91(1.15) 6.24(1.70)** .32(.12)** .27(.17) .49(.14)*** 
Higher political satisfaction 1.47(.95) -.41(1.11) -4.01(1.93)* .20(.13) -.06(.16) -.31(.15)* 
Female - -.02(.49) .77(.60) - -.00(.07) .06(.05) 
Higher social religiosity - 1.18(1.19) 3.98(1.35)** - .16(.17) .31(.11)** 
Higher political religiosity - -1.88(1.03) -1.34(1.10) - -.26(.15) -.10(.09) 
Higher confidence in Islamic 
parties 
- 4.59(1.06)*** 3.39(1.16)** - .64(.15)*** .26(.10)* 
Know name of deputy - -.89(.52) .09(.63) - -.13(.08) .01(.04) 
Have deputy friend - .99(.97) .04(.87) - .10(.07) .00(.07) 
Better evaluation members - - -3.91(2.55) - - -.30(.21) 
Better perception elections - - 3.57(1.40)** - - .28(.12)* 
Higher average caseloads - - -4.18(1.42)** - - -.33(.12)** 
Satisfying casework resolution - - 1.36(1.12) - - .07(.04) 
Contact, no connection with 
deputy 
- - -1.35(.80) - - -.12(.06) 
Percentage large parties in 
district 
- - -8.49(3.46)* - - -.66(.29)* 
Constant -.54(1.37) -1.95(1.70) 5.57(3.03) - - - 
N 237 193 151    
LR Chi2 33.65 38.77 45.50    
Prob. > Chi2 .0000*** .0004*** .0009***    
Pseudo R2 .1404 .2449 .3707    
Log Likelihood -103.542 -80.670 -49.690    
* p<.05  **  p<.01 ***p<.001 two-tailed test; Standard errors are in parentheses; 1 ∂y/∂x for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1.
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Discussion and Implications 
 
Contrary to my expectations at the start of the project, the results cast doubt on the 
contention that members’ efforts to serve citizens build support for a parliament with the power to 
make laws.  Under conditions of patronage, what appears to build support is not casework, but 
Islamist opposition, or, more specifically, confidence in a political party which provides 
alternative policy programs.  Confidence in other political parties, which is not included in the 
models but was tested as an alternative, was also associated with greater support for having a 
strong parliament. 
Further, the results suggest that efforts to improve the transparency and fairness of 
elections and to address clientalism in the deputy-citizen relationship may be the single most 
important way to build support for a stronger parliament in Morocco and Algeria.  
Responsiveness to particularized demands may build support for democracy and democratic 
institutions but only to the extent that citizens view casework as open to all.  Otherwise, it may 
simply perpetuate the system of rents that existed prior to liberalization of the parliament.  In a 
similar way, Melissa Thomas and Oumar Sissokho suggest that alternance has not changed the 
patron-client system, and may even have made it worse in Senegal.447   
This result suggests a significant break from theories of support in other developing 
country systems (e.g. the institutionalization literature) in favor of a patron-client paradigm which 
allows for the possibility that the actions of members neither bolster confidence in a stronger 
parliament, nor contribute to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes.  What is remarkable is that 
the determinants of support are similar in the two countries, despite the fact that the political 
systems are quite different.   
Finally, the results suggest that political attitudes are shaped by changes in the political 
environment.  They suggest that legislators act as links, shaping popular attitudes in 
consequential, though perhaps counterintuitive, ways.  Given institutional opportunities and 
constraints, it is not self-evident that members automatically enhance the prospect of democratic 
transition by improving popular support for the legislature.  Rather, it seems more likely that they 
depress popular support for giving the parliament more power and, thus, contribute to the 
inability of the opposition to press incumbents for stronger parliamentary prerogatives in future 
rounds of bargaining.   
 
                                                     
447 Melissa A. Thomas and Oumar Sissokho, "Liaison Legislature: The Role of the National Assembly in 
Senegal," Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 1 (2005).: 111. 
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The Representation and Patron-Client Paradigms 
 
Finally, the results suggest that studies of and programs related to casework ought to 
consider the possibility that casework is generally clientelistic and best viewed through the prism 
of a patron-client model.  The findings also suggest that the representation paradigm is 
appropriate for cases of parliamentary politics in settings of electoral authoritarianism, but only in 
limited and specific ways.  When it is not clientelistic, casework can be regarded as a form of 
representation, but it does not make a parliamentary system representative.  In other words, even 
when casework is particularistic and not clientalistic, it is not sufficient to make the parliamentary 
system as a whole representative.  In a democracy, casework may be one function of a member, 
but it is certainly not a substitute for policy responsiveness in a legislative system which is 
accountable to the electorate.  Further, in most developed democracies, high casework volume 
developed only in the last fifty years.  Citizens require more of their elected officials than the 
occasional intervention with a personal problem, no matter how great.   
The limited extent to which casework fits a representation model is illustrated by 
evidence that particularistic benefits alone do not make citizens more certain that they want a 
parliament with the power to make laws.  Until the parliament breaks out the status quo of 
electoral manipulation, patronage, and corruption in which it has been mired for decades, robust 










Policy Implications for Legislative Strengthening Programs under New Authoritarianism  
 
 
Legislative Strengthening Programs 
 
More than fifty years after President Woodrow Wilson first campaigned for a strong role 
of U.S. foreign policy in the spread of democratic governance, a host of public and private 
organizations have coalesced to form an international democracy promotion regime which boasts 
a combined annual budget of two billion dollars.448  The emergence of democracy as the 
                                                     
448 Following from collective understanding in the field of International Relations, Stephen D. Krasner 
defines an international regime as an “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.  Stephen 
D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).: 2.  Regimes embody 
both formal organizations as well as informal norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures.  
Eric C. Bjornlund provides a history of the expansion and internalization of democracy promotion from its 
birth as an American foreign policy objective to its explicit linkage with human rights and international law 
by the UN General Assembly, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Commonwealth, 
and a number of other multilateral and nongovernmental organizations.  Eric C. Bjornlund, Beyond Free 
and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2004).: Chapter 2.  See also Thomas Carothers, ed., Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy 
Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).  Thomas Carothers, 
"A Quarter-Century of Promoting Democracy," Journal of Democracy 18, no. 4 (2007).  For work on 
democracy promotion in the Middle East, see Ronald D. Asmus, Larry Diamond, Mark Leonard, and 
Michael McFaul, "A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle 
East," The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2005).,  Katerina Dalacoura, "Us Democracy Promotion in the 
Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: A Critique," International Afrairs 81, no. 5 (2005)., and  
Guney and Celenk, "The European Union's Democracy Promotion Policies in Algeria: Success or Failure?" 
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“preeminently acceptable form of governance” underlies a host of initiatives which aim to 
strengthen the capacity of civil society, electoral mechanisms, and free media in newly 
democratizing countries, as well as in many authoritarian regimes.449   
A new and rapidly-expanding area of democracy promotion activities focuses on 
legislative strengthening.  The USAID agency, the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the 
European Union (EU), Elections Canada, and a host of other multilateral organizations and 
developed democracies have programs which assist national, regional, and local legislatures to 
more effectively fulfill the complex roles of independent and effective lawmaking institutions.  
From Algeria to Pakistan and from Albania to Paraguay, parliamentary assistance projects 
provide technical and training programs to improve areas of legislative practice as diverse as 
constituent relations, document minutes of parliamentary sessions, promote e-governance, and 
improve the relationship between the parliament and the press.450  
The importance of strengthening legislatures as part of democracy promotion activities is 
increasingly recognized by governance experts.  Hugh Roberts asserts that the failure of US 
organizations to address the subordination of the legislature to the executive remains a key gap in 
democracy promotion efforts.  In his view, an empowered legislature—one which plays an 
independent role in legislation and provides oversight of the executive and bureaucracy—will 
create internal pressure for free and fair elections because it increases the incentives for social 
groups to seek representation in and through it.451   
 
Obstacles to Parliamentary Support Programs 
    
Parliamentary support programs face at least two types of obstacles.  The first is the lack 
of systematic research relevant to parliamentary projects in authoritarian settings.  Thomas 
Carothers notes that while practitioners develop rich practical knowledge, little scholarly 
research, beyond a body of reflective pieces on key debates in democracy promotion, is available 
                                                     
449 Quote from Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 (1999).: 
3.  See also  Programme, Parliamentary Development: Practice Note ([cited).   
450 See for example, National Conference of State Legislatures, International Technical Assistance Projects 
(2007 [cited January 15, 2008); available from http://www.ncsl.org/public/internat/Technical.htm.  
Programme, Parliamentary Development: Practice Note ([cited).   
451 Hugh Roberts, "Rethinking Democracy Promotion in the Middle East," in Rethinking Democracy 
Promotion in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Project on Middle East Democracy, United Institute of 
Peace, January 16, 2008). 
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to guide the efforts of practitioners.452  Further, although books on the history and politics of 
election monitoring, media support, and civil society assistance programs are available, no 
parallel volume exists on legislative strengthening.453  In addition to the dearth of program 
evaluations on parliamentary support projects, there is a corresponding lack of studies which shed 
light on the dynamics by which institutions operate in authoritarian nations.  Without such 
research it is difficult to make an informed judgment about whether legislative strengthening 
projects should be continued when they appear to have largely cosmetic effects.454  Further, this 
gap leaves practitioners with little distilled information about how to improve these programs in 
the short-term.455 
 The second, and more consequential, obstacle to parliamentary support projects stems 
from the rise of “new authoritarianism”.  These regimes tout democratic rhetoric, but are neither 
democracies nor democratizing.  Instead, they enact shallow and deceptive political reforms to 
boost waning legitimacy without changing the underlying structure of political power.456   
New authoritarianism presents unique obstacles to parliamentary support projects 
because regime power brokers seek to enhance the visibility of elections and parliaments while 
preventing them from functioning in a transparent and democratic manner. Governments may 
face incentives to engage in parliamentary support projects in order to gain resources and 
opportunities for members and staff, or to lessen international pressure for democratic reform.  
However, new authoritarian regimes “box clever”, in the words of Hugh Roberts, limiting and 
manipulating programs in order to maintain an incipient parliament.457  Mona El-Ghobashy has 
                                                     
452 Carothers, ed., Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion.  Examples of important pieces 
include those concerning the gradualism versus sequencing debate and democracy promotion community’s 
response to the seminal work of Carothers on the “End of the Transitions Paradigm”.  See also Thomas 
Carothers, "Misunderstanding Gradualism," Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3 (2007)., Thomas Carothers, 
"The "Sequencing" Fallacy," Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007)., Kenneth Wollack, "Debating the 
Transition Paradigm: Retaining the Human Dimension," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 3 (2002)., Thomas 
Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002). 
453 Krishna Kumar, Promoting Independent Media: Strategies for Democracy Assistance (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).  Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building 
Democracy. 
454 This lack of information is also reflected in debates over “electoralist” and “anti-electoralist”, 
sequencing versus gradualism in the literature, and other issues within the democracy promotion 
community which, thus far, rely on rich practical knowledge from the field, but few cross-national studies 
of political institutions under authoritarianism.  See also Clark, "Why Elections Matter?" 
455 Packenham argued that technical assistance programs should not be undertaken until a better 
understanding of the political consequences of legislatures is better understood.  Although this body of 
literature has grown since 1970, it is still insufficient.  See Packenham, "Legislatures and Political 
Development." 
456 Diamond, "Elections without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.", Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise 
of Illiberal Democracy," Journal of Democracy 76, no. 6 (1997). 




highlighted the ways in which the Egyptian Parliament accepts programs which enhance the 
parliamentary library and digitize the minutes of parliamentary sessions.458  These strategies limit 
legislative strengthening programs to narrow, politically achievable programs which emphasize 
technical support and training projects.  However, the projects fail to address the core governance 
issues; namely, flawed elections and a weak and controlled parliament which lacks an 
independent role in oversight and policymaking.459   
Fish has shown that weak prerogatives of the legislature have consequences for the 
success or failure of democratic transition and consolidation.  I have argued that failure to address 
weak and corrupt parliaments also has implications for public demand for a stronger legislature, 
which, I suggest is a contextual factor in future rounds of elite-level bargaining over the 
distribution of domestic power between the branches of government. 
  
What Builds Support for a Strong Legislature? 
 
I argued in Chapter 6 that programmatic benefits and institutional outcomes (e.g. 
transparent elections), not particularistic benefits, enhance popular support for a parliament with 
stronger prerogatives.  Having had a casework request resolved in a satisfactory manner or having 
had contact with a deputy in the district, whether through a personal connection or through some 
other non-direct interaction (e.g. at a meeting or party office), is not associated greater support for 
a strong parliament in either country.  These findings cast doubt on the argument in the legislative 
institutionalization literature that the representative link automatically builds feelings of support 
and appreciation for the legislature and contributes to its strengthening vis-à-vis the executive.   
Instead, the findings strongly support accumulating evidence about the importance of 
positive outputs of institutions for building popular support for democracy and, by extension, 
democratic institutions.  Predictors of support for a parliament with the power to make laws 
include greater confidence in political parties, including Islamist parties; in Morocco, better 
evaluations of the job members are doing and, in Algeria, perceptions of more transparent 
elections and open casework operations.  These findings are consistent with work from several 
regions which links evaluations that institutions are delivering on transparency and democracy 
with more supportive attitudes toward democracy.  
 
                                                     
458 Mona El-Ghobashy, February 15, 2008   
459 Roberts, "Rethinking Democracy Promotion in the Middle East."  Roberts accessed 2008.   
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Implications for the Design of Legislative Strengthening Programs 
 
These results suggest three lessons which could inform the design legislative 
strengthening programs either by suggesting a change of course or by reinforcing the importance 
of particular efforts.  The first implication is that caution might be taken when considering 
programs aimed at improving constituent-deputy relationships in the district if these programs 
focus exclusively on casework.  Programs which focus on improving the provision of 
particularistic benefits, however effective, may not address the real problem of representation, 
which is that the parliamentary system lacks both vertical and horizontal accountability and 
leaves many constituents unconvinced of the importance of achieving a strong parliament.  For 
example, the project which supported local parliamentary offices in Algeria until 2004 may have 
improved the ability of members to provide casework, but it probably did not enhance the ability 
of members to develop alternative policy strategies to deal with the issues at the heart of the 
problems presented to them.   
The second suggestion is that programs must focus on challenging areas of reform which 
include improving the transparency of elections and parties and enhancing the lawmaking and 
oversight powers of the parliament.  As noted, predictors of support for a parliament with the 
power to make laws include greater confidence in Islamist parties (and parties more generally); in 
Morocco, better evaluations of the job members are doing and, in Algeria, a better perception of 
the transparency of elections and the openness of casework operations.  Legislative strengthening 
programs which enhance the capacity of parties to develop alternative policy solutions—even if 
the parliamentary system limits their ability to shape laws—and projects which improve the 
transparency of elections are likely to have the greatest impact on bolstering public support for 
parliament in ways that enable opposition elites to achieve stronger constitutional prerogatives.     
The third implication relates to the importance of encouraging fuller inclusion of 
opposition parties, the development of stronger party systems, and the creation of opportunities 
for debates about public policy.  Opposition parties, in this case, Islamist parties, but also other 
secular parties, play an important role in providing programmatic benefits, representing policy 
positions of marginalized segments of the population, and enhancing demand for a strong 
parliament.  In Morocco, the Islamist opposition enjoys a narrow institutional opening for debate 
which improves competition among the parties to provide alternative policy proposals.  
Confidence in all parties, including in Islamist parties, is positively related to support for a strong 
parliament.  Like other opposition parties, the PJD represents the policy positions of a particular 
segment of marginalized Moroccans.  It is the most religious citizens—those who support a less 
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secular view of the relationship between religion and politics--who are most likely to believe that 
having a parliament with the power to make laws is most appropriate for their countries.  
Exclusion and repression of part of the political spectrum and failure to reform and strengthen 
parties may be detrimental to the development of demand for a more effective and competitive 
parliament institution.  
 
The Rise of New Authoritarianism: Further Considerations for Governance Program 
Priorities and Planning 
 
While there are important reasons for strengthening parliaments, there is, in my 
assessment, a need for caution about whether and how to do so.  
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Evaluating Carefully Whether to Work with Legislatures 
 
First, it is important to evaluate carefully the wisdom of investing funds in legislative 
strengthening in countries in which incumbents lack the political will to develop the parliament 
into an autonomous, influential, and representative institution.460  Mona el-Ghobashy’s comments 
during a recent working session are a case in point.  My own field research also suggests that 
many projects in Morocco and Algeria have contributed to cosmetic changes, such as digitizing 
parliamentary debates and providing equipment for local offices.  While parliaments in Morocco 
and Algeria need technical support over many years to develop the capacity to play an 
independent role in policymaking, improvements may be made in areas which do not challenge 
the basic rules of the game, but afford a certain level of legitimacy to the parliaments’ shallow 
democratization efforts.  Practitioners recognize these limitations and work to overcome them.  
Organizations like NDI and USAID frequently work with parties and civil society as a means by 
which to avoid the limitations of program implementation, for example, in the parliament.   
 
Conditionality: Maximizing the Results of Programs 
 
As a result of the potential for democracy promotion programs to enhance the legitimacy 
and, thus, robustness of authoritarian regimes, the concept of reverse conditionality, or 
conditionality-in-kind, should be, in my view, a part of legislative strengthening programs.  
                                                     




Future funding should only be provided to the extent that tangible progress has been made in 




Policymakers recognize that the public views the parliament as a body without “authority 
and influence” which is undeserving of more power.461  Denoeux and Desfosses argue that: “[t]he 
Moroccan legislature still finds it difficult to shed the damage done to its public credibility by 
three decades (1970s through 1990s) during which elections were manipulated by the Ministry of 
Interior, and during which it failed to assert in many meaningful way[s] any of its core 
constitutional prerogatives.”462     
Unfortunately, the representative link leaves the average citizen unconvinced that the 
parliamentary practices of the past have changed, according to overwhelming interview evidence.  
The results of this project show that public relations efforts, like those engaged recently in both 
countries, are unlikely to produce a level of public support for a strong parliament which can 
positively affect future rounds of bargaining over institutional design.  Instead, certain 
parliamentary support projects may be ineffective at addressing the ways in which partisan 
legislatures contribute to the robustness of authoritarianism.  Even projects which focus on the 
provision of constituency service may not improve support for democratic institutions because 
they do not represent a departure from the political logic which characterized the pre-
liberalization period.  An anonymous interviewee in a study of the Moroccan parliament prepared 
by independent contractors suggested that: “[t]he devaluing of the real work of the deputy, be it 
by ignorance or be it by political calculus, brings limitation to his function and by the same to the 
democratic process.”463  These obstacles make larger questions about how legislatures develop 
and why legislatures may prolong authoritarian rule more exigent.  Politically challenging 
reforms which improve the ability of the parliament to provide programmatic benefits and 
outputs, such as transparency, are necessary to change public perceptions and allow the 
parliament to contribute to democratic progress not stagnation.     
 
                                                     
461 Guilain P. Denoeux and Helen R. Desfosses, "Rethinking the Moroccan Parliament: The Kingdom's 
Legislative Development Imperative," Journal of North African Studies 12, no. 1 (2007).: 80. 
462 Ibid.: 81. 
463 "Strategie De Communication Globale De La Chambre Des Representants,"  (Rabat: Obvision Agence 
































The Constituent Survey 
 
The Algerian and Moroccan constituent surveys are nationally-representative surveys of 
the adult population residing in Algeria and Morocco.  The surveys were conducted from August 
2006 to February 2007.  The sample size is 800 in each country. 
 
First-Stage Sampling: Electoral Districts 
 
 The first-stage sampling unit is the electoral district, as defined by the electoral map for 
legislative elections to the countries’ Houses of Representatives.464  The forty-eight electoral 
districts in Algeria are equivalent to the state (willaya); an additional eight seats are elected 
overseas.  The ninety-one electoral districts in Morocco are drawn within the country’s sixteen 
administrative districts; an additional thirty seats are reserved for women on national lists.  The 
electoral district is used as the first-stage sampling unit in order to permit the data from the 
constituent survey to be matched with data collected from a survey of elected members of the 
lower house of Parliament in Algeria and upper house of Parliament in Morocco (See Table A1. 




Stage 1a.  In Algeria, sixteen of the country’s 48 (domestic) electoral districts were selected 
using random stratified sampling, where the strata were district magnitude and region.  First, the 
districts were listed by order of their magnitude and grouped into three categories: small (four 
seats), medium (five to nine seats), and large (ten to thirty-two seats) districts.  Within each of 
                                                     
464 The Moroccan and Algerian Parliaments are bicameral.  The Algerian National Popular Assembly 
(lower house) comprises of 389 directly-elected members.  The Moroccan Chamber of Representatives 
(upper house) comprises of 325 directly-elected members.  In both countries, legislative elections are 
conducted using a form of closed-list proportional representation in multimember districts.  Districts range 
from 2 to 5 in Morocco, with an additional 30 seats on national lists reserved for women.  Districts range 
from 4-32 in Algeria, with an additional eight seats in overseas districts (e.g. Paris, Cairo, Berlin, etc). 
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these categories, districts were randomly selected such that the proportion or districts selected in 
each category is approximately equal their proportion in the total population of districts.  Thus, 
the probability of selection for any individual member of the adult population is approximately 
equal at stages 1a and 1b. 
 
Stage 1b.  The 16 selected districts were divided into regions.  In Algeria, the regions consist of 
the Center, West, East, and South/Southeast.  Districts were selected from each region at a rate 
approximately proportional to population: Center (one), West (two), East (three), and 
South/Southeast (two).  The reduction of districts from sixteen to eight in Stage 1b respected 
region as a stratum, but, convenience was a consideration in the reduction.  The team sought to 




Stage 1a.  In Morocco, twenty-four of the country’s ninety-one (geographical) electoral districts 
were selected using random stratified sampling, where the stratum was administrative region. 
  
Stage 1b.  The twenty-four selected districts were divided into regions.  In Morocco, the regions 
consist of the Center, North, East, South, and the Moroccan/Western Sahara.  Districts were 
selected from each region at a rate approximately proportionate to population: Center (four), 




TABLE A1. 1.  Constituent Survey Sampling Design 
 
 
 Algeria Morocco 




     Unit Electoral District Electoral District 
     Design Random-Stratified Sampling Random-Stratified Sampling 
     Strata District Magnitude and Region District Magnitude and Region 
     Total Districts 48 91 
     Districts Selected in 1a 16 24 
     Districts Selected in 1b 8 12 




     Unit Individual Individual (Within Household) 
     Design Quota Sampling Random-Stratified Sampling 
     Sample Size 800 800 
     Response Rate 59.2% 75.3% 
   
a Stage 1b is non-random.  Reduction of 16 randomly-selected districts to 8 accomplished 
respects regional distribution but considers also location of interviewing staff for within region 






Stage-Two 2a.  The number of respondents sampled in each eight Algerian districts was 
proportional to that district’s share of the total population in the country.  However, two smaller 
willaya were over-sampled in order to ensure that at least fifty respondents came from each 
selected district.  The number of respondents was thus decreased in Algiers, the largest district.   
 
Stage-Two 2b.  Within the district, individuals were selected using quota sampling, where the 




Stage-Two 2a.  The number of respondents sampled in each twelve Moroccan districts was 




Stage-Two 2b.  Within the district, individuals were selected using random stratified sampling.  
Several dispersed locations were selected followed by streets within these areas.  Once the first 
house was selected, an individual was chosen within the home respecting a series of strata: 
housing type, gender, age, level of education, marital/family status, and socio-professional 
category (including employment status).  The interviewer had a list of required profiles; for 
example, a woman 35-44 years of age, married, with high school education.  If that woman could 
not be found at the first house, the interviewer went to the next home until she could be found, 




 The estimated response rate is 59.2 percent in Algeria and 75.3 percent in Morocco.  
These figures are calculated based upon data provided by interviewers on the number of refusals 
since the previous completed survey.  The modal responses are 1 in Algeria and 0 in Morocco. 
 




General.  There are two potential sources of error resulting from the Algerian sampling design.  
The first is difficult to address with a weighting strategy.  Because of the use of quota sampling, 
the study is characterized by non-random selection of individuals with relationships to 
interviewers.  Cross tabulation of the data suggests that the interviewer is more likely to know the 
name of a deputy for interviews for which the interviewer and the respondent know one another 
well, than for interviews for which the interviewer and the respondent have met only a few times 
or do not know one another at all (p <.016).  Although not statistically significant, the same 
relationship holds for all other forms of contact between the interviewer and Member of 
Parliament.  This suggests that a large numbers of individuals in the sample who know the name 
of a deputy (50 percent) may be over-estimated because the sampling design over-estimates 
family and personal relations of interviewers who themselves may be connected more closely to 
individuals of privileged political standing.  The use of quota sampling is an on-going limitation 
of many nationally-representative social science surveys conducted in Algeria.  Weights have not 




Unequal Probability Weights.  In order to ensure that at least fifty surveys were conducted in 
any one willaya, individuals in two smaller willayat (Tissemsilt and Tamanaraset) were 
oversampled.  These were taken from Algiers, the largest district.  A weight (wreg) was 
calculated to adjust for unequal probability of selection based on electoral district.   
 
Poststratification Weights.  Official statistics suggest that women and less-educated individuals 
were under-represented in the final dataset.  Thus, a weight was calculated for gender (wgender) 
and education level (weduc) based upon official statistics at the national level.  Willaya-level 
statistics are, thus far, unavailable.   
   
Component Weights.  A final weight was computed as the product of the weights for electoral 
district (wreg), gender (wwomen), and education level (weduc).  The resulting weight was 
centered (wcenter2) and the 95-100th percentile trimmed because the range was more than four 
times the average weight; a common rule of thumb (Raghu).  The component weight used in the 
analyses is wcenter3 (See Figure A1. 1.). 
 






















 All Moroccan adults residing in Morocco have theoretically an equal probability of 
selection.  Thus, no weights were calculated. 
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The Member Survey 
 
The Algerian and Moroccan member surveys are representative of the membership of the 
Algerian National Popular Assembly (2002-2007) and the Moroccan Chamber of Deputies (2002-
2007).  The surveys were conducted from August 2005 to May 2007.  The size of the population 
is 389 in Algeria and 325 in Morocco (See Table A1. 2.).  The sample size was 204 in Algeria 
from which 97 responded (response rate of 48 percent); the sample size was 195 in Morocco from 
which 112 responded (response rate of 57 percent).465   
 
TABLE A. 2. Member Survey Sampling Design 
 
 
 Algeria Morocco 
   
First Fifty Percent of Sample 
 
     Unit Member Member 
     Design Random-Stratified Sampling Random-Stratified Sampling 
     Strata Party Parliamentary Group 
     Number Members Selected 102 97 
     Over-Sampled Units Parties with Less than Eight 
Percent of Seats and Women 
Parliamentary Groups with 
Less than Eight Percent of 
Seats and Women 
   
Second Fifty Percent of Sample 
 
     Unit (All Members In) Electoral 
District  
(All Members In) Electoral 
District 
     Design Cluster Sampling Cluster Sampling 
     Strata Region and Population of 
District 
Region and Population of 
District 
     Number Members Selected 102 98 
     Number Districts Selected 16 24 
   
Total Members Selected 220 195 
a Stage 1b is non-random.  Reduction of 16 randomly-selected districts to 8 accomplished 
respects regional distribution but considers also location of interviewing staff for within region 
selection.   
 
 
                                                     
465 Response rates are approximate. 
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Selection of First Fifty Percent of Sample: Members by Party/Parliamentary Group 
 
 The first half of the sample was drawn by randomly selecting a known proportion of each 
party (Algeria) and parliamentary group (Morocco).  All women were selected, as were members 
of all parties in Algeria with 21 or fewer seats (5 percent) and parliamentary groups with 21 or 
fewer seats in Morocco (6 percent) (See Table A1. 3.).   
 
TABLE A. 3. Member Survey Sampling by Party/Parliamentary Group 
 








Algeria     
   FLN 199 .51 64 .32 
   RND 47 .12 26 .55 
   Islah 43 .11 26 .60 
   HMS 38 .10 26 .68 
   Independent 30 .08 60 1.00 
   Workers Party 21 .05 21 1.00 
   FNA 8 .02 8 1.00 
   En-Nahda 1 .002 1 1.00 
   PRA 1 .002 1 1.00 
   MEN 1 .002 1 1.00 
Total 389 100 Percent 204 100 Percent 
     
Morocco     
   MP 72 .22 34 .22 
   Istiqlal 60 .18 28 .18 
   USFP 48 .15 23 .15 
   PJD 42 .13 20 .13 
   RNI 39 .12 19 .12 
   CD 28 .09 14 .09 
   Socialist Alliance 21 .06 21 1.00 
   FFD 8 .02 8 1.00 
   Unified Socialist Left 3 .009 3 1.00 
   Alliance of Freedoms 1 .003 1 1.00 
   No Affiliation 7 .02 7 1.00 
Total 325 100 Percent 195 100 Percent 
 
 
Selection of Second Fifty Percent of Sample: All Members in Selected Electoral Districts 
 
 Next, sixteen Algerian and twelve Moroccan electoral districts were selected using 
random stratified sampling, where region and population/district magnitude were the strata.  
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These districts are the same as those used in sampling in the constituent survey.  All members 
from these districts were added to the sample. 
 
Weights Compensating for Unequal Probability of Selection of Individuals 
 
 Weighting was necessary to adjust for the unequal probability of selection of members by 
party size and gender.  There were no outliers in the weights in either country; therefore, no 
trimming was done (See Figures A1. 2. and A1. 3.). 
 














































Respondents in Qualitative Interviews 
 
 




TABLE A2. 1. Members Interviews in Morocco 
 
Number Gender Age Party Place/Region Date 
1 M 40-49 USFP Rabat January 2006 
2  M 40-49 USFP Rabat April 2006 
3  M 50-59 PJD Rabat July 2006 
4  M 70-79 USFP Marrakech May 2006 
5 M 60-69 Istiqlal Rabat September 
2005 
6  M 50-59 USFP Rabat April 2006 
7  F 50-59 FFD Rabat January 2006 
8  M 60-69 PJD Rabat January 2006 
9  M 50-59 Istiqlal Rabat June 2006 
10  M 50-59 USFP Rabat May 2007 
11  M 60-69 USFP North November 
2006 
12 M 50-59 Istiqlal East March 2007 
13  M 70-79 Alliance South June 2006 
14 M 50-59 MP Rabat May 2006 
15 M 60-69 USFP Rabat September 
2005 
16 M 50-59 CD Rabat August 2006 
17  M 50-59 USFP Rabat April 2006 
18  M 60-69 Alliance Rabat July 2006 
19 M 50-59 USFP Rabat July 2006 
20 M 60-69 PJD Rabat May 2007 
21 M 60-69 PJD Rabat May 2007 
22  M 70-79 MP Rabat May 2007 





TABLE A2. 2. Constituent Interviews in Morocco 
 
Number Gender Age Function Place Date 
1 M 40-49 Unemployed Tangiers July 2006 
2 M 40-49 Unknown South November 
2006 
3 F 30-39 Unemployed Casablanca July 2007 
4 F 40-49 Unemployed Rabat July 2007 
5 M 50-59 Driver Casablanca July 2007 
6 F 40-49 Teacher Khemmiset May 2006 
7  M 20-29 Employee Rabat May 2007 
8  M 40-49 Government 
Employee 
Rabat May 2007 
9  F 20-29 Student Rabat May 2007 
 
 
TABLE A2. 3. Observer Interviews in Morocco 
 
Number Gender Age Function Place Date 
1 M 50-59 Consultant Rabat June 2007 
2  F 30-39 NGO Staff Rabat September 
2005 
3  F 50-59 NGO Staff Rabat July 2006 
4  M 40-49 Journalist Rabat July 2006 
5  M 20-29 Student Rabat May 2007 
6  M 20-29 NGO Staff Rabat  May 2007 
7  M 50-59 Professor Rabat June 2006  







TABLE A2. 4.  Members Interviews in Algeria 
 
Number Gender Age Party Place Date 
1  M 40-49 RND Algiers December 
2005 
2  M 50-59 FLN Algiers March 2007 
3 M 60-69 El-Islah Algiers December 
2005 
4  M 60-69 El-Islah Algiers March 2005 
5  M 50-59 Independent Algiers May 2006 
6  M 60-69 Independent Setif June 2004 
7  M 50-59 MSP Algiers June 2004 
8 F 50-59 RND Algiers June 2004 
9  M 60-69 Islah Algiers August 2006 
10 M 50-59 PT Algiers July 2006 
11  M 50-59 FLN Algiers May 2006 
12  M 50-59 MSP Algiers December 
2005 
13  M 40-49 Islah Algiers May 2006 
14 M 40-49 Islah Algiers May 2006 
15 M 50-59 MSP Algiers July 2006 
16  M 40-49 Independent Algiers May 2006 
17  M 50-59 Islah Algiers December 
2005 and July 
2006 
18  M 40-49 FLN Algiers April 2007 
19  M 50-59 Islah Algiers March 2005 
20 M 40-49 Islah Algiers December 
2005 
21 M 40-49 Islah Algiers May 2006 
22  M 50-59 FLN Algiers December 
2005 
23  F 50-59 FLN Algiers November 
2005 
24  M 50-59 Independent Algiers January 2006 
25    Independent  January 2006 
26  M 40-49 FLN Algiers March 2007 
27  M 40-49 FLN Algiers March 2007 





TABLE A2. 5. Constituent Interviews in Algeria 
 
Number Gender Age Function Place Date 
1  M 30-39 Student Outside 
Algeria 
April 2007 
2  M 50-59 Employee Algiers April 2007 
3 M 20-29 Student Oran July 2004 
4  M 30-39 Student Algiers July 2006 
5 M 20-29 Student Algiers April 2007 
6  M 30-39 Student South April 2007 
7 M 50-59 Unknown Algiers May 2006 
8  F 40-49 Employee Algiers April 2007 
9  M 50-59 Professor Algiers March 2007 
10  M 50-59 Taxi Driver Algiers March 2007 
11  F 30-39 Teacher Algiers April 2007 
12 M 50-59 Taxi Driver Algiers April 2007 
13 M 50-59 Employee Algiers April 2007 
14  F 20-29 Employee Algiers April 2007 
15  M 50-59 Employee Algiers March 2007 
 
 
TABLE A2. 6. Observer Interviews in Algeria 
 
Number Gender Age Function Place Date 
1  Male 40-49 Former deputy (1987-
1992) 
Algiers October 2005 
2  Male  50-59 Journalist, political 
scientist 





3  Male 40-49 Party member Algeria April 2007 
4 Male  40-49 Political Scientist Algiers October 2005 
5  M 50-59 Candidate from PRA Algiers March 2007 
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